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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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8 January 1985

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KGB'S AFRICAN POLICY REVIEWED

Paris AFRICAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Nov 84 pp 52, 54

[Article by Pascal Chaigneau: "KGB African Policy"]

[Text] The three main aspects of the Soviet Services overall operations in Africa are: on-site action units, guerilla training, and penetration techniques.

At the level of the on-site units, the Ninth and Tenth Departments of the First Directorate of the KGB, are charged respectively with operations in anglophone and francophone African countries. The Eighth Department has responsibility for the former Portuguese colonies.

Created in 1959, Moscow's Institute of African Studies works closely with these departments and, since 1975, has had one of the largest computerized information banks on Africa today. As for the KGB's Second Directorate, in charge of counter-espionage, it handles the surveillance of African embassies in the Soviet Union, African nationals in the USSR (diplomats, journalists, and students, in particular).

The KGB works directly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which sets forth strategic goals. And the Fifth Division of the GRU (Soviet military intelligence organization) — «Strategic Intelligence in Africa» — illustrates the complementary role of the military services. Within Soviet embassies in Africa, GRU officers are dispatched not only as «military attaches» but also as diplomats together with KGB personnel, whose ranks are swelled by representatives of the press agencies, Tass and Novosti. Tass and Novosti are controlled by KGB General Oudaltsov.

To these must be added the many «cooperation missions», their members, and technical and military advisers, as well as the managerial staff of Intourist agencies.

A more precise idea of the size of the KGB presence in Africa may be had by noting that, according to the most realistic sources, in 1983 some 43,692 Eastern bloc military

personnel and 39,312 «technical and economic advisers» were working in 23 black African countries.

In the Soviet Union, the KGB and the GRU have set up since the sixties various «guerilla training centers», where future leaders of «national liberation movements» are taught. Currently, three such centers may be identified in the USSR: The «Dietsoye» center in Leningrad ; one in Odessa and one in Sigulda, near Moscow.

Six hundred to 800 African nationals (for the most part Namibians) are trained there for an average of nine months every year. As these centers provide the foundation for future socialist elites, they bring up a much larger question — the techniques by which the Soviet operations work.

The KGB uses three main techniques to further its penetration on African soil:

- establishment of a local network,
- setting up of a parallel network and creation of a «pool» of African nationals,
- setting up of African agencies infiltrated by the KGB.

In both functional and chronological terms, support for any KGB action in an African nation is formed by the establishment of a local network, the «Rezidentura». It is set up as soon as diplomatic relations with an African nation begin, with the Soviet embassy and eventual consulates serving as its mainstays. Around these, it attempts to build up influence quickly, as the Soviets realize that a young nation or regime must be caught in its formative stage.

From this point on, Soviet authorities working locally establish a parallel network of African nationals. An essential task of the KGB is recruiting native politicians, managers and technicians. The embassies have funds reserved for this purpose, funds

generally allocated to the second secretary, who is assigned to handle this on-site recruiting.

When it is sufficiently developed, this parallel network is placed under the control of the ambassador, who often has the rank of regional director (for a country or group of countries) of the Soviet secret services (KGB and GRU).

Within the Soviet Union itself, the importance of the KGB's recruitment role is related to the number of nationals of the African country staying in the USSR. The military trainees in the Soviet war schools, the high-level African Communist Party members sent for training, and the students at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow are targets. The «Special African Service» has, as its main mission, the setting up of a pool of national or ethnic «elites» which infiltrate the country's government, and may be used as a replacement pool. This reflects the major concern of the Soviets, in the face of the frequent policy changes by African decision-makers, to make permanent their presence and influence.

In allied countries (Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Benin, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, in particular), the USSR offers to help heads of state establish services, similar to the KGB, as a security measure and a way to eliminate potential opposition. Exportation of the model is systematically accompanied by infiltration of these services by agents under cover, mostly Africans.

The KGB's objective is the disguised annexation of these African services by its own local networks.

Far from having obtained a guarantee of security, the «friendly» head of state has become a pawn in Soviet hands. His room for maneuver or reversal of his ideological and political options is practically zero. Such determinants help him understanding the situations in Congo-Brazzaville, Benin, Angola, and Ethiopia.

The phenomenon is especially pertinent given that the KGB is a master at playing both sides. Even when close ties have been established with an allied regime, Kremlin authorities establish contacts by means of other special services with opponents in exile or local civilian and military opponents.

Preparing for all eventualities, the «sister country» has, by means of a tri-level system, minimized any impulse by the African government to change orientation, while at the same time setting up a range of possible alternatives.

In countries allied with the West, the KGB tends to infiltrate local communist parties,

political groups opposing the regime, and religious minorities.

In socialist-oriented countries, the Soviet presence will again make itself felt in communist parties, by economic and military aid, and by training high-level government officials in Soviet schools and universities.

In countries not oriented toward either of the two blocs, the strategy is based on infiltration, disinformation and recruiting local contractual agents.

The KGB is aided by the support of Eastern European, Cuban, and North Korean secret services.

The coordination of action by the Soviet, Cuban and Eastern European services is handled in Moscow by the Eleventh Department of the First Directorate of the KGB, or «Department of Advisers». Likewise, the resident KGB in each of the capitals of these countries approves the «projects» of each of the services involved.

With regard to its African structure, the KGB has at its disposal a support system which, in combination with its own force, makes it the most important service in this area.

The East German MFS and the Czechoslovakian STB contribute to Soviet penetration and work with the extremely active DGI of Cuba.

A few figures will enable us to size up the current role of the Cubans in sub-Saharan Africa. In military personnel and their agents, there are:

Approximately 20,000 technicians and advisers in Angola, 650 military advisers and officials of the Special Services in Mozambique; more than 6,000 military advisers in Ethiopia, 420 technicians in Tanzania; close to 300 military advisers in the Congo, 250 military advisers in Guinea, 150 military advisers in Equatorial Guinea, 110 military advisers in Sierra Leone; approximately 100 military advisers in Guinea-Bissau, 70 advisers in Sao Tome and Principe, 35 advisers in Madagascar; approximately 20 advisers in Benin.

Oriented basically toward military tasks, the Cubans are to be seen today as the direct extension of the Soviet presence in Africa.

Although Cuba has been «costing» the USSR over a million dollars a day in economic assistance since it became a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Havana is providing, in return, immeasurable support to the Soviet Union in its expansionist policies.

In Africa, the Cubans are used by the Kremlin for military actions in which direct intervention by the Red Army would be

considered unwise.

Anxious to head off any risk of a military putsch, the political decision-makers of African countries of Socialist-orientation have turned to the USSR and Cuba to surround their military institutions with foreign personnel.

But these African leaders have imprisoned themselves in a different kind of risk. They often become dependent on these foreigners who supervise the national armies and, in particular, the presidential guards.

North Korean military services handle Soviet interests in an identical manner. In Madagascar, where the Cuban presence remains especially weak, some 300 military personnel sent from Pyongyang form the guard of President Ratsiraka, for whom they are completing construction of a new palace away from the capital, and whose security will be handled by them.

It can be seen that a number of heads of state have no more than a theoretical margin to maneuver, and it would be wrong to believe that the continued privileged economic relations with the West changes this situation in any way. Whereas the West continues to give economic aid to these countries in an attempt to preserve not only foreign markets, but also political influence (the Congo, Benin, Guinea and Madagascar, in particular, for France), the USSR either directly or by surrogates, has been able to infiltrate the essential power bases at a cost of not more than 0.004 per cent of its GNP in bilateral economic aid to Africa. On this point, Soviet strategy exhibits an incomparable superiority over the West. (*Politique Internationale*, January 1984).

CSO: 3400/335

BRIEFS

HUAMBO TELEVISION--The transmissions of the People's Television of Angola from Huambo town resumed yesterday, covering Huambo and Bie Provinces. The Huambo regional television station installations had been attacked 3 years ago during a criminal action carried out by UNITA, resulting in the disruption of services. The station broadcasts from 1800 to 2130, for about 3 hours and 30 minutes, and covers national and regional events, films feature programs and a newscast with national and local news. [Text] [Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 0500 GMT 15 Dec 84 MB]

CSO: 3442/117

YAOUNDE REPORTS BIYA INTERVIEW WITH RFI

AB162302 Yaounde Domestic Service in French 1200 GMT 16 Nov 84

[Text] Yesterday, President Paul Biya was the guest of Radio France Internationale's [RFI] feature program "Press Club of the Third World." Pending the rebroadcast of the program tomorrow at 1600 [1500 GMT] on Radio France Internationale and at 2015 [1915 GMT] on Radio Cameroon, we will broadcast to you excerpts of the interview. President Biya spoke of moralizing the behaviors and fighting (?tax evasion).

[Begin Biya recording] Our determination to fight fraud is obvious. You know that revenues from customs duties and services have increased significantly because of the extremely harsh measures that have been designed to stem fraud; however, fraud has been prevalent for a long time and cannot be eradicated in a day. It is a big job. We are now working out other measures to further bring the problem under control.

I intend to set up specialized commissions to crack down on defrauders. But once again, we must be realistic. There are 9 million Cameroonians and many businessmen. We cannot assign a policeman to each of our citizens. The fight against fraud is an exacting and long-term task. We are going to continue it. [end recording]

President Paul Biya also answered a question on the (?situation) in state enterprises and joint ventures. Let us listen to him:

[Begin Biya recording] We have undertaken the job of reorganizing these companies. We have appointed a number of executives, whom we found to be honest and very experienced, to head these companies. In the next few weeks, we are expecting a World Bank mission that will assess these companies in order to give us a clear understanding of their situation and to restructure them. So, for us, state enterprises continue to play an important role in Cameroon's economy. But right now, we are also determined to promote the small- and medium-sized enterprises as well as to set up a new investment code.

What I can say is that since the small- and medium-sized enterprises seem to us to be more suitable for what we call a balanced development--because of the social amenities we are going to give them--these enterprises will also enable us to decentralize industries, for as you know, most of the industries in

Cameroon are concentrated in Douala. They are also enterprises whose dimensions will enable Cameroonian businessmen to increasingly participate in the industrial life of the country. In conclusion, therefore, I will say that we give some priority to the small- and medium-sized enterprises, but as far as parastatals are concerned, before we continue to create more, we want to finish the restructuring of existing ones. [end recording]

The issue of oil production, which is a taboo subject for some people, was also discussed by President Paul Biya. He made himself quite clear on this subject.

[Begin Biya recording] As I said in May 1983, I am going to say again here: Cameroon's oil production is modest. I would even say that we should not compare Cameroon's oil production with those of the big world producers we know. Our production can be estimated around 5 million tons [rate not stated] and you know the downward trend of oil prices [words indistinct]. And when we talk of a budget of 620 billion [CFA francs], there are oil taxes that go into it up to an amount of 123 billion CFA francs. Concerning foreign reserves, I can tell you that there is none, because since the oil was discovered, revenue from oil has gone to support current budget and capital investments. We do not have any reserves in the United States. When we get dollars, since we are on the franc zone, we transfer them to our accounts there. We talk about oil production, but in Cameroon we have never wanted to mobilize public opinion around a perishable commodity, a commodity which has no stable price. Cameroon has always based and continues to base its economy on agriculture and industry. [end recording]

Another topic dealt with during this Radio France Internationale "Press Club" program was relations with France. President Biya said relations with France are good and also spoke about what Cameroon expects from the forthcoming symposium on French economic activities in Cameroon.

[Begin Biya recording] What I am expecting from that symposium is first of all the strengthening of the bonds of friendship between France and Cameroon. We are also organizing this symposium to better explain to French businessmen the new measures that have been taken, especially in the fields of investment incentives. We expect French investors to continue to have an interest in the Cameroonian economy and invest in it. France is the first economic partner of Cameroon, and even if there has been some criticisms in the press, this criticism should not compromise this fundamental solidarity. We also believe that with Cameroon's evolution, cooperation between our two countries needs some improvement. First of all, we would like to see the quality of French technical assistants sent to Cameroon upgraded--top executives, management, and in the field of education, for example, we lack mathematics and physics teachers. We are going to send a mission to France to recruit such people. So instead of sending a large number of technical assistants, we would rather have a limited number of technical assistants of high quality. [end recording]

BRIEFS

POPULATION CENSUS IN 1986--The Minister of State for the Plan and Regional Development Mr. Youssoufa Daouda told senior officials of his ministry Tuesday to arm themselves well for the general census of the population due to hold in 1986. Mr. Youssoufa Daouda was addressing central and provincial departmental heads who are currently meeting in Yaounde. The senior officials are expected to work out ways and means of carrying out the 1986 head count of the population as well as look into the sixth five year development plan due to take off in 1987. [Excerpt] [Yaounde CAMEROON TRIBUNE in English 14 Nov 84 p 1]

COOPERATION WITH PRC--Cooperation between China and Cameroon is widening its scope of activities. The Chinese Communist Party [CPC] today presented some works of art to the Cameroonian National Union [UNC]. Mr Miao, the Chinese ambassador to Cameroon, revealed that the gift was worth 10 million CFA francs and consists of decorative objects and handicrafts. Francois Sengat-Kouh, the UNC political secretary, thanked the CPC for the art works and expressed pleasure over the fact that the already fruitful relations between China and Cameroon in the political, economic, technical, and cultural fields continue to grow. [Text] [Yaounde Domestic Service in French 1900 GMT 16 Nov 84 AB]

CSO: 3419/119

300 MILITIAMEN SWORN IN

Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 17 Nov 84 pp 6, 7

[Text] On Sunday of last week, a contingent of over 300 militiamen swore allegiance to the flag, 148 coming from Praia's rural section and the rest from the urban section.

The ceremony, which took place in Varzea Stadium, was headed by Comrade Joaquim Pedro Silva, commander of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARP) and member of PAICV's National Commission. Prominent among the guests of honor were Comrades Agnelo Dantas and Miguel Lima, chief of staff of the FARP and state secretary of fishing, respectively. Also present at the ceremony were several officers and petty officers from the FARP and the Police of Public Order (POP).

After making several comments on the establishment of the militiamen and their role in our society, Pedro Silva said: "This oath is just one of the ways of materializing the principles that we are upholding, extending the social bases of our regime to an increasing extent and affirming them from day to day as institutions that will become consolidated and will always be in the service of the great popular masses." That leader subsequently observed: "The people's militias are playing a significant role in national reconstruction and, alongside the FARP, are participating actively not only in the nation's defense, but also in the concrete tasks involved in socioeconomic development."

Throughout his address, in discussing the quality of the militiaman, Pedro Silva cited discipline as a key factor in the formation of a militiaman and in the discharge of his function in the communities around him.

In conclusion, Pedro Silva, on behalf of the party leadership, addressed a message of thanks to several private entities which, through their lofty show of patriotic responsibility, have excused their employees who are militiamen so that they might undertake their training and social assignments.

It may be recalled that, 2 months ago, a contingent of over 500 militiamen swore allegiance to the flag on the island of Fogo. The ceremonies, which took place in three areas, namely, Sao Filipe, Cova Figueira and Mosteiros, were directed by the chief of the People's Militias Directorate, Antonio Carlos Tavares.

Newly Sworn-In Fraternize With Veterans

It was nearly 0800 hours when the first groups of militiamen who were going to take the oath that day started to arrive. A few moments after their arrival, the head of each platoon began to gather and organize his men in front of the platform. At 1030 hours, the oath-taking ceremony opened, followed by the reading of the message from the newly sworn-in militiamen.

At the conclusion of the ceremony, the then sworn-in contingent made a complete march around the Varzea Stadium, walking in front of the platform of honor to salute the guests present there. Then they left the stadium grounds, holding a brief gathering on the road leading to Cidade de Lisboa Avenue. From there, accompanied by a band, they marched in the direction of Companhia Jaime Mota. The entourage marched along the various streets of our capital. Also parading were the several hundred militiamen from the entire island of Santiago and from a delegation of paramilitary forces from the island of Fogo which had come to the city of Praia to take part in this great event which would later culminate in a get-together luncheon held between the newly sworn-in militiamen and the veterans.

Following the luncheon, there was a cultural afternoon, during which the militiamen from the rural section of Praia had an opportunity to visit some places of interest.

As we learned from the head of the People's Militias Directorate, this luncheon was funded in its entirety by private entities. This goes to show once again the support that certain entities have been giving to the country's party and government structures for the training of paramilitary forces whose function it is to ensure social calm and order.

Upon being approached by our reporter, Antonio Carlos Tavares remarked: "The larger the number of militiamen, the greater the population's intervention in various areas of national reconstruction will be"; adding: "As you know, there cannot be any development without social order. It is in this context that the role of the militiaman in the local structures assumes key importance for national reconstruction."

During our interview with that official, he observed that, with the number of militiamen now sworn in, the POP will have greater support in the areas that they have not yet managed to reach.

Throughout the 6 months of intense training, those paramilitary forces, in addition to having received political training, also learned to coexist with others. According to Carlos Tavares, the organization of the militias "is an authentic school of civic education."

At the present time, only the islands of Sao Nicolau, Maio, Brava and Boa Vista lack militias. The subject of our interview told us that the militias

have not yet been formed on those islands because of the conditions which are adverse for them.

However that official remarked that it is planned to establish paramilitary forces on all the islands by 5 July 1985, as part of the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of national independence.

"Is another incorporation of militiamen planned in the near future?"

"No, we do not intend to have an incorporation just now, except on the islands which do not yet have them. Now, our only concern is to revamp the individuals who have already been trained. This is because we don't want to train militias just for the sake of training; but rather, we want militiamen to have a different image, that is, to be committed to their people and to be defenders of legality." That military leader concluded by saying: "To have people join the ranks of the militias, it is not necessary for them to be members of the mass organizations. So long as they meet the necessary conditions, all individuals who so desire will be accepted. Throughout the training, those people will acquire qualifications for joining the local mass organizations."

2909

CSO: 3442/103

COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY TACTICS DISCUSSED

Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English 19 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial: "The Path of Relevance"]

[Text] Counter-revolutionary forces have their tactics; and they have not relented in applying them against the December 31 Revolution. They have come in various forms aimed at various groups.

Fence sitters should be prevented from taking the side of the revolution by increasing their uncertainty about the process; the revolutionary ranks should be weakened by splitting it into mutually suspicious factions based on such disruptive factors as negative tribal sentiment and pointless ideological flights of imagination.

For those opposed to the revolution from the very beginning, the counter-revolutionary spearhead thrusts at steeling them in their opposition by developing in them the attitude of uninterest in facts--they would have no desire to be told about the merits of the revolution. They don't want to be convinced.

Another area where these forces turn their attention involves national organizations. They do two things. Behind the scene they cause their collaborators to form organizations with various names and for ostensibly good sounding aims, even revolutionary names. But such organizations are in reality cells of reaction.

Attention

The other aspect of the counter-revolutionary agents' attention to national organizations is to prevent already existing ones from joining hands with the progressive forces in support of the revolution. To do this effectively, they try to cause a rift between the leaders of the organizations in order to set up internal factions against those seen as leading the organizations along the revolutionary path. We saw this trend developing within the Ghana Peace and Solidarity Council, and we asked the leaders of the council to tell the nation what was happening.

We told these leaders our feeling that some of them had taken the anti-PNDC attitude, and we asked where they thought such an attitude could lead the council and to what purpose. There was no answer.

But answer or no answer, we believe that in the revolutionary situation all national organizations, particularly those like the Peace and Solidarity Council, which by their nature cannot be apolitical have no relevance if they do not find their strength in the revolutionary cause.

We believe, indeed, that historically the resolution of the internal situation of the Solidarity Council may ultimately present a classic example of the contradictions which must be eliminated one by one in the maturation of the revolution.

CSO: 3400/325

'RAMPANT' EMBEZZLEMENT OF FUNDS WEAKENING COOPERATIVES

Accra GHANAIAAN TIMES in English 23 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Co-operative Cul-de-sac"]

[Excerpt] The Registrar of Co-operatives, Mr S. O. Agyeman, has called for measures that could ensure honesty and a high sense of financial discipline in the operations of co-operative societies. Such measures, he called, should help to check embezzlement of funds and the other malpractices that have become rampant in the co-operative set-ups.

The efficient and effective operation of the co-operative system is a matter of crucial importance for the advancement of the revolution because it affects the whole question of rural development, and therefore, the future of the majority of the people of the nation. In the foreseeable future, the progress of the government's rural development plan will hinge on the co-operative organization of most rural economic efforts that are aimed at meaningfully raising the living standards of the rural communities. Co-operative production enterprises, co-operative marketing endeavours, and other economic activities organized on the co-operative basis are going to be the most rewarding methods by which the mass improvement of rural social life can be most reliably pursued.

In view of the present-day costs, cottage industries, no matter how small-scaled they may be, have little chance of success in individual hands if the rural people should be given the leading participation in the mobilization of their natural resources. In which case, the determination and development of such industries can be fruitfully organized only on the co-operative basis.

If the co-operative distribution system had been allowed by co-operative officers to succeed, the former village consumer shops process would have grown into a success by now, and the present Community Shops system would have had a far easier take-off. But the corrupt manner in which regional co-operative distribution depots were run by the officers throughout the country destroyed that process.

And many of the existing co-operative associations would have grown into better faring enterprises by now if they had not been weakened by so many malpractices indulged in by their various officers.

Since the revolution came, a lot of stress has been put on the efficacy and importance of the co-operative system; but one is still to see concrete evidence that the PNDC's projections for the system are being satisfactorily implemented by those put in charge.

CSO: 3400/325

BRIEFS

RSA TRADE TO CONTINUE--Port Louis--The Mauritian Prime Minister, Mr Aneeroud Jugnauth, has told parliament that Mauritius will maintain its trade links with South Africa. Mr Jugnauth was replying to an opposition question and recalled that Mauritius had many economic problems, and that the government had to act in the interest of the country. "There is nothing to be ashamed of." Regarding the setting up of a Taiwanese commercial representative bureau, he said Mauritius recognised only mainland China, "but there is also a place called Taiwan that exists." He added that Mauritius could gain many advantages from a rapprochement between the private sectors of Taiwan and Mauritius and that the government was in favour of such links.--Sapa. [Text] [Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 27 Nov 84 p 14]

CSO: 3400/317

'PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE' AGAINST REBELS COMMENTED

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 13 Nov 84 p 10

[Article by Antonio Maria Zorro: "The Lisbon Connection Is That of PC-FRELIMO"]

[Text] No denial has been made by the Maputo radio or press of the military success of the guerrillas announced in the most recent communiques from RENAMO [Mozambican National Resistance], specifically, the seizure of the bases in Mueda, Namarroi and Catur, the bombing of the ports of Nacala and Quelimane or the thousand casualties that the rebels claim to have inflicted on the government forces during October. On the other hand, those information sources announced the arrest of another Portuguese, Mario Cabral, a resident of Pemba (formerly Porto Amelia), noting that, before him, another named Rosa had been arrested on charges of having set up a guerrilla camp on his property. If true, it must be a very large property....

The lack of military communiques from FRELIMO forces one to conclude that the only party governing in Mozambique is counting less on combating the rebels with weapons than with psychological warfare. In fact, the government reports are increasingly filled with news of assassinations of foreign cooperants and stories of atrocities committed by the guerrillas. Strangely enough, some of those atrocities (women beaten to death or babes in arms thrown live into fires) are identical to those committed by the Army of Zimbabwe in the Matebelandia area and reiterated some time ago by both the British press and the South African Bishops Conference. Knowing the relations that exist between Zimbabwe and the "Cleanup Brigade" currently in FRELIMO's service to carry out "dirty work," perhaps one could arrive at conclusions that would be discrediting to the Mozambican government authorities.

The psychological warfare waged by Maputo has also continued to develop beyond the Mozambican borders, attempting to convince us of two falsehoods of a typically Marxist type: that there is a "Portuguese component" in RENAMO solely responsible for continuing the fighting and that this component is connected with Lisbon.

"There is, in fact, a Lisbon connection," commented the RENAMO representative for Europe, Jorge Correia, a few days ago, having been asked by us for the viewpoint of the movement headed by Afonso Dlakama; but that connection, which

is becoming increasingly clear, is the one between FRELIMO and Alvaro Cunhal's Communist Party. And it has become increasingly clear from a reading of the Portuguese Communists' newspaper, which has become the loud-speaker for the propaganda from Maputo. It is also a loud-speaker with rather distorted sounds. For example, last week O DIARIO commented on how the names of Vasco Leitaó, Palha Cardoso, Maximo Dias and Armindo Chipenda, individuals whose existence is unknown to us, are associated with RENAMO in Lisbon. Another example: The same newspaper denounced the journalist Alexandre Sloop as a RENAMO collaborator, having put at the latter's disposal his office on Praça das Flores. This is ridiculous, because Alexandre Sloop only serves as representative in Portugal for the news agency United Press, and it is in that capacity that he receives and transmits, when he considers it worthwhile to transmit, the news which RENAMO sends to United Press and to all the news agencies. Furthermore, insofar as I know, Sloop has no office on Praça das Flores. The author of the attempted charge must be rather unfamiliar with the layout of Lisbon, and must be confusing Praça das Flores with Praça da Alegria, where the United Press offices are and have always been located.

FRELIMO Deserters Pretend To Be Persecuted Villagers

In the opinion of Jorge Correia, FRELIMO and its foreign backers are exaggerating in this campaign, which could only be used for internal consumption in this area of Mozambique controlled by the government authorities.

He commented: "There are things that no one with good sense could believe; such as the announced escalation of guerrilla violence against the rural population and the foreign cooperants, particularly the Portuguese. A guerrilla movement needs complete backing from the rural population in order to be able to maintain itself and develop. If there were no other reasons, reasons of an ethical type and of consistency with the RENAMO program, this would suffice to prompt the guerrillas not to torment the rural populace, as FRELIMO is attempting to convince us. The same thing holds true regarding the alleged assassinations of foreign cooperants. Are they deliberate assassinations, apart from the deaths of those who may be occasional victims of guerrilla operations? But for what purpose? What interest could we have in nurturing in this way the image of armed bandits with which the communists insist upon describing us? It would be very stupid on our part. But I have no doubt that FRELIMO will continue to spread slander concerning us."

Jorge Correia reminded us that, at the time of the disappearance of Portuguese and Italian cooperants who, FRELIMO claimed, had been assassinated by rebels, RENAMO declared itself at the disposal of the Lisbon and Rome governments so that they might undertake an "on the spot" investigation. There was no response.

Moreover, as he told us in conclusion, during his recent stay in Pretoria, for reasons of the failed tripartite talks, he learned from the South African vice minister of foreign affairs himself, Louis Nell, that Swaziland had requested South Africa's assistance in solving the problem of the many hundreds of Mozambican refugees in its territory who, FRELIMO's propaganda claims, consist of villagers fleeing from attacks by the resistance movement. "They were not.

Minister Louis Nell was informed by the Swazi authorities that all the refugees were...deserters from the government's forces."

Joana Simeao Has Been Forgotten

Meanwhile, in Maputo, President Samora Machel still has to be concerned with women. Let us explain: This does not involve "Don Juan" demonstrations on the part of the head of state of the People's Republic of Mozambique, nor any sentimental adventures. Samora Machel's concern for women is of a strictly political nature and has obviously totalitarian features.

At the closing of the OMM's [Organization of Mozambique Women] Special Conference, Samora spoke, observing that the women of his country will lose their citizenship if they marry foreigners and that Mozambican men who contract marriage with foreign women would be excluded from government office and from the leading cadres of the single party. When he dresses as a marshal, President Samora orders his uniforms from a London tailor; but when governing is involved, he still dresses in accordance with the most select style of totalitarian regimes.

The OMM's Special Conference (it might be said in this connection) discussed a large number of topics, ranging from adultery to prostitution, and "women's integration into the productive society." However, there was one issue which should concern all the women of Mozambique, and concerning which not a word was spoken: What is the fate of a woman named Joana Simeao, champion of Mozambican independence and leader of an independence movement, who was imprisoned with other party leaders just after the turnover of power to FRELIMO and who since then (nearly 10 years have elapsed) has mysteriously (or to speak clearly, criminally) disappeared?

2909

CSO: 3442/103

SIX SCENARIOS OF FAMINE SITUATION IN VARIOUS REGIONS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 17 Nov 84 p 15

[Text] Famine in Mozambique: a First Example

Over 3 million people run the risk of starving to death in Mozambique if the international community does not promptly supply backing in the form of food and other types of assistance.

This number is recorded in the latest report from the coordinating office for United Nations activities in the People's Republic of Mozambique, one of the countries hardest hit by the drought in Africa and the third largest beneficiary, following Ethiopia and Zaire, of UN assistance, amounting to over \$40 million per year.

The consequences of the drought are particularly severe in Mozambican territory because of what the report describes as a "serious security situation," caused by the battles between the Armed Forces and the members of Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), as well as scattered groups of attackers.

The drought has particularly struck five of Mozambique's 10 provinces: Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Sofala and Tete, and the most serious security problems exist in the provinces of Manica and Sofala, according to the same document.

It is estimated that over 100,000 people fled to Zimbabwe from Tete Province alone during recent months, the document emphasizes, citing an example of the serious situation occurring in the region.

It is in the southern part of Manica Province that the famine and security situation appears most serious, and where the action of the Mozambican Red Cross and League of Red Cross Associations is preventing what the one in charge of the nutritional camp in Nachaze described as "an imminent massacre."

Famine in Mozambique: a Second Example

When the members of the Red Cross arrived in the region, according to the same official, "An average of five children were dying every day; the diseases of dysentery, tuberculosis and malaria were proliferating; and most of the adults survived only by eating roots and leaves of some still green plants."

Machaze is surrounded by dozens and dozens of kilometers of sandy soil, and the trees and other plants, once green, now have a grayish and completely dry appearance, and for this reason many people were forced to walk over 60 kilometers per day even to find anything green, wasting the little energy that they still had.

It has not rained for 3 years in the southern part of Manica. Eight wells 40 meters deep are dry, and only five of the seven pumps existing in a similar number of wells in which the water is in small supply and yellow are operating.

During September, an emergency operation was mounted to save the largest possible number of people. But in Manica, as in many other parts of the country, it is impossible to travel along a road, owing to the unpredictable ambushes of the so-called "armed bandits."

The roads in Manica, a province in which first Ian Smith's forces and later those of RENAMO triggered the first armed operations against Mozambique, are now completely mined and there are frequent explosions and cases of amputation of lower limbs.

In early October, a military column with supply trucks left Chimoio, farther to the north, where a warehouse has been set up for the Red Cross operation, in the direction of Machaze, took 10 days to cover 90 kilometers and lost two heavy vehicles destroyed by antitank mines.

Famine in Mozambique: a Third Example

Thus, the operation is being carried out almost exclusively by air, with a DC-3 (Dakota) chartered from the United States, and a crew from Botswana, which makes from four to six trips daily in the triangle comprised of Machaze, Chimoio and Beira.

Thousands of tons of corn, powdered milk, codfish, blankets, soap, machetes and seed, among other products, are carried to the region every day in this way; and, as the head of the Machaze nutritional center remarked: "It may now be claimed that we have succeeded in preventing the massacre which the deaths of at least 10,000 people in slightly over a month would constitute."

At this center, consisting of a warehouse, a house, a makeshift rooming center and a few stores, there are 70 children still lodged, many of whom still eat only milk and porridge seven times a day, because their bodies cannot withstand any other kind of heavier food.

Despite the fact that it has been operating for over a month, one can still observe the obvious signs of malnutrition: the swollen stomachs, the symptoms of "marasmus," the constant coughing and the lack of weight.

An eight-year old boy was taken in weighing only 4 kilograms, lacking the ability to speak or make motor movements. Nearly 45 days later, he laughs at the table when he sees in front of him a plate with corn mush, sugar and oil.

Besides these cases, considered the most serious, the Mozambican Red Cross collaborators provide three servings of milk per day to another 900 children under 10 years of age distributed in three camps situated around the nutritional center, as well as corn, milk, codfish, medicines and blankets, in addition to seed and machetes, to a total of 15,000 people scattered among villages located in a circle 80 kilometers in diameter.

Famine in Mozambique: a Fourth Example

A total of 127 persons from the locality of Mutanda headed toward Machaze, making a 32-kilometer hike through the jungle to escape from the mines on paths and roads.

They were all the able-bodied people from the village, men, women and children, who came to the Machaze center seeking the month's food for the village.

One of the men disclosed: "The only ones who didn't come are those who could no longer walk, because they were too weak or ill; and there are more than 500 of us in Mutanda alone."

For 24 hours, they rested out in the open (despite the fact that it was the coolest season, with the temperature exceeding 30 degrees centigrade at 0900 hours); and the next morning they received the provisions.

"We have to make several trips, because we cannot carry so much weight," remarked another villager, after the first "matabicho" (light lunch) that he had had "in I don't know how long."

A few meters away, about 100 women and children were waiting for the old pump installed by the Portuguese nearly 40 years ago to draw from the well, at an exasperating pace, a pail of almost brackish water.

The distribution was quick and orderly: 5 kilograms of corn for grinding and 1 kilogram of dried fish (codfish) per person per month (half of the minimum essential for survival). "But until a new supply arrives, what we have has to suffice for everyone," explained the head of the Machaze center. "At least for a few days no one will go without eating, and this is enough to prevent their dying of starvation."

This type of operation takes place nearly every day, covering over 1,000 people, primarily from Bassane, Tucotuco, Chipoje and Mutanda.

Famine in Mozambique: a Fifth Example

In the Machaze area the death rate has declined to limits considered moderate, and at the health center, where a 24-year old youth with a 14-months nursing course taken in Chimoio is "jack-of-all trades," there are a few cases of tuberculosis, premature birth, injuries and other more or less serious illnesses.

"The problem now is the Cjidoco area, 90 kilometers from Machaze and 15 from the border, where we don't know how many people are dying of starvation; although the latest information indicates a dozen per day."

A few days before leaving for the region with a Red Cross team, the head of the Machaze center commented: "The roads are not safe and there is no air strip; and so we are going to try to reach there by land from Zimbabwe. I shudder just thinking of what we are going to find."

These are but a few isolated examples of a situation with dimensions little known in Mozambique as yet. But we can imagine what is happening in the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala and Tete, where the drought persists.

The seed that has been distributed will continue to hope for a few drops of rain. But if the rain does not arrive, the 19 non-governmental organizations from a similar number of countries, and the Mozambican executive body and authorities will hardly succeed in preventing many thousands of lives from being lost as a result of famine.

Famine in Mozambique: a Sixth Example

At the present time, 3 million people in Mozambique need immediate assistance and support; and many more millions of Mozambicans may perhaps not be at death's door, but they are surviving on tea, kale and a little cornmeal as their only food.

2909

CSO: 3442/103

MNR DEFECTOR CONSTANTINO REIS DESCRIBES CAREER IN MNR

Reveals MNR Connections

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 2 Dec 84 p 2

[Text]

MAPUTO -- Convicted spy Roland Hunter was also the paymaster of a rebel radio station broadcasting anti-Frelimo propaganda into Mozambique while he was a member of the Defence Force.

This startling claim of pre-Nkomati Accord subterfuge was made this week by a former rebel broadcaster who defected to Maputo.

Mr Constantino Reis (25), now in the custody of the Mozambique security service, Snasp, claimed in an interview with the Sunday Star Foreign News Service in Maputo that Hunter regularly paid out the R400 a month salary he and other Mozambicans on the station staff received from a special SADF fund.

Mr Reis said he crossed into South Africa via Swaziland with the help of the Portuguese consulate in Mbabane and was offered help with his studies on condition he joined the anti-Frelimo Mozambique National Resistance (MNR).

He did so and moved onto a smallholding about 45km from Pretoria with MNR Secretary-General Orlando Cristina, Adriano Bomba, the Mozambican Air Force pilot who defect-

ed to South Africa in his MiG-19, Bomba's brother Fransisco and several others who worked for the radio station.

Reis said there was conflict as well as co-operation between MNR leaders and their South African contacts.

Disputes had occurred over the proceeds of large-scale ivory smuggling out of Mozambique which began in 1983.

There were also arguments over targets. MNR leaders were against hitting the Beira-Mutare pipeline or the Beira-Malawi railway but the South Africans had insisted, he said.

Cristina always agreed with the South Africans while Dhlakama took a more independent line, Reis said.

But, he added, it was useless to argue because the South Africans simply went ahead and carried out the attacks themselves.

They used special troops separate from the new Mozambican recruits who were given special training, he said.

The recruits were brought to Phalaborwa after being fetched by sea from the Dondo area on the Mozambican coast.

The rebel's regular contacts in South Africa included a Major Keyser, a man called Van Niekerk, a Sergeant-Major

de Bruyn, a Lieutenant Johan, an Angolan called Monteiro, and Roland Hunter, who was jailed later for passing information about SADF activities.

The station also received news of MNR activities from the organisation's Phalaborwa base each week.

Reis said there were well established connections between West Germany and the MNR.

Seven study places were reserved each year for MNR members who did courses in politics in what Reis described as a "private university". In 1982 the MNR held crucial leadership conferences in Germany.

A further conference took place in Bonn in March, 1983 at which elections were held for leading positions in the rebel movement.

Reis said the Nkomati Accord led to many desertions from the MNR into Zimbabwe and Malawi.

● It was alleged during Hunter's trial that he communicated with the ANC while employed as a military intelligence clerk during his National Service.

Tells About Radio Hate

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 2 Dec 84 p 21

[Text] THE SUNDAY STAR investigation into mysterious subversive broadcasts hostile to Southern African governments has uncovered a wealth of detail, including the interview below with a former rebel radio operator now being detained in Maputo. The BBC Monitoring Service has confirmed that at least two emanate from South Africa. And experts believe many more are operating from a central base in the Transvaal. Stay tuned as we probe the background of these propaganda machines that are spewing out messages of subversion and fear.

MAPUTO — Former Mozambique rebel broadcaster Constantino Reis told The Sunday Star this week about his work in the shadows for the rebel radio station, "Radio Free Africa", known in Mozambique as the "Voice of the Hyena".

Reis, a prisoner of the Mozambican security service, Snasp, described — in the presence of a Snasp guard — how he fled from Mozambique because of "political problems" and joined the Mozambique National Resistance in South Africa.

At the Portuguese embassy in Swaziland he said he was told that while he could not be given a Portuguese passport there was "another way" in which he could continue to study.

This led "via Johannesburg". He agreed and was taken to the SA border at Komatipoort. Two South Africans then drove him to Johannesburg where he was handed over to a Portuguese hotelier. He was interviewed by Francisco Bomba, elder brother of the pilot Adriano who defected to South Africa in a MiG 19 jet.

Bomba said Reis could continue his university studies on condition he joined the MNR.

Then he was interviewed by MNR Secretary-General Orlando Cristina and the movement's president Alfonso Dhlakama.

In October, 1982 Reis said he was taken to Pretoria to work as a broadcaster on The Voice of Free Africa, the MNR radio station.

He said he moved to a small-holding about 45 km from Pretoria which housed Cristina, the Bombas and about six others who worked on the station. He prepared taped news broadcasts compiled from BBC, Radio RSA, Radio Mozambique and Voice of America news bulletins.

Then tapes were made in a luxury car fitted out with recording equipment. There were no studios.

The station also received news of MNR activities from its Phalaborwa base each week.

He said they later moved into a Pretoria building housing the offices of the Angolan rebel movement UNITA and the Muzorewa auxiliary forces that fled to South Africa after Zimbabwean independence.

But work came to an abrupt halt after the murder of Cristina on April 17, 1983.

Reis was at the farm when the assassination, still clouded in mystery, occurred. The radio team was told that the murder had brought unwelcome publicity to the farm and it was moved to a new MNR camp at Pietersburg in June, 1983. They were then taken to camps at Messina and Phalaborwa.

Later, he said, the team was taken to a small airstrip in a mountainous region and boarded an aircraft which took them to the Gorongosa game park in Mozambique's Sofala Province. Dhlakama and the Bombas were living there with their families.

He spent a year at Gorongosa and at a lesser base at Pungwe. He

said he became critical of the MNR over this period.

When he warned the MNR soldiers that the South Africans would abandon them he said he was jailed and beaten.

While decyphering incoming messages from Dhlakama, Reis said he found one suggesting that he (Reis) should be shot.

He decided to flee. Meanwhile, The Voice of Free Africa team was disbanded but a new group named Voice of the Resistance was formed and kept in reserve at Pietersburg, Reis said.

Reis slipped out of the Gorongosa base at night and made his way to the Caia district on the Zambezi River. He gave himself up to the Mozambican authorities in Tete province. — Foreign Service.

BRIEFS

BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE, HILLSAM AGREEMENT--Hill Samuel and the Bank of Mozambique have signed a clearing account agreement to facilitate bilateral trade between the two countries. The arrangement applies essentially to basic commodities but can be used for eligible capital items. The terms of the agreement are confidential but will basically involve the offsetting of imports and exports with a "swing" or imbalance being allowed up to certain limits. Mr Barry Mason, deputy managing director of Hill Samuel, who negotiated the agreement, says the agreement is expected to bring about an expansion of trade between the two countries. "Reciprocal trading techniques, of which the Mozambique clearing agreement is an example, represent an effective way of doing business with African countries and should assist in developing relationships between South Africa and these countries," says Mr Mason. Hillsam has become increasingly active in countertrade and non-conventional trade financing techniques in South Africa. The bank is currently involved in a major countertrade research programme in which a number of South Africa's major corporations are taking part. Moreover, the bank recently formed a joint venture with Creditanstalt, of Austria, to assist South African companies in increasing their trade with non-traditional and sensitive markets. In terms of this venture, a range of non-traditional trading techniques is available to South African exporters, including non-recourse financing, barter trade, counter purchase, parallel deals, buy backs and offset agreements. Up to 30 percent of world trade is carried out in the form of non-conventional trade agreements. [Text] [Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 4 Dec 84 p 3]

USSR CONSUL OPENS EXHIBITION--(Epyin Pyikorenko), the USSR consul general to Mozambique, last week began a working visit to Niassa Province. On 5 December (Epyin Pyikorenko) opened a literary exhibition in Lichinga with books on the social, political, and cultural life of the USSR. During the exposition's opening ceremony, the USSR consul general to Mozambique made a brief presentation on the life of the Soviet people. The occasion was attended by USSR guest workers working in Niassa Province in the field of education. [Text] [Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0800 GMT 10 Dec 84 MB]

CHISSANO LAUDS ITALIAN AID--Cooperation between Mozambique and Italy has grown significantly over the past 4 years in sectors that serve our interests. According to Minister of Foreign Affairs Joaquim Chissano, there are important projects under way in our country which are landmarks in the relations between Mozambique and Italy. Not only that, it is a cooperation based on the mixing of the blood of the Mozambican and Italian peoples, the head of the Mozambican diplomacy said at a farewell dinner he gave in Maputo last night to the outgoing Italian ambassador. Minister Chissano praised the role played by the Italian diplomat in promoting that cooperation between the two countries during his 4-year assignment in Maputo. Patrizio Schmidlin, outgoing Italian ambassador, expressed the hope that the Mozambican people will overcome their problems through the process of national reconstruction. [Text] [Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0400 GMT 11 Dec 84 MB]

CSO: 3442/110

NAMIBIA

BRIEFS

NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT SEAT SHIFTED--Windhoek, 7 Dec (SAPA)--The SWA/Namibian seat of government shifted from Windhoek to Swakopmund today. A spokesman for the office of the administrator-general, said Dr Willie van Niekerk and his office would move back to Windhoek on 14 January. The annual change-over dates from the German colonial period in SWA/Namibia, when the administration moved to the coast to escape the heat of summer in the interior.

[Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1005 GMT 7 Dec 84 MB]

CSO: 3400/331

CONSUMER GOODS TO BE CALLED 'SCARCE' NOT 'ESSENTIAL'

AB041345 Paris AFP in English 0345 GMT 4 Dec 84

[Text] Lagos, Dec 4 (AFP)--A wide range of consumer goods, including rice, detergents, soap, milk and other provisions previously tagged "essential" are henceforth to be known and referred to as "scarce" commodities in Nigeria, in keeping with the military administration's War Against Indiscipline (WAI) campaign.

The WAI crusade, inaugurated last March, is being launched in phases, each focussed on a specific theme. The stated aim is a national ethical reorientation and promotion of ideal social values. The latest phase on "nationalism and patriotism" makes it mandatory for large public and private establishments to fly Nigeria's green-white-green national flag on their premises. The memorisation of the pledge and Nigeria's two-verse national anthem is also emphasized.

The WAI operations office, which ordered the substitution of "essential" for "scarce" [as received] in the reference to the listed goods, said Monday that only a negligible minority of the urban and elite members of society bought the so-called "essential goods."

The name change has become necessary because of the "life and death" connotation ascribed to such commodities, the office said, adding that the goods were "scarce, but are in no way essential to the survival of Nigerians."

Before now, almost all conceivable consumer items, including foodstuffs, were branded "essential" here, but ironically, such goods have been priced beyond the reach of ordinary citizens against a background of a national economic squeeze fueled by galloping inflation. Shortages have often been blamed on hoarding, and observers have noted little or no improvement despite stepped up government efforts, including the massive importation of the items. Press reports abound of huge scrambles at occasional public sales, which often leave a majority of the anxious public with little or no commodities at the end of the day.

The Lagos administration has meanwhile said it would stop the importation of rice and other food items as soon as local production met demand.

CSO: 3400/301

PROBLEM IN AJAOKUTA STEEL MILL NOTED

Kano SUNDAY TRIUMPH in English 4 Nov 84 p 12

[Article by Samson Namo]

[Text] CONTRARY to widespread expectation, the nation's dream for her industrialisation via the Ajaokuta Steel Company may, not after all be a reality for a long time to come.

This is because work on the Itakpe Iron Ore which, according to surveys by experts, harbours vast deposits of iron ore, and will supply all raw material requirements of both the Ajaokuta and Delta Steel Plants, is yet to take off.

As of now, construction works for the industrial plants and the Osara Dam, necessary for the take off of the Itakpe Mines which normally should have preceded those at Ajaokuta and Delta Steel plants, have not even started.

Inquiries reveal that the Itakpe contracts which are worth ₦130 million were signed in July 1983 after a foreign consulting firm had advised the ousted civilian government about the durability of the Itakpe mines to our steel economy.

The sites for the construction were cleared in September last year and had since remained fallow.

It was further learnt that the consultants advised that a ₦60 million rail line be constructed from the Itakpe mines to link Ajaokuta (a distance of about 70 kilometres) for easy evacuation of blasted iron ore to the steel plants.

The Sofre Mines of Paris, France, who are the project consultants further discovered that the Itakpe iron deposits were enough to last another 25 years even with an annual extraction of 2.135 million tonnes of ore for the steel plants.

In the original plan envisaged, the Itakpe mines were to have commenced full production by the first quarter of this year but with the absence of industrial plants and related civil works, what it now means is that the entire project would have to be rescheduled whenever the federal government indicates its interest for it.

The appointment tour undertook, however, revealed that even with the absence of sufficient funds and equipment from the government, the Iron Ore Company has constructed 3.5 kilometres of access roads round the hilly mining sites through direct labour.

Some of the engineers and geologists I spoke to at the mining site, told me that if only standard mining could be provided, the company was set to extract the quantity that would meet the projected annual 2.135 million tonnes of iron ore.

None of the management staff of both the Ajaokuta Company and Itakpe Iron Ore was prepared to speak to me on the issue on account of a recent circular from Lagos banning them from speaking to the press.

CSO: 3400/302

GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY OWES 325 MILLION NAIRA FOR ABUJA

Kano SUNDAY TRIUMPH in English 4 Nov 84 p 1

[Article by Emmanuel Yawe and Aminu Ibrahim]

[Text] THE Federal Government still owed 325 million Naira to contractors for work already done at the new federal capital, Abuja.

The Minister for the Federal Capital Territory, Major-General Mamman Vatsa, told the Sunday Triumph that the Federal Military Government has accepted the liability.

He said the ministry was conducting a supervision exercise to ensure that work done was equal to that amount. He revealed that ₦900 million had already been paid out to contractors for work already done.

According to the minister ₦1.3 billion has so far been spent in executing the projects. He said the ₦1.3 billion included salaries, personal emoluments, consultancy fees, construction of roads and buildings well as satellite towns.

The minister said he had introduced a new system of cross-checking work done at the new Federal Capital. The new system, according to him involves field officers charged with checking work done and subsequently submitting their reports. The reports are then passed on to audit department which cross-checks the work and submits relevant documents to the accounts officer, who will again cross-check before making payments.

On the accounting system in the ministry, the minister blamed the fraudulent practices in the past on the FCTA (Federal Capital Territory Authority) which he discribed as an 'illegal baby'. He said the FCTA was established with no legal backing as a result of which it perpetuated fraud.

He said, the situation was further compounded by the confusion between the FCDA (Federal Capital Development Authority) and the Ministry for Federal Capital Territory.

He said the Ministry for Federal Capital Territory and the FCDA had only one accounting officer in the person of the permanent secretary. It was

difficult, he explained, for the permanent secretary to account for expenditures in the ministry and the FCDA.

The ministers said that a managing director has now been appointed to be the chief executive and accounting officer of the FCDA, while the Permanent Secretary would be the accounting officer of the ministry only.

CSO: 3400/302

MINISTER PREDICTS WEAK OIL MARKET UNTIL 1990

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 22 Nov 84 p 1

[Text] THE oil market is likely to remain relatively slack up to the end of this decade, before a positive rise in demand for Nigeria's oil.

Giving the warning in Lagos yesterday, Petroleum and Energy Minister, Professor Tam David-West suggested that Nigeria "must therefore study and introduce appropriate market flexibilities to enable her remain competitive in the market and guarantee a reasonable level of oil revenue, to help the country out of the present economic predicament."

The minister was addressing the Executives of the Business International Group of Companies held at the Eko Holiday Inn, Victoria Island, yesterday.

Realities

Professor David-West's address titled "Energy Prospects and Policies" delved into an examination of Nigeria's energy sources, uses and options.

He said that Nigeria would continue to work consistently within OPEC, because the country has no alternative to the organisation. He said that independent actions taken occasionally in response to market realities should not be misconstrued as affronts to OPEC.

The Minister said that Nigeria plans to ensure that the LNG project is prosecuted, so as to be on stream by the turn of the decade, when there are prospects for high demand for gas.

Professor David-West said that Nigeria shall continue to implement the petrochemical plans which will provide raw materials and lay the foundations for industrial take-off. He attributed the problems of industrialisation to lack of provision for indigenous raw materials.

He urged the Business International Group to interact with the Government by letting the Administration know the conditions which would help them supplement Government's efforts in the task of revamping the economy.

CSO: 3400/302

IDIAGBON WARNING TO STEEL WORKERS NOTED

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 30 Oct 84 p 5

[Article by Yinka Geudon]

[Text] ALL categories of workers in the Ajaokuta Steel Rolling Mill have been warned by the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, to desist from all actions inimical to the smooth running of the plant.

Addressing the workers at Ajaokuta at the weekend, the Chief of Staff said the workers should accept the views of the Federal Military Government on our steel industry as a vital point of economic take-off for the country, on which progress should be rapid and unhindered.

The recent staff changes in the establishment, he said, was designed to overhaul general administration of the plant with a basic aim of ensuring safety of huge resources being invested.

"Let me assure you that the strengthening of the management remains a continuous exercise and all staff members must give maximum support to the new leadership to obtain results as envisaged," Brigadier Idiagbon said.

For those who strove to record good performance and efficiency, the Chief of Staff assured instant recognition and reward from the government.

"But any worker who poses any kind of threat to the effective operation of the plant would be seriously dealt with. It is very unfortunate that in the recent past some Nigerians who have stolen the nation's money and engaged in rough mismanagement have sought to cover up by burning public property," he said.

He remarked that what was painful was that such bad citizens had failed to realise that most of the public property they set ablaze were components of priority projects undertaken at huge cost either by belt tightening and shelving of other projects or through foreign loans.

Brigadier Idiagbon said such activities should be seen by all as a serious act of economic sabotage which represented a definite clog on the wheels of Nigeria's progress and this must be contained at all cost.

MINISTER: NIGERIAN PRESS STILL HAS COLONIAL MENTALITY

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 30 Oct 84 p 8

[Text] GROUP Captain Emeka Omeruah, Minister of Information, Social Development, Youth, Sports and Culture, said in Lagos on Sunday that the press in Nigeria had not changed from the "bring-down syndrome" of the pre-independence era before the military administration came to power.

Group Capt. Omeruah, who was speaking on a television programme to mark the 25th anniversary of television in Nigeria, expressed regret that even after independence, the Nigerian press still looked at the government as something that should be brought down.

He said while the system employed by the founding fathers of the press in Nigeria could be justified under a colonial government, the same situation could no longer be justified now.

The minister said before the promulgation of Decree 4, the Press was in a riotous situation but that with the law, an element of maturity had emerged because people had started to respect what was printed on the pages of Nigerian newspapers.

He said civil servants were not barred from speaking to the press or giving their views on any issue and that it was not true that "even when journalists publish the truth, it is still punishable if it embarrasses a public official", pointing out that "if truth is printed you have no case to answer".

On the broadcast of commercials by radio stations, he said it had been agreed that only state radio stations should continue to handle advertisements.

The minister said no private individual had come forward to ask for licence to operate a television station and repeated government's willingness to consider such request on its merit.

Group Capt. Omeruah said since independence, no leadership in Nigeria had been called upon to give account of its stewardship, adding that the present administration was the first to introduce accountability by the leadership.

The minister said Nigeria could produce a workable political system if the communality in its citizens was developed.

He commended what he called the vanguard role played by the press in the WAI campaign and urged the press to take the war to the grassroots.

CSO: 3400/302

LOCAL PRODUCTION OF EXPLOSIVES, ARMS, AMMUNITION BEGINS

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 9 Nov 84 pp 1, 2

[Article by Omafume Amurun]

[Text] THE Defence Industries Corporation (DIC) has begun local production of military explosives, personal arms and ammunition, Head of State, Major-General Buhari, has disclosed.

Speaking at this year's five-day Chief of Army Staff Annual Conference which began at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) in Lagos yesterday, he said this was the first step towards the complete production of a wide range of military hardware.

He said it was the intention of the Federal Government to ensure that the DIC met its obligation in manufacturing small ammunition for the army in the nearest possible future because according to him, similar establishments in other parts of the world have already made their countries self-sufficient in defence production.

General Buhari said the local manufacture of some components and spare parts are envisaged in the next two years and the research and development directorate of the DIC has been set up to effect modifications to equipment.

The head of state also said the equipment procurement system in the armed forces was being reorganised to ensure standardisation within the three services.

He said that test and evaluation processes would also be perfected to ensure that those introduced would meet our weather and terrain peculiarities.

On maintenance, he said servicing of vehicles and equipment should be done on schedule and that the army could not afford to replace any equipment damaged through neglect.

General Buhari enjoined the conference to introduce joint exercises at all levels of training in the three services.

He said this would "result not only in professional proficiency but in extending the esprit-de-corps that exists between you and your colleagues in the sister services."

The head of state commended the proposal to set up a joint research development, training and evaluation department at the Ministry of Defence.

He said this was bound to prove invaluable in the modernisation efforts of the armed forces.

General Buhari said he was aware that contingency plans have been made against possible insurrections and external aggressions.

He also advised soldiers to be vigilant at all times and to report to higher authorities unusual movements because, according to him, there were enemies who would not relent in their efforts to destabilise the nation.

General Buhari called on formation and unit commanders to educate their men to maintain discipline in barracks and to ensure that they were the flagbearers for the War Against Indiscipline (WAI).

"It must be impressed on all officers and soldiers that it is their responsibility to protect their civilian brothers rather than terrorise them", he added.

General Buhari said the standard of training in various army institutions had a lot of room for improvement.

He said this could be achieved by deploying the right calibre of officers and non-commissioned officers to these institutions.

He said it was the policy of the present government to encourage serving officers and soldiers to gain the required knowledge from institutions of higher learning.

General Buhari said the school of electrical and mechanical engineering should be expanded and adequately equipped for this purpose.

He reiterated that the nation's borders would remain closed until a workable arrangement was reached between us and our neighbours on trade.

In his address, the Chief of Army Staff, Major-General Ibrahim Babangida assured the head of state that in the Nigerian Army, he had a very strong, loyal and reliable constituency.

He said General Buhari was an outstanding soldier whose records of service and performance were tagged with practical innovations to motivate troops.

He said, "I am assuring you without any iota of doubt that you have complete support of the officers and soldiers of the Nigerian Army in all the programmes you are executing for Nigeria and her people."

BRIEFS

RELIGIOUS FANATICISM--THE military administration is poised to evolve ways of eradicating religious fanaticism throughout the country, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Maj.-Gen. Muhammed Magoro, has said in Yola. Maj.-Gen. Magoro who visited the Lamido of Adamawa, Alhaji Aliyu Mustafa, in his palace, described as "unfortunate", the Maitatsine religious disturbances which claimed many lives. Welcoming the minister, the Lamido commended the military administration for the high regard it accorded traditional rulers. Meanwhile, Maj.-Gen. Magoro has directed that details of the four Malian children who were remanded in connection with the Maitatsine riots be forwarded to him urgently so that he could contact the Malian embassy. [Text] [Enugu DAILY STAR in English 14 Nov 84 p 16]

14 MAITATSINE SUSPECTS HELD--A Maitatsine type of scare has hit yet another town in Gongola state. There was a stampede in Numan town, 60 km south of Yola as rumours of a possible religious uprising spread in the state. Non-indigenes left the town, in a hurry. Meanwhile, 14 suspects believed to be Maitatsine followers have been arrested. All of them had marks generally held to be peculiar to followers of the sect that caused the death of nearly 800 people in an earlier uprising in the Gongola state capital. Dangerous weapons were found on them. The facts of the fresh scare, were reported by the sole administrator for Numan Local Government, Mr. Joseph Audu, to Governor Muhammadu Jega who promptly, when to the town to assess the situation. Mr. Audu said that he had received reports on Thursday night of infiltration into Numan town by suspected members of fanatical sect. NSO officials and the police rounded up 10 suspects at Ngbalang at a road block near Numan, he said, adding that four others were later arrested. [Ibrahim Auduson] [Text] [Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 11 Nov 84 p 3]

BRIBERY SCANDAL--A N1 million bribe scandal involving some ex-politicians in Bendel State may soon blow into the open. The scandal which has to do with the purchase and supply of free books to schools in the state affects some contractors. The state governor, Brigadier J. T. Useni made this known to the Daily Times, while commenting on the problems which the state government was encountering over free books supplied to schools by the civilian administration. "Although, the report of the panel which probed the purchase and supply of free books has not been deliberated upon by the state executive council, I already know that over N1 million was given as kick-backs. I have also known those who gave and those who took." Governor Useni wondered how the state

government could be owing as much as N8 million on the purchase of books alone, when the books so purchased were no where to be found. He spoke of how some middlemen increased the prices of books indiscriminately, adding that some schools that were supposed to be supplied with 5,000 books only received 2,000. [Text] [Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 23 Nov 84 p 32]

NEW OIL POLICY--NEW procedures for allocating areas for further exploration and production of petroleum in the Chad Basin will soon be announced by the Federal Government. In this direction, the NNPC has already established two seismic data acquisition crew and has carried petroleum exploration into the Chad Basin and Benue Trough. Disclosing this at the second yearly conference of the Nigerian Association of Petroleum Exploration in Lagos yesterday, the Minister of Petroleum, Professor Tam David-West said the government would step up its effort in the field of oil exploration. Prof. David-West observed that the reduction in the production of oil was in response to the depressed world market demand, "But need we accept that the drastic reduction in petroleum exploration can be explained in the same manner?", he queried. Professor David-West then raised the following posers which he said the association would examine critically. *Is it in fact a reasonable answer when we know that petroleum exploration today is the insurance we take against the early exhaustion of our petroleum resources in future? *What can we as a nation do to revive petroleum exploration? *How do we go about acquiring petroleum exploration technology and domesticating it? *How do we ensure that every square metre of sedimentary basin within the confines of this country and our continental shelf is thoroughly explored? *Are our Oil Exploration Licence (OEL) and Oil Prospection Lease (OPL) regulations adequate to meet the challenges of the eighties and nineties? [Text] [Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 28 Nov 84 p 1]

DROP IN IMPORTS--NIGERIA'S imports from Italy have declined by about 50 per cent following the Federal Government's restriction on the in-flow of goods, Dr. Francesco Mazzola, Italian Minister of State for External Trade, said on Tuesday in Lagos. At an informal meeting with Italians resident in Nigeria, Dr. Mazzola said the imports included investment goods and machinery. He said Italy imported crude oil worth about one billion dollars (about N750 million) from Nigeria annually, adding that there was scope for improvement in the trade relations between the two countries. [Text] [Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 29 Nov 84 p 13]

OIL PRICE FALL PREDICTED--OIL prices will continue to fall and OPEC will remain under pressure for, at least, the next three years, according to a Financial Times of London analysis published on Tuesday. Oil has now become a commodity market in which prices will fluctuate considerably, the paper said. The analysis, prepared by the US-based Cambridge Economic Research Associates and City of London Stockbrokers, gave data to suggest that "in the next three years, the likeliest trading range (for oil) is 18 to 22 dollars a barrel". Prices would remain weak even if the Gulf War continued because of high non-OPEC production and surplus refinery capacity, the report said. Oil consumption was also said to be likely to grow at a yearly rate of between 1 per cent and 2 per cent in the next three years. This would give additional amount of between 2.1 million barrels per day (BPD) to 2.8 million BPD to world

consumption in the period, the report said. Non-OPEC producers were expected to contribute around 0.8 million BPD, leaving only two million BPD of additional production for OPEC in the period. "The result will be OPEC's deepening dilemma--how to parcel out a miserly increase in demand during a period in which many of its members expect and need increased revenues," the report added. [Text] [Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 30 Nov 84 p 1]

CSO: 3400/303

DIFFERENCES AMONG UNION LEADERS DISCUSSED

Dakar AFRICA in French Nov 84 pp 33-35

[Article by B Boris Diop: "Trade Unions: The Battle of Leaders"]

[Text] The National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS) is experiencing its most serious crisis since its creation in 1968. It is difficult to say whether it is due to quarreling among individuals or a struggle among factions. B Boris Diop tried to understand this battle of leaders in which, according to him, the ruling Socialist Party is not always an impartial arbitrator.

It is true that the Labor Exchange located 15 Escarfait Street does not look like much. Despite its long, somber corridors and decaying walls, this modest two-story building is headquarters to Senegal's most powerful trade union, the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS), affiliated to the ruling party.

The opponents of its present secretary general, Madia Diop, had told us: "Go to the Exchange, you will not find a soul there." Yet, everything seems normal here: The constant comings and goings of the permanent employees, numerous other workers and secretaries give the feeling of a rather ingratiating and lively disorder. To be sure, the three policemen glimpsed making tea in front of the main entrance did not end up there by chance. As a matter of fact, rival CNTS factions had clashed violently on the morning of 20 July, causing 78 wounded and one dead, docker Daouda Ngom who was shot; opponents blame each other for the tragedy.

The bloody event gives a tragic dimension to the CNTS crisis. To tell the truth, however, this union has, paradoxically, always found a relative stability in these scandalous personalized battles of diversion, opposing leaders desperately lacking in charisma. How can we fail to be reminded of gladiators left to themselves in the bottom of a pit and furiously killing each other for lack of control over their overflowing energy.

In order to understand how this came about, it may be necessary to go back to 27 February 1970, the day Abdou Diouf was appointed prime minister. The serious social troubles of the previous years having shown that the Senghor regime's control over the labor movement was weak, it appeared necessary to allow the

largest possible number of union officials to take part in the decision-making process on both a parliamentary and governmental level. "Responsible participation" was born. Two union leaders, Doudou Ngom and Adama Ndiaye, entered the government in that capacity.

Unfortunately, these important national responsibilities contributed to the emergence of a privileged class within union circles. Due to the demands of their duties, they had less time to devote to their mandators who bitterly criticized them for it. Reducing the risks of excessive demands, the key factor for the authorities, was preserved. It is a known fact, however, that a scapegoat is never useful for very long, as it always ends up falling victim to the weight of the common sins. Far-seeing strategists therefore always prepare relief troops behind the scene.

Accusations

Babcar Diagne was singled out as early as September 1972 when he assumed the leadership of the Cape Verde Regional Union. Thus supplied with a solid rear base, he fretted impatiently, but he spent 5 years under restraint, waiting. They were 5 embittered years for Secretary General-Minister Doudou Ngom who was being accused of all sorts of things. The ritual death, strangely glossed over, then occurred one day in November 1977. The jeers of the vast majority of delegates prevented Doudou Ngom from delivering his speech during an extraordinary congress. That was the end of the man who had proudly called himself "The Man of May 68" (at the time, his appeal to the workers had restored last minute order).

As though moved by an invisible and inspired chess player, Babcar Diagne was thrust to the fore of the trade union movement. The new CNTS boss was thought to be a staunch Senghor supporter. A former employee of the Lesieur plant, he became a minister.

The secretary-general-breaking machine was immediately set in motion once again, i.e., accusations of illicit gains, collusion with management, etc. This time, however, things were less simple. Madia Diop, an experienced trade unionist, had pulled himself to the top through hard work, transforming his original union (Foodstuff Industries) into an actual stronghold. Senghor and management were not too happy about this former opponent of the African Rally Party who had sought refuge with Mobido Keita after he had been sentenced to a very stiff prison term in 1963. His relative popularity, however, forced the authorities to handle the impulsive and unpredictable Madia Diop with consideration.

Abdou Diouf's coming to power was for him a "divine surprise." Fortunately, Madia discovered that he supported Diouf. Since the word change was in everybody's lips, it was a good opportunity for getting some respite on the social front. In short, there is nothing like offering a supposedly charismatic leader to workers to make them forget economic hardships for a short while. Aware that the goal was near, the crafty Madia raised a fuss to give the impression that he was not obligated to anyone. He demanded Babcar Diagne's immediate resignation and sent a 2-month ultimatum at the end of which he would create his own trade union. A CNTS extraordinary congress was convened on 17 and 18 November 1982 at

the Socialist Party House under the chairmanship of Magatte Lô and Jean Collin. The new bureau was elected before the activity report of the outgoing bureau could be studied! It was obviously the end of the Babacar Diagne's era.

At cat-and-mouse game began between Madia Diop and the Socialist Party. Refusing any ministerial position, he nonetheless accepted the post of vice-president of the National Assembly. The confederal team he had accepted as a compromise was anything but homogeneous. That is why Madia has been so busy since March 1984, excluding and excommunicating his former comrades. Others are leaving him.

The CNTS Nero, as he is "amicably" called by his opponents, will soon find himself totally alone at the Labor Exchange. He will then be forced to put the key under the mat and take life easy in one of his dream retreats.

That is not all: Pathé Sène, his former right hand man at Foodstuff Industries, portrays him as a corrupted individual of the worse kind and charges him with illegally holding several offices at the same time, thus drawing a monthly salary of 1,770,000 CFA francs. Pathé Sène, 39 years old, is what could be called "disappointed with Madia's brand of leadership." His vehemence is that of recent parricides. He finds it strange and dishonest that Madia is today criticizing price increases when he was crisscrossing the country in August 1983 trying to make them palatable to the workers. The Interprofessional Collective Agreement seems to him to be an actual dupes' bargain to the benefit of the heads of enterprises. Pathé Sène strongly suspects Madia (whom he says is fascinated with Sékou Touré) of wanting to seize power and of being a false socialist and a concealed communist. He is also said to be in contact with Iraq and Qadhdhafi. Ten or so workers claiming to be opposed to Madia attended the meeting: They agreed with their leader. One of them, Mamadou Diouf, an employee of the CSS (Senegalese Sugar Company) who has 2 wives and 11 children, declared that he and 25 of his layed-off comrades have not seen Madia for almost 3 years and that it is with Alioune Sow's help that they succeeded in winning their suit. According to his own statement, Pathé Sène is not considering a reconciliation with Madia.

Pretentions

Mrs Fambaye Fall Diop, the leader of the Committee for Straightening Trade Unionism (CRS), which came into being due to the crisis, declares that she has only one concern: To fight for the unity and cohesion of the working class. Her sincerity seems real, but one wonders if the CRS' creation does not refute such a goal. Suspected of being in Jean Collin's service for the purpose of destabilizing Madia, she defends herself vigorously: "Collin is not behind the CRS. If we defend Collin, it is because he has always been publicly attacked by Madia. As it stand, he is a servant of the state, an assistant of President Abdou Diouf who relies on him heavily. The fact that he is a "toubab" [European] does not prevent him for being a full-fledged Senegalese. It is therefore our duty to defend him, for we must all respect those whom the president trusts." It remains that the CRS of Fambaye Fall Diop, minister delegate of emigration, regroups trade unionists most of whom are experienced, to be sure, but also in serious difficulty with their bases. In addition, some of the signers are said to have been unaware of the drafting of the "Manifesto" even though it binded them. For example, we were able to meet with Malick Mbaye of the ORTs, who

declared: "I was not consulted neither before nor after and I have no faith in the CRS. If I were forced to choose, I would choose Madia. His only fault is that he is too impulsive; he insists on saying out loud what everybody thinks inwardly."

Actually, Madia's only serious opponent is Alioune Sow, secretary general of the powerful Unique National Transport and Tourism Federation of Senegal. This 45-year old giant has devoted most of his life to the trade union struggle. With an easy and flamboyant manner of speech, emphasized with expressive gestures, Alioune Sow looks like a winner. His tall silhouette is familiar to the habitual visitors of the Palace of Justice where he regularly follows the cases of laid-off workers.

For the time being, his only position is that of president of the neo-FROLUDES (Fighting Front for Trade Union Democracy). On 28 October, he was to be elected secretary general of the Democratic Union of Senegalese Workers (UDTS), an union which will be affiliated with the Socialist Party. Yet, having succeeded in rallying under him the whole of Madia's opposition, Alioune Sow is not easy on his CRS allies. He cannot forgive them for having voted his ouster from the CNTS a short while back. Without concern for tactical amenities, he calls them "Opportunists of the worse kind" and criticizes what he considers to be maneuvers aimed at imposing a candidate on the leadership of the future UDTS. It cannot be said that the Front is very homogeneous. If, however, Alioune Sow can afford to bully his "friends" in this manner, it is because he is aware of being the strongest.

As may be expected, he reserves his most acerbic criticism for Madia Diop who is, according to him, so obviously antidemocratic. He says: "He ensured for himself an automatic majority through the cooption game, arbitrarily raising the number of Confederal Bureau members from 78 to 180. It is not normal. The trade unionist movement must be lead by a team which is itself headed by a qualified man. Workers are fed up with terror, they want to control their elect." According to him, the Interprofessional Collective Agreement is a monumental error. Very violent in nature, Alioune Sow calls Madia a "Primitive mind, an ignoramus and coward who sends workers to their death and entrenches himself in one of his many offices." It may be surmised from hearing such comments that any possible reconciliation between the two men is impossible. "Impossible is not an unionist notion," says Alioune Sow. "If Madia gives up his dictatorial pretensions, we will be able to get reconciled. Collin tried to patch us up, but he is the one who slammed the door."

It is true that after the heated events of July, Madia attacked almost everybody. Believing rightly or wrongly that he was the target of a vast plot, he did not try to spare anybody. Calling for the transformation of the Socialist Party into a Workers and Farmers Socialist Party and criticizing the recent price increases, Madia publicly threatened the ministers with having them ousted within 48 hours "If they continued to oppose the working class' interests." In order to dodge blows, Madia always shifts abruptly to the left. The opposition is never easy with him but he knows that it considers him a lesser evil than Alioune Sow. The central machine of the Party for the Independence of Labor (of Marxist-Leninist leaning) thus clearly declared its intent to support Madia "Against the offensive of reactionary forces."

Polygamy

The political situation being particularly delicate and the concept of an union fully independent from the authorities becoming increasingly more definite, it would have been imprudent to arouse Madia's antagonism. Whence the discreet reconciliation with Jean Collin, confirmed by the CNTS secretary general with a small malicious and satisfied smile: "Only mountains never meet; men, despite their difference of opinion, can hold discussions in order to find solutions to the problems which arise. The main thing is the desire of all involved to resolve the conflicts which could oppose them to one another."

Marking time, however, is not peace. In this specific case, it could be instead a more pernicious, but less noisy and furious, pursuit of the war. The polygamous regime which the Socialist Party will be forced to accept due to the UDTs' creation (which could have been instigated) can only be temporary, that is certain. Abdou Diouf and his party will have to choose, in time, between this new union and the CNTS. As a rule, the electorate alone will decide, but it will not be very difficult to "help" the favorite be more "representative." For the time being, each of the two camps asserts that it attracts the largest number of workers. It is true that the "Madia myth" has suddenly become outdated: New, more autonomous and militant unions are picking up a large share of his supporters almost everywhere. The fact remains that, faced with opponents who are all busy preparing their constitutive congresses, Madia is the only one organizing meetings and making of each congress of renewal (Foodstuff Industries, OPT) a true show of force.

As for Alioune Sow, he claims to hold the majority in many enterprises, particularly in the Senegalese Sugar Company where approximately 7,500 out of 8,000 employees would belong to his party. We soon will know how it stands, although the figures quoted by Alioune Sow seems too impressive to be true. On the other hand, it is reasonable to anticipate that, under the pressure of lukewarm sectors of the Socialist Party, many of Madia's faithful will abandon him for the UDTs.

The CNTS crisis is not solely unionist. The intervention of the Socialist Party will necessarily be dependent upon its own increasingly more acute internal rivalries. The solutions advocated by the Socialist Party have often proved to be mere palliatives carrying the seeds of premises for much more serious union crises. This time, the situation is so tense that the socialists, like the apprentice sorcerer, are running the risks of raising forces they will be unable to control.

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CSO: 3419/186

PLANNED OVERTHROW OF RENE REPORTED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Dec 84 p 10

[Article by Tim Clarke]

[Text]

DURBAN. — About 300 exiles and members of the Seychelles Resistance Movement met in London last weekend to unite forces to plan the overthrow of the Government of Mr Albert René in the Seychelles.

The exiles, who came from all over the world, elected Mr Gerard Horeau, leader of the Seychelles Resistance Movement in England, as their leader.

Mr Horeau told The Citizen at the weekend

that the new organisation would soon be issuing a declaration of rights. Among the demands the organisation would make was that President René should hold "free elections" on the Indian Ocean island and that these elections should be monitored by outside bodies.

Mr Horeau claimed that President René was frightened to hold open elections because he knew that he would lose a "free election".

He claimed that President René had been forced to hold a Press conference in Victoria on the mainland of Mahé last week to satisfy the local population that the Seychelles was not falling under Soviet influence and domination.

Mr Horeau said "President René was forced to call the Press conference because the islanders are fearful of the growing Soviet presence and influence on the island. They are freedom loving people who do not want to be dominated by Communist Russia. Most of them are pro-West and have become alarmed at the increasing Soviet influence in the area."

Mr Horeau also claimed that President René was living "in fear of his life". This was the reason for the 30-man

strong bodyguard of ex-mercenaries which guarded the President day and night.

Mr Horeau also said that Mr James Pillay, the former Commissioner of Police, had resigned from his post because the government of Mr René felt that he (Mr Pillay) was too pro-Western.

Mr Horeau was also able to confirm that Mr Pillay has been transferred to the Licensing Department on the island after being Commissioner of Police for many years, including the period during the abortive coup, in November 1981.

Mr Pillay has been replaced as Commissioner by Mr Max Fontaine. Mr Fontaine, who was Deputy Commissioner of police for many years, is regarded as being more to the Left than Mr Pillay.

CSO: 3400/296

COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC, POLITICAL SCENARIOS DISCUSSED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English Vol 25, No 24, 28 Nov 84 pp 1-4

[Text]

The country is in an advanced state of economic and political degeneracy from which it is unlikely to recover in the short or medium-term. Government machinery barely functions; and the potential for political instability is growing rapidly. Despite the economic crisis and the unprecedented accumulation of wealth by a handful of leading politicians and businessmen, there is unlikely to be a coup until 84-year-old **Siaka Stevens** dies.

The key problem for years has been the almost institutionalised corruption among bureaucrats and whole-scale smuggling of diamonds and gold. Allowing for a modicum of smuggling, diamonds should earn about \$100m annually, gold about \$50m and fishing up to \$100m. In practice government revenue from these sources is under \$100m. It needs \$180m annually.

In October, in a most remarkable development, a private company, *Precious Minerals Marketing Company* (PMMC), bought the 49% shareholding in the *National Diamond Mining Company* (NDMC) held by *BP Minerals*, a subsidiary of the *British Petroleum Company*. The Sierra Leonean government already owned 51% of NDMC, so that the BP sale has given Sierra Leonean interests 100% of the shares.

PMMC, however, was established as a private company in August this year. The government owns 25% of it, **Jamil Said Mohammed** 15%, **Tony Yazbeck** (two prominent Lebanese businessmen) 15%, with the balance divided unequally between 46 or 47 private individuals and companies. (Legally a private company can have no more than 50 shareholders). **Jamil** is managing director.

It was decided at the time of PMMC's inception to establish a special foreign exchange allocation committee responsible for allocating all foreign exchange for imports. The 13-member committee, which

meets monthly in State House, includes the governor of the *Bank of Sierra Leone*, **Dr. Jim Funna**; the deputy minister of finance, **Joe Amara-Bangali**; the minister of mines, **Hassan Kanu**; the deputy commissioner of police, **Bambay Kamara**; **Jamil**; and various other government and private sector representatives.

In practice the committee allocates almost exclusively the foreign exchange earnings of PMMC, which therefore has great influence in the committee. In September a first allocation of \$3m was made. A similar amount was allocated at the end of last month. According to **Jamil**, from its inception in August to the beginning of October, PMMC's sales had earned \$11m and that subsequently sales were expected to increase.

There is considerable speculation about the degree of government involvement in PMMC, largely because so far the conventional means for monitoring the earnings of such a private company are not being applied. PMMC buys diamonds in Sierra Leone with local currency (leones), values the diamonds itself and then sells them directly in Europe, mainly in the diamond centre of Antwerp. (*De Beers* until last month had an arrangement with the Sierra Leone government to buy diamonds directly from NDMC. Following talks between **Jamil**, *De Beers* and the government, PMMC has now decided to market its diamonds directly).

Foreign exchange accrues in PMMC's overseas accounts independently of any monitoring mechanism by the *Bank of Sierra Leone*. Indeed, the bank now has no control over any of the gold or diamond export earnings. It is a unique situation: the most important function of a developing country's central bank - is now being undertaken in the largest part by a private company. The IMF in particular is highly critical of the new arrangement, although

there is no indication that PMMC's privileged position is being abused. The present IMF standby agreement is on the verge of being cancelled as a result.

Another important matter yet to be clarified is the procedure for valuing diamond exports. The Government Diamond Office (GDO), established in 1974, is meant to value all diamonds prior to export, so that first the 3% export duty can be assessed with reasonable accuracy, and secondly that the exporter repatriates the equivalent amount of foreign exchange on completion of the sale in Antwerp or wherever. The legal requirement that all diamonds should be valued by the GDO is written in the 1976 Ratification of the 1974 Diamond Corporations Agreement, section 10.

For years the system has been massively abused. The official GDO figure for diamond exports in 1980 was \$80m. In 1981 it was \$30m, and in 1982 and 1983 it was an annual \$18m. The figure for 1984 will probably be substantially less.

At the best of times the system was bound to be abused a little. The diamond merchants, who would buy diamonds in leones from local diggers in the south-east mining district, would tell the GDO what price they had paid. Usually the GDO would accept the merchants' figures. Sometimes the merchants would obviously under-value their purchases so that they would not need to repatriate all of their foreign exchange earnings accruing from the overseas sale of their diamonds. More recently, with huge profits to be made on the mark-up of imported goods, they would actually over-value their purchases so that they could import goods worth more than the value of their diamond sales, more than making up their "losses" by the profits made on the sale in Sierra Leone of the imported goods.

And of course it was vital for the *Bank of Sierra Leone* to cooperate closely with the GDO so that a check could be kept on the supposed balancing of export revenue and the amount of foreign exchange directly and indirectly repatriated. In practice the bank has been consistently interfered with by politicians. Dr. Funna has had an increasingly impossible job.

In due course the government and the PMMC will doubtless take advantage of the rationalisation of the diamond industry implied in the creation of the PMMC, to establish new valuation and monitoring procedures. There is already some talk of forming a new independent valuing body to replace the GDO. (Some confusion has been created by the misunderstanding that gazetted diamond exporters have a right to value their diamonds independently of the GDO).

Aside from the concern over the mechanisms of the PMMC, there is a growing political factor which

could be of much consequence in an immediate post-Stevens period: a few members of the Afro-Lebanese and Lebanese community in Sierra Leone, notably Jamil and Yazbeck, have a dominance in the economy unprecedented in any other African state. Popular resentment against the Lebanese is pervasive and vitriolic, even though the majority of businessmen of Lebanese extraction keep a relatively low profile and are personally respected by most Sierra Leoneans.

Jamil's empire

Company records in the registrar-general's office in Freetown are far from comprehensive. In many cases, as could be expected, shareholdings are held by nominees. It is on record, however, that Jamil has interests, often controlling ones, in practically every strategic sector of the Sierra Leonean economy. His interests include:-

- *Precious Minerals Marketing Company*, of which he is managing director and direct owner of 15%. According to Jamil, PMMC hopes to earn \$60m annually. (By comparison, the government's total projected export earnings for 1983-1984 are \$102m. Actual earnings are running well below target).
- *International Bank for Trade & Industry* (IBTI), of which Jamil is managing director. Though he almost certainly has a controlling interest, the first registered shareholders were *Jammat Trust Bank SAL* (Beirut), and *Hassan and Karim Mohammed*, his two sons. IBTI, by offering extremely attractive financial terms to locals, has done exceptionally well since its establishment in 1981.
- *Sierra Fishing Company* of which Jamil is managing director. The company was formed in 1976 as a joint venture with *Fransove* (25%) - a company which in turn is owned by French and Soviet interests, the Sierra Leonean government (25%) and the Sierra Leonean *National Development Bank* (10%), which provided the registered office for the venture. The balance of the shares went to Sierra Leonean individuals, with Jamil probably taking 15%. A study made last year for the *United Christian Council* referred to the company as "an autocratic body which kept fish prices high". Sierra Leone's fishing waters, among the richest in the world, provide the country's biggest source of foreign exchange after diamonds and gold. *Sierra Fishing Company* has a lucrative shrimping business, and exports regularly to the United States and Europe. Last year the company bought seven new vessels; this year four 150-ton vessels were bought from South Korea.
- *The National Trading Company* (NTC), owned jointly by Jamil and Yazbeck. Until last year the NTC was a state company with a monopoly over a large range of imports, including many basic items. As a result of gross mismanagement, while in state ownership, it was eventually sold to the private sector. We understand that NTC still has exclusive import rights on 87 commodities.

The above four companies give Jamil effective control in the four major sectors of the economy. He also has large interests, almost certainly controlling ones, in *International Construction Company*, the local salt factory, *Sierra Explosives* (a munitions company which manufactures cartridges and acts as agents for a limited amount of imported gelignite), a palm oil plant, a small airline, the *New Citizen* newspaper, *Pademba Laundry* and an oil trading

company which has acted as agent for imports of Nigerian crude oil. (Oil sources in Freetown say that the agent receives 8% of the value of a shipment: Sierra Leone imports about \$40m of oil annually). We understand that Jamil is now interested in starting up an insurance company.

Jamil is indeed a legend in Sierra Leone. He controls a fully-integrated business and has built up substantial interests abroad, with offices and residences in Las Palmas and London; and associates in the United States, Lebanon and in many countries in West Africa. His fishing interests in Morocco are thought to be sizeable, and he is expanding his contacts in neighbouring Guinea.

Yet until about 1960 he was a truck driver, half Madingo, half Lebanese. Within years he had made a fortune in the diamond business, becoming indisputably the leading private diamond dealer. Controlling as he does now such a staggering array of businesses, it was perhaps not surprising that President Stevens gave his blessing to PMMC. But for Jamil this latest venture is something of a gamble: the economy and the government needs it to succeed – to provide the foreign exchange to the embattled commercial sector for essential imports – in order to safeguard its own survival.

So far the prospects of PMMC salvaging the economy look remote. There are three main reasons why:-

- 1) There is too much corruption at every level in the government. Nowhere in West Africa is it more entrenched than in Sierra Leone. A combination of fraud, peculation and gross mismanagement has come to light regularly during the past few years.

In 1980 a junior minister, Alfred Akibo-Betts, uncovered what was known as the "Vouchergate Scandal", in which for years payments in the form of "Local Purchase Orders" had been issued to officials and others for goods and services that had never been rendered. By 1980 nearly 30 people had been charged, though they represented a minority of those involved directly and indirectly in the affair. Shortly after, the auditor-general issued a report, covering the period 1974 to 1979, in which fraud and unauthorised overspending was documented in many government departments. In early 1982 it was revealed that millions of leones had regularly been misappropriated by civil servants in a racket known as "Squandergate". Dozens of civil servants were arrested. In his budget speech in 1982, the then minister of finance, Salia Jusu-Sheriff, noted that "almost every case of fraud has been the result of collusion and a well-coordinated conspiracy".

The government has made little impression on corruption. For political reasons even ministers are sometimes charged and convicted of illegal activity. Only last month 95 civil servants were dismissed for embezzling millions of leones. The litany of fraud continues. PMMC, under Jamil's direction, will have to buck completely the system if it is to succeed.

- 2) The machinery of government is out of control. It neither functions nor provides the policy planning needed to pull the country out of chaos. As Jamil has said, it is essential that the black market exchange rate premium over the official rate be reduced so that foreign exchange can be channelled into the legitimate economy. The foreign exchange allocation committee in 1981 allocated \$3m at the rate of 6 leones to the dollar, compared to the official rate of 2.5 leones. The second allocation was at 5.75 leones. The intention is to reduce gradually the rate of allocations, thus squeezing out the black market.

However, many import-based products manufactured in Sierra Leone are price-controlled. The manufacturers cannot therefore obtain foreign exchange at a much higher exchange rate unless they put up the price of their products. Until now, because the government has not allowed them to increase prices, they have not in many cases been able to acquire the foreign exchange they need to keep going.

- 3) Foreign companies and multi-lateral institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, International Development Agency and Food & Agricultural Organisation have no confidence in President Stevens' ability to preside over any significant economic rehabilitation. With a few exceptions, such as for the Austrian-managed *Marampa Iron Ore Company*, foreign companies are not allowed to repatriate earnings. Starved of foreign exchange for imports while having to pay nearly 30% on domestic borrowing, and frustrated by pervasive corruption, the incentive to stay in Sierra Leone is marginal, especially with the growing prospect of serious political instability and bloodshed. With the IMF debating whether to cancel the remainder of its standby facility for Sierra Leone, with the prospects for capital inflow looking increasingly poor, with the relinquishing by BP of all its interests in Sierra Leone, and the practical winding down by *De Beers* of its activities there, corporate morale has never been lower.

Potentially Sierra Leone has the resources to have the highest per capita income in West Africa. In the absence of capital inflow to cover the balance of payments deficit, the government in the short-term is under great pressure somehow to increase its cashflow. It is therefore quite probable that the double-barrelled diamond kimberlite pipe at Kono will be exploited. Technically the kimberlite has to be mined from underground via a shaft sunk between the two vertical pipes in order to maximise overall revenue. But that would cost at least \$80m. A compromise plan suggested when BP Minerals still managed the kimberlite, was that the top of the pipes should be open-cast mined so as to produce an initial cashflow, hopefully enough to finance the sinking of a shaft.

In October, officials from NDMC inspected the \$8m worth of earthmoving and mining equipment (excluding a suction dredger) brought into Sierra Leone some time ago by the Saudi Arabian-owned gold-mining company, *Bin Rafaah*. The equipment, apparently transferred from *Komatsu* in Saudi Arabia, has been sitting on the quayside at Freetown. Owned by Sheik Abdullah Bin Rafaah of Jeddah, there is speculation over *Bin Rafaah's* status following its brush with the government in June (AC Vol 15 No 19). It appears that its earth-moving equipment will indeed now be used for mining the kimberlite. Clearly *Bin Rafaah* is set to become a big shareholder in PMMC.

Aside from the intractability of the economic crisis, the consuming question is whether there will be a coup and what form of government will result if there is. Certainly all the ingredients for a populist coup are present: an atrophied, corrupt one-party system, a concentration of vast wealth in the hands of a few, widespread popular resentment of the Lebanese, increasing prices and shortage of food.⁴

declining incomes for the impoverished majority of the population, and a president whose life-expectancy is short.

The coup stakes

However, there is unlikely to be a coup before Stevens dies. There are three points to consider on this score:

- Stevens, an accomplished political tactician, takes full advantage of the average Sierra Leonean's respect for age. He promotes his origin, allegedly half Limba, half Mende and brought up in Creole-dominated Freetown, as a means of successfully detribalising his position, thus avoiding the alienation of any one major tribal group (Mende, Temne, Limba and Creole). People believe that a change of government will be taken care of by natural means, and feel therefore it is not worth staging what could be a bloody coup.
 - The senior ranks of the army, under the command of Maj-Gen. **Joe Saidu Momoh**, are well looked after. Some of them in private are highly critical of the government, but are not inclined to take part in a coup against Stevens. Junior officers at Wilberforce barracks in Freetown have voiced their misgivings more loudly, mainly, it seems, in order to obtain some of the perks afforded to senior officers.
 - Sierra Leoneans are a notoriously passive people. There is no active and organised internal opposition to stir them into revolt. There have been demonstrations in Freetown in the past, most recently early this year. But they can be put down quite swiftly with strong-arm tactics. The opposition groups abroad (AC Vol 25 No 3), have never managed to unite. In September, government employees at Kilometre 91, on the Freetown to Bo road (the country's most vital transport artery), blockaded the road in their efforts to persuade the government to pay their salaries. After a week in which no traffic got through without payment, public opinion began to turn against the employees, and some sort of settlement was made.
- Hitherto the main London-based movement, the *Sierra Leone Alliance Movement*, (SLAM) has been usurped somewhat by the forming in June of the *Sierra Leone Democratic Party* (SLDP). SLAM is at least temporarily quiescent, and the SLDP, which had two of its supporters detained two months ago for distributing pamphlets in Freetown, has yet to make an impact. There is a high probability that foreign-based opposition will remain disunited and exploited by opportunists for personal gain.

When Stevens dies there is likely to be a relatively short period in which top figures of the ruling *All Peoples' Congress* (APC) attempt to maintain the *status quo*, probably with the backing of some leading businessmen. However, a combination of intense infighting among the political elite and a very high popular expectation for change would unravel the authority of the existing elite and open the way for a coup, backed or led by the army.

In this scenario, in present circumstances, the longstanding first vice-president, 54-year-old **Sorie Ibrahim Koroma** would assume the acting presidency. Immediately behind him would be the ambi-

tious political operator, 56-year-old second vice-president **Francis Misheck Minah**.

Competition between these two, rife for years, appeared to gain momentum after the APC congress in November 1981 when Stevens said publicly that he intended to retire sometime after the next general elections (which were held in mid-1982 - AC Vol 23 No 13). Despite a serious motor accident in 1978, Koroma, against the predictions of many observers, has held resolutely to high office. But following the forced resignation in May of former second vice-president **Christian Kamara-Taylor**, a number of well-placed Temne* politicians have worked to engineer his downfall (AC Vol 25 No 13). A combination of ill health, pressure from Temne activists and competition from Minah in a post-Stevens showdown, would probably enable Minah to grasp the presidency. Perhaps with this in mind, some powerful local business interests have apparently switched their support from Koroma to Minah.

As a deterrent to a popular uprising or military coup, it was reported earlier this year (AC Vol 25 No 19) that **North Korean** and **Cuban** advisers had begun to train a special forces battalion at Samu in Kambia district. Further investigation has revealed, almost conclusively, that no North Korean military advisers have been stationed in Sierra Leone. There was a Cuban contingent at Samu to train State Security Department (SSD) personnel, but they left earlier this year.

Confusion over the North Korean report appears to have arisen due to a combination of factors: the former foreign minister, **Abdulai Conteh**, **Sorie Koroma** and **Jengo Stevens** (son of the president) have visited North Korea in the recent past; at the time there were North Korean military advisers in neighbouring Guinea; and the idea of having North Korean advisers in Sierra Leone appears to have been committed to paper before being ditched. (At the last count there were 12 North Koreans in the country: three accredited diplomats, three non-accredited "assistants", four students and two "doctors" working for the army HQ at Wilberforce barracks.)

At present the only form of "praetorian guard" is the SSD. Jamil does employ a number of private guards, though it has been denied that he employs 150-200 Palestinians as reported in AC Vol 25 No 19. An anti-smuggling unit, presumably financed directly or indirectly by PMMC, has recently been established under the command of a former British serviceman under the name of **McQueen**, whose base

is at Hastings airport off the Freetown to Waterloo road. The unit, run on precise military lines, has several landrovers and a stock of small-arms at its disposal. We understand that it might have acquired, or be about to acquire, one or more armoured vehicles and a helicopter.

It seems therefore unlikely that the present capacity of paramilitary forces would be enough to thwart a determined coup attempt by the army. The next stage in the post-Stevens scenario is thus the forcing out of office of the acting president - probably Minah, possibly Koroma - by an army-led or army-backed coup, which would be widely supported in at least the early stages. Given that nearly all senior politicians are discredited in public opinion, the chances of the military putting up a civilian presidential candidate would be remote. The only well-known politician of high public standing is Jusu-Sheriff, who now has the non-job of minister of planning and economic development ●

Footnotes

1. Yazbeck's interests in Sierra Leone include the exclusive franchise for *Mercedes Benz, Agricultural Company Ltd* (whose latest venture includes poultry), the National Workshop (a former government asset hived off to the private sector because of bad management), the *National Trading Company*, diamonds (as a dealer in Sierra Leone, as owner of *Universal Diamond Cutters* and now as shareholder in PMMC). He has substantial business activities in Lebanon, Cyprus, Western Europe and the United States. A well-educated and astute businessman, he is widely considered to be the richest Lebanese in Sierra Leone.
2. *De Beers* sent a team of valuers to Sierra Leone twice yearly prior to the DIMINCO sales, which realised \$15-\$20m annually.
3. A report believed to have been produced by Military Intelligence (MI) and handed to Stevens by the MI director, referred explicitly to Lebanese influence in the country and the potential dangers it posed to public order.
4. Bags of rice (100 kilos) are almost unavailable at the official controlled price of 46 leones. The going rate is up to 100 leones. That compares to a monthly wage of 60 leones for a street cleaner and 110 leones for an office clerk. Ministers and MPs receive monthly a large supply of rice (AC Vol 23 No 22) meant for distribution to their constituents. In practice much of it is sold at the highest possible price. The United States, which supplies a sizeable proportion of Freetown's rice consumption, is considering shipping PL480 food aid in the form of wheat instead of rice in an effort to force Sierra Leone to grow its own rice. *Seaboard Inc*, the American company which runs the local brewery, would distribute and sell the wheat and place the proceeds in a special fund for agricultural development. The overriding drawback to the idea is that Sierra Leone would develop a taste for a commodity which it could never produce itself.
5. Stevens clearly had visions of retiring to the gigantic hill-top palace he was then having built overlooking the sea to the south of Freetown. To deflect criticism that he used public money to build it, he gave it to the state, which then gave it back to him for his birthday.
6. Koroma recently revealed that he is from the Madingo tribe, not a Temne as had always been supposed.

FAILURES OF ETHIOPIAN-BASED OPPOSITION NOTED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 28 Nov 84 pp 7-8

[Text]

SOMALIA: OPPOSITION FAILURES. The two Ethiopian-based opposition movements, the *Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia* (DFSS) and the *Somali National Movement* (SNM) have recently suffered further serious setbacks. On 17 October two DFSS central committee members, **Abdurahman Aydeed Ahmad** and **Ikar Haji Mohammed Husayn**, were apparently gunned down at the DFSS' forward HQ at Dire Dawa in eastern Ethiopia. The DFSS version is that a Somali government agent penetrated a DFSS training camp near the Ethiopian-DFSS-occupied village of Balamballe in central-western Somalia, where he then shot dead the two DFSS central committee members.

The assassinations point strongly to a continuation of the internal splits that have plagued the DFSS for some time (AC Vol 24 No 24 & AC Vol 25 No 21). In May this year mutinies in DFSS camps led to serious internal fighting, the flight into the bush of several hundred guerrillas, and the return to Somalia of about 200 of them. DFSS chairman, Col. **Abdullahi Yusuf**, hurriedly cut short a foreign trip. He then convened a central committee meeting at which his opponents, including **Abdurahman Aydeed**, mustered only 10 out of 50 votes. The mutineering guerrillas were crushed by DFSS military commander, Col. **Mahmud Farah Hassan Da'ardeh**. In August the latter was blown up by a land mine. It is quite likely that **Abdurahman Aydeed's** assassination was revenge for Col. **Mahmud's** death.

We understand that shortly before his death **Abdurahman** had acquired a sizeable amount of ammunition, which was then distributed to his own supporters in the DFSS camp near Galadi. He had also attempted to get in touch directly with the SNM. Though the SNM and DFSS are under strong pressure from the Ethiopian government to unite, Col. **Abdullahi** evidently saw a threat to his leadership in the way **Abdurahman** was establishing his own close rapport with the SNM.

The SNM also suffered a major blow in October when one of its top military commanders, Col. **Mahamoud Hashi "Lixle"**, died in a clash with government forces. A former head of the SNM's military wing, Col. "Lixle" masterminded the highly successful raid on the top security prison of Mandera in January 1983.

The SNM was about to start an offensive in north-west Somalia following a Somali army attack on one of the main SNM training camps, at El Habashi, about 20 kilometres inside Ethiopia. The SNM, after its last congress in July and the change of leadership, devoted some time to reorganising itself. Its renewal of activity in October was apparently spurred by the appointment of **Hassan Keite** as governor of Hargeisa. Keite, a colonel and a former ambassador is a member of the Habr Yonis clan of the Issaq. A popular figure, his appointment is clearly intended to pose a threat to SNM support in the region. Another reason was the need to react to the death sentences (yet to be carried out) on seven students. Like 13 others who got sentences ranging to life imprisonment, the students were all accused and convicted on 3 October by the National Security Court in Mogadishu of belonging to an illegal organisation, of distributing pamphlets and of being involved in a series of small bomb explosions in Hargeisa.

in June and July. Thirdly, by early October the SNM's new arms supplies (probably from Libya) had arrived, and a batch of new guerrillas were ready for action following a recent SNM recruiting and training drive.

Several SNM groups were preparing to cross the border when the Somali army tried to pre-empt the SNM offensive by attacking El Habashi. The SNM admitted to over 50 casualties. The following week it went on the offensive, attacking several government military positions. The government imposed a dusk to dawn curfew in Hargeisa, and for a time all vehicles coming from Djibouti were halted at Boroma several hours drive to the north of Hargeisa. On 16 October the authorities executed by firing squad a camel-driver caught with a camel-load of ammunition and five others who were charged with not informing the authorities about it. Further executions of SNM sympathisers in the last week or two have been reported.

Despite the security precautions, in late October and early November the SNM infiltrated several small groups over the border. At least a dozen military posts have been attacked in hit-and-run raids, including two key positions on Hargeisa's outer defensive perimeter: Dararweine, one of the main fuel and ammunition dumps, and Toon. Both are about 10 kilometres from the centre of the town. Fighting has taken place at points between Hargeisa and the border, at Bokol, Qol Bulale, Salahie and Inagaha, and further north at Baki, beyond Boroma. There have been several clashes further south, to the west of Burao and between Burao and the border. Some of the more remote military positions have apparently been evacuated. Government troops have concentrated at Wareebeva 45 kms from Burao (leaving the villages of Eik, Bisika, Balaydig and Duruqsi unguarded). A government convoy was also attacked last week on the Burao-Berbera road.

Although the above were small-scale operations, the government is worried. There have been a number of special meetings on security in Hargeisa and Berbera over the last few weeks and a number of top-level visits to the region. Col. **Ahmed Mahmud Farah** of the party's political committee has been to Berbera; and on 5 November defence minister Lt-Gen. **Ali Samatar** arrived on a two-day visit, partly to hand out medals to the troops in Hargeisa. Minister of the Interior Gen. **Ahmed Suleiman Abdulahi** took his Italian counterpart, **Oscar Scattaro**, to Hargeisa at the end of October, causing the curfew to be temporarily lifted. Scattaro has been one of a series of Italian visitors to Somalia recently to take a look at the security situation. The Italian deputy prime minister, **Forlani**, was also there last month; and in early November Lt-Gen. **Ricardo Barsanova**, head of the Italian Carabinieri, arrived for a four-day visit. Recent American visitors have included Gen. **Vernon Walters**, President **Reagan's** trouble-shooter, and Lt-Gen. **Robert Kingston**, commander of the US Central Command for RDE, who has just held talks with both President Siad Barre and Lt-Gen. Samatar.

The government has also sent two top-level delegations overseas in an attempt to acquire more weapons. Gen. Ahmed Suleiman is in Romania and Italy; Lt-Gen. Samatar paid a short visit to Egypt early in November for the same reason. (While there he was also briefed on the latest Egyptian attempt to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia an idea probably made at Somalia's request, with US backing). Lt-Col **Mengistu**, the Ethiopian head of state, met the Egyptian foreign minister at least twice during the OAU conference. ●

Footnote:

Following the shooting down of a Somali airline by Somali fighters, a number of other airlines have been banned. ●

SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIMROSE ELECTION OUTCOME ANALYZED

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 2 Dec 84 p 9

[Article by Graham Watts]

[Text] Political cryptographers are busily decoding the signals from Primrose. Their earliest interpretations--that the white backlash has begun--seem overly pessimistic. But rightly or wrongly, the perception remains: the 'reformers' won the seat, the hardliners won the war.

THE National Party's drastically reduced majority in the Primrose parliamentary by-election this week is likely to strengthen the voice of hardliners in the party who say its reform programme offers too much too soon.

This is the view of observers who fear the programme offers too little too late.

For the government's promise to devise a constitutional formula for blacks is caught between black demands and white intransigence -- "between the devil and the deep blue sea", according to Dr Hennie Kotzé, senior lecturer in political science at Rand Afrikaans University.

What is likely to add to the hardliners' argument is the fact that tough measures against extra-parliamentary opposition appear to have worked. Black townships which were daily aflame in the past three months are once again "quiet". It would be difficult for those against the recent wave of detentions to argue that there is no link.

Like the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) which this week broke ranks with Assocom and the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) by coming out in support of the government's tough security measures, many more in the conciliation camp face a difficult debate.

Observers believe that as long as

the NP is slow to broaden its electoral base and consolidate its support among the business community, it will remain vulnerable to the Primroses of the political process.

NP claims to appeal to the English vote bear little substance, they say, and the FCI and Assocom remain firm in their opposition to the government's detention of trade union leaders.

Disquiet

There is disquiet in industry circles about police investigations into the recent two-day work stayaway by about half a million black workers. It is believed a 'show' subversion trial is being planned that will further damage fragile relations between employers and unions.

The police have been seeking affidavits from some companies about losses sustained during the stayaway and they are also known to be investigating charges of subversion against the chairman of the stayaway committee, Mr Thami Mali, "and others". If the "others" include prominent trade union leaders, say industry sources, then what many employers would prefer to be treated as an issue between them and their em-

ployees will be put into the political arena.

The narrowness of Dr Piet Welgemoed's win at Primrose lends its weight to the hardline position.

"Those in power are seeing this as a move to the right," said Dr Kotzé. "And they perceive it as a threat. I am pessimistic that they might put the brakes on the reform process, especially with regard to constitutional rights for blacks."

Dr Kotzé said National Party organisers reported that the issue of black rights and unrest surfaced more frequently during the Primrose campaign than complaints about the economy. For the hardliners who see this as a threat, an economic upturn doesn't hold the promise of relief they hoped it might.

"I don't think this is the feared white backlash," said Dr Kotzé, "but they do."

Dr Kotzé said not too much store should be placed on by-elections. Past election analysis models based on by-elections had proved inaccurate.

There may well be a conservative trend, especially in the Transvaal, said Dr Kotzé, but one must bear in mind that the NP still has the support it needs in the Cape.

Coupled with this are other considerations:

● There is every possibility of an economic upturn before the next general election in 1989.

● There will be a constituency delimitation before that election which will "unload" the rural constituencies and give more voting strength to urban seats.

● Primrose is a blue collar urban constituency and is sufficiently different from most other urban constituencies to indicate a limit to the number of seats that are vulnerable to a conservative vote. Even the highest figure quoted by election analysts — 40 — would not substantially affect the NP's power, especially if a balance is restored through the delimitation.

● The government didn't make as much use of the powerful medium of television during the Primrose election as it did in last year's referendum on the constituency or would do during a general election.

Nevertheless, up and down the Reef there are dozens of uncomfortable NP public representatives whose perspective when it comes to policy options is more likely to be affected by their hopes of staying in Parliament than by their concern for a legitimate constitutional formula for blacks.

CSO: 3400/318

NATIONAL SERVICE REDUCTION CONTEMPLATED

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 2 Dec 84 p 6

[Article by David Breier]

[Text]

SPECULATION is growing that the Government is planning to reduce national service next year.

The issue of compulsory military training or conscription is at present on the agenda of a committee of inquiry under General Jannie Geldenhuys, the Chief of Army, which is to report to the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, by the end of this year.

Observers believe the committee could recommend the reduction of compulsory military camps or even a shorter call-up period. One possibility being mooted is the return of the ballot system.

Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the Progressive Federal Party, will give evidence to the committee tomorrow on why the PFP believes conscription should be phased out and replaced by a larger professional and volunteer army.

PFP spokesmen have been surprised at the mildness of the response by some pro-Government sources to the PFP's call.

The SABC, which usually gives the PFP short shrift, has given objective coverage to Dr Slabbert who has been allowed to state his case clearly on television.

And most significantly, the Sunday newspaper *Rapport*, edited by Dr Wimpie de Klerk who is close to the Government, has called on the Geldenhuys Committee and the Government to take an objective view of the PFP proposals.

"It is a fact that, rightly or wrongly, there is a measure of political controversy around the Army.

"There must be appreciation for the Army's need to be acceptable to all race groups in the country and for the mixed feelings on the use of the Army in unrest situations in black townships," the newspaper has stated.

The most scathing reaction to the PFP has come from Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr Adriaan Vlok, who has said the ANC would benefit from the PFP's stand.

When General Malan announced the appointment of the Geldenhuys Committee in Parliament this year, he said national service obligations were determined by the threat against South Africa and would be adjusted in terms of the threat.

CSO: 3400/318

ANC OFFICIALS ON RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

London SECHABA in English Nov 84 pp 27-30

[Interview with Comrades Chris Hani and Mac Maharaj; date and place not given]

[Text]

We print here extracts from a Radio Freedom interview which was first published in 'Mayibuye.' Comrade Mac Maharaj, a senior member of the ANC, and Comrade Chris Hani, a member of the NEC, were asked to give their opinion on political developments in Southern Africa and South Africa in particular.

Question: It is believed in certain quarters that the signing of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984 has dealt the armed struggle in South Africa a severe blow. The racist regime in its comments called our post-Nkomati military operations "a few parting shots of the ANC." Can you comment on the prospects of the armed struggle in South Africa now?

Answer: The signing of the Nkomati Accord between the People's Republic of Mozambique and racist South Africa does constitute

a setback for the struggle for national liberation of our people, the struggle for social justice and freedom. But we don't hold the view that the accord is a severe blow for the armed struggle in our country. As is known, the armed struggle in our country is rooted internally. We have never relied on organising the armed struggle and carrying out military operations from countries neighbouring South Africa. Indeed, we have never carried out any military operations from Mozambique or any other territory that borders South Africa.

The very organisation of operations, the training and expansion of our army, takes place internally. I said earlier that it is correct to say that the signing of the accord does raise a few problems, but these are problems that can be solved and overcome, both by our organisation and our army. If we can look back, the armed struggle in our country did not begin with the independence of Mozambique.

Angola, Zimbabwe and many other countries bordering South Africa. It started earlier, and even in those days, when those countries were still not free, our movement and army were able to continue organising the armed struggle internally, and able to carry out operations inside the country.

But it is true that the independence of these countries did create favourable conditions for the intensification of our armed struggle, and we have always regarded them and still regard them as allies in the struggle to rid the continent of the most vicious, oppressived regime, that is plaguing the whole continent of Africa, and Southern Africa in particular. The enemy is deluding itself by believing that the operations after Nkomati are "a few parting shots" of the ANC. We have got the capacity to intensify the armed struggle in South Africa.

Answer: I'd like to add that it may be the cheap propagandists of the regime who can talk like that, but even they ought to turn back to their own facts. It is the regime's propaganda men who are today confessing that since Nkomati there have been more acts of military action and sabotage inside South Africa than in the comparable period last year. This is admitted by the regime, who, on the one hand, says we are dead and finished, and on the other says we are the greatest danger to its existence. Furthermore, it is not a new story in the history of any people's struggle, as well as our struggle, for a beleaguered regime to keep on saying that the forces of change are in their death throes. This was said by Jimmy Kruger repeatedly. I think you will remember his image of a small snake that was dead. Well it is out today, the ANC still lives. And in fact the ANC is a force of change.

Who are the desperate people? The forces of reaction or the forces of revolution? Look at what Pretoria is doing to Africa, let alone what it is doing inside South Africa. All these acts violate every international law, violate the sovereignty, the integrity of independent states of Southern Africa. They ride roughshod over the rights of the people outside as well as in-

side South Africa. What for? To preserve their own existence.

destruction of the African National Congress and our people's army, Umkhonto We Sizwe. They have identified their danger correctly. And their acts of desperation, their cheap propaganda, are for the world and our people, and are aimed at fooling themselves into the belief that they can perpetuate their rule for ever. But our theory of war, our theory of a people's war, our theory of revolution, our revolutionary practice, always rested in the fact that our revolution belongs to the people, will be made by our people, that our armed forces will grow, thrive, multiply and bring victory by immersing themselves in the struggle of our masses. That has been our basic approach: nothing has changed since then.

Q: One of the principles of guerrilla warfare is that the guerrillas must have a rear base and a supply line. It would seem that they have been effectively closed in relation to Swaziland and Mozambique. Can you comment?

A: It is true that it is a point of advantage if a guerrilla war can have at its disposal reliable rear bases. This means that the guerrilla army has got possibilities and facilities to train itself in favourable conditions as well as to equip itself. But it is well known that guerrilla warfare can be launched, as it has been launched in a number of countries, without a guerrilla army enjoying reliable facilities. So there is no rigid approach of saying you cannot wage guerrilla warfare unless you enjoy favourable rear bases. In the contemporary situation, we have the struggle of the people of El Salvador escalating and reaching unprecedented heights against a dictatorship which enjoys the support of the Reagan Administration. That movement, the Farabundo Marti, does not enjoy the rear facilities -- and in fact it has entrenched itself inside the country, depending on the massive support it enjoys from the people of El Salvador.

If we go back to our own situation, when our organisation, the African National Congress, and her allies deliberately took the position of

opting for armed struggle against the racist and fascist regime in our country, the movement knew very well that there were no rear bases around our country, and that the pillar of our struggle would be the people themselves. So the fact that the enemy is trying to bully the countries neighbouring our country into submission does not constitute a situation where we are going to be helpless, where the armed struggle would be emasculated, because the basic factor is the people.

A: If I may add to this point, it is necessary for our people, when listening to the propaganda of the regime, to ask themselves some basic questions. As my colleague says, when the ANC and her allies decided on the path of armed struggle, there were no countries capable of providing us with rear bases. The regime had the support, as it has now, of the whole imperialist world. We decided at that moment, then that the only way forward was through people's war. We made preparations for it and we did not count on the success of our revolution being based on the facilities from the neighbouring states. We did not count on rear bases. We examined, we put all our knowledge of guerrilla warfare together, theoretical and practical. We studied others' experiences and we came to the conclusion that whatever the topography of our country there is one feature which ensures the victory of our revolution. It is the masses.

Q: Would you be able to say that in all the things that have happened in the region, with the signing of the Nkomati Accord, and what is going on inside the country, the ANC envisages a change in tactics to deal effectively with the present objective situation?

A: Our strategic and tactical approach is, and has always been, to entrench our political and military presence inside our own country. This is an ongoing process. At no time have we ever based our strategy on possibilities of facilities in the neighbouring countries. So for us the new situation does not spell out any new change, because our basic task has been to strengthen our presence, both politically and

militarily, inside our country. And it is because of this strategic approach that we see in our country today a new political situation, a situation of mass resistance enlisting ever-soaring numbers of our people. We don't believe that this new development and this unprecedented upsurge is accidental. On the contrary, it is a product of our political and military work, which we have intensified in the last eight to ten years, resulting in a situation where the people themselves have formed their own democratic and progressive organisations. This development, therefore, creates the very conditions for the expansion of our army and the growth of the political underground inside the country. All that we can say is that this new development of political upsurge and resistance should be strengthened.

A: On the same question, let me complement what has been said. The strategy for change does not require a rethink from us. Comrade President Tambo has said in the January 8th message that there are four pillars of our struggle. First, the ANC underground, which is mobilising and organising our people. Second, the united action of the masses of our people. The third is the development, growth and actions of our army, Umkhonto We Sizwe, dedicated to the strategy of a people's war. And the fourth pillar is international support for the struggle. Now, I do not think that those pillars have changed; what can change is the element of tactics that you employ in a particular situation.

Q: How do you react to the suggestion that the present situation demands an ever-strong presence of the ANC and MK inside the country?

A: I think that the question should be seen as a question of responsibilities that are thrown on our shoulders today. In order to proceed to victory, we have to intensify the process of developing the ANC and Umkhonto We Sizwe inside the country. The responsibility on those of us who are already in Umkhonto We Sizwe is to spare no effort in order to ensure that all of us contribute more than we ever did towards

that process.

But what is the responsibility of society? First, massive mass struggles are taking place throughout the country. These struggles are important in their own right. They are a vehicle for our people to recognise that they have to stand together, organise together and confront the enemy. But today it has become even more necessary that people at home should ask themselves that, if MK is to be our defensive organ of the people, the army protecting our masses, there is a responsibility from the people also to help Umkhonto not just with food, but with manpower, men and women prepared to fight, prepared to hold the weapon in their hands, belong to an organised force. Those who lead mass struggles in any particular part of our country should ask themselves the question that, whilst you are doing their work, in what way are you facilitating the growth of the whole national struggle? They have a responsibility of ensuring that the particular components or terrain in which they are fighting is not an isolated one. We have to reach hands from every area of the struggle, and to link particularly between the mass overt struggles and the underground and armed struggles of our people. Now these are the elements which the present situation requires from us.

Therefore, the growth of the ANC and MK inside South Africa is an urgent and immediate necessity. That necessity puts a responsibility on both those who are organising Umkhonto and the ANC as well as the masses in struggle. Each of us needs to ask ourselves: Are we doing the maximum? And we have to acknowledge another factor which relates to the basis of victory — that without the ANC or MK there can be no victory. So, all our people have a responsibility, not only to see if they are acting today, in contrast to the regime, but to make sure that the field work and the fighters of our country enter the ranks of the overwork of the ANC and MK inside South Africa.

A: If I'd be allowed to add a few observations to what has just been pointed out. We are a people's army, fighting a people's war. The

growth and strength of this army depends largely on the support it enjoys from the majority of our people. Reference has been made to the responsibility that our people have got to discharge in ensuring the effectiveness of our political and military blows against the enemy. Our people should not be mere spectators in the intensifying political and military struggle against the enemy. Every form of support should be given to our cadres as they confront the enemy in the cities, towns and villages of our country. The doors of the houses of our people should be open to our cadres. Everybody should realise that he has got a role to play to ensure the success of our military operations. To ensure that every cadre, as he throws a grenade in the house of a policeman, into the barracks of the fascist army, that that cadre must be able to get away, must be able to survive in order to be able to fight tomorrow. This task of fighting the enemy cannot just be relegated to the ANC and MK, but should be the task of all the patriots of our country, all those democrats who want to build a new South Africa, who want to destroy racism and fascism in our country.

The growth, then, of our army is the task of all of you inside the country who are committed to destroying that regime. Those who are confronting the fascist education authorities in order to achieve a democratic education in our country, those people in the rural areas fighting the removals in places like Mogopa, Drie Fontein, Crossroads, KTC and a number of other areas, should realise that the most potent weapon they have is the ANC politically and Umkhonto We Sizwe militarily.

Even before Umkhonto We Sizwe comes to meet them, they should so organise themselves that they are ready to join the ranks of our army and to fight within it, to defend themselves against all the injustices and brutalities the enemy perpetrates against us.

FORWARD TO VICTORY!

ANTIGOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS BACKED

London SECHARA in English Nov 84 pp 1-2

[Editorial: "Rooted in the People"]

[Text]

The people of South Africa are showing their anger once more. Never has the country seen a more widespread and powerful upsurge of militant protest and political activity than that which has been taking place over the past few months.

Resentment has grown as the conditions people live in have steadily deteriorated. Many thousands each year have lost homes, jobs and land through resettlement and forced removals. Retrenchments increase the number of unemployed, and in townships like Lamontville, under threat of being incorporated into a Bantustan, people face a future in which seeking work will become even more difficult. Rising prices and the increase in General Sales Tax render meagre wages more meagre.

The workers have been strong in showing their dissatisfaction. The regime itself admits to 76 strikes during the first six months of this year, involving 50 000 workers — three times as many strikes and five times as many strikers as during the corresponding period in 1983. The National Union of Mineworkers, only just over two years old, has been engaged in a confrontation with the mine owners and the regime, over wages and working conditions.

Since early in the year, students in schools and universities have been demonstrating and boycotting classes in protest against corporal punishment, the low quality of their education, and the fact that students' representative councils are forbidden in Black schools. Later, as students began to protest against the new con-

stitutional 'dispensations,' their protest became part of the general political flood.

Faced, as the year went on, with rent increases in some areas and incorporation into Bantustans in others, faced with the double insult of the tricameral parliament and the new local government legislation, faced with the corruption of those traitors who took places on town councils and in the House of Representatives and the House of Delegates, young and old resisted, taking to the streets in a massive upsurge of demonstrations.

Louis Le Grange, Minister of what the regime calls 'Law and Order,' claims that "other forces and organisations" have been responsible for the wave of protest. He does not explain how an unwilling populace could have been persuaded to face riot squads and armoured cars, dogs and batons and sjamboks, rubber bullets and plastic bullets and live ammunition. It was the regime that used this intimidation, and not the organisations of the people.

Many have been arrested, many have suffered dreadful injuries, many have been killed — some as young as six years old. Doctors have said that casualty departments in the hospitals have been heavily overloaded, but hospital staff have been instructed not to give any information about this. In spite of a ban on demonstrating at funerals, funerals of some of the dead — in keeping with tradition — became demonstrations, and general protest continues.

Finally, Umkhonto We Sizwe has mounted more attacks on such symbols of the regime as police stations and government departments. Commentators, including that mouth-piece of the regime, the *Citizen* newspaper, have noted that these attacks have become more frequent since the Nkomati Accord was signed. The regional commander of the South African Defence Force in the Eastern Transvaal stated in August that, despite the signing of the Accord, South Africa still faces "constant threat of being undermined from within." In September, the *Rand Daily Mail* ran an item about how to recognise a limpet mine.

It is clear that the bases of our people's army are where they belong, among our people, but the links between the people's army and the people are closer and stronger than that.

The colours of the ANC have appeared in demonstrations. The cadres of Umkhonto We Sizwe are the sons and daughters of our people. The activities of Umkhonto We Sizwe are an expression of the wishes and aspirations of the people of South Africa, as well as of their rage and their determination, their spirit and their courage.

Power to the People!

Victory is certain!

CSO: 3400/322

REID-DALY TO BOW OUT FOR TRANSKEIAN

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 5

[Article by Stephan Terblanche]

[Text] Legendary Selous Scouts leader and present Officer Commanding the Transkei Defence Force, Major-General Ron Reid-Daly, is soon to hand over his command to a young black officer from Umtata.

And the man soon to be appointed chief of the Transkei Defence Force (TDF), Colonel Zondwa Mtirara (33), has for five months quietly undergone the last stage of his grooming for the job at the elite South African Army College at Voortrekkerhoogte.

Together with another Transkeian officer, Col Mtirara became the first black to complete an advanced course at the Army College.

And in Umtata Gen Reid-Daly, who has completed four years of a six-year contract with the Transkeian government to train the country's fledgling Defence Force, now awaits the "political decision" which will terminate what is probably his last military command.

"All of this is a political decision, but the sooner it is done, the happier we will all be," says the tough-as-teak general.

Gen Reid-Daly says his task, and that of the other ex-Rhodesian officers contracted to the TDF, was to train the force to a viable stage where it could produce its own command element.

Pleased

"I suggested that Col Mtirara take over the command and that when he does take over, he should be well-trained. We therefore sent him to the SADF for this course and we are very pleased with the result," he said.

Gen Reid-Daly says he has no other future plans and will stay on in the TDF under Col Mtirara's command.

Col Mtirara is the son of Paramount Chief Albert Mtirara of the Tembus.

LSO: 3400/318

URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT UP, DESPITE GROWTH POINTS

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 4 Dec 84 p 7

[Text]

INDUSTRIAL growth in decentralisation points has not compensated for rising unemployment in the urban areas.

This is the view of Professor Trevor Bell, of the Rhodes University economics department, and Dr Vishnu Padayachee, of the Institute for Social and Economic Research of the University of Durban-Westville.

Writing in the latest issue of *Development Southern Africa*, the Development Bank of Southern Africa's quarterly journal, the researchers say nothing must be done to jeopardise the growth performance of the metropolitan areas.

They say unemployment rates have shown a cyclical, but rising trend, remarkably similar to those of the UK and other OECD countries.

"The evidence indicates that the rising trend in unemployment is primarily related to a slowdown in the rate of growth of the demand for labour, rather than any significant shifts in labour supply," they say.

However, the causes of the decrease in demand for labour are not readily apparent.

The researchers believe the major cause has been

the fall in the rate of economic growth. The three major forces underlying this downswing are:

- The rise in raw-material prices since the mid-sixties.
- The slowdown of the process of diffusion of technology by advanced industrial countries to industrialising Third World countries.
- The downward pressure on the relative price of manufactured goods because of rapidly increasing productivity and the resultant international competitiveness of newly industrialised countries (NICs) and Japan.

"These factors gave rise to a series of supply-side shocks which have moved the advanced industrial countries and therefore the world economy in a downward direction."

In South Africa this was alleviated to some extent by the expansionary, spending effects of two major gold booms.

The answer to rising unemployment does not lie in merely severely restrictive, deflationary monetary and fiscal policies.

"Such policies, though perhaps unavoidable for balance of payments reasons, tend to aggravate rather than cure problems of unemployment."

CSO: 3400/318

COMMENTARY ON WORRALL-WOODS DEBATE

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 1 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Stanley Uys: "Blame President Botha for that Censored Debate"]

[Text]

A UNIQUE debate took place this week at Cambridge University between South Africa's Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Dr Denis Worrall, and editor-in-exile Donald Woods. The subject was whether economic sanctions should be imposed on South Africa.

South African newspapers have not been able to publish a proper report of the debate, because Mr Woods is banned and may not be quoted.

An application to the authorities to allow publication of this particular report was turned down, which shows just how ludicrous this law can be.

Anti-apartheid activists at Cambridge tried to prevent Dr Worrall speaking, but British fair play won the day and the debate took place.

But the meeting voted by 540 to 134, with 252 abstentions, to sever all links with South Africa.

The result came as a surprise to many at Cambridge, because the Cambridge Union Society, which arranged the debate, is traditionally conservative and because the voting had been expected to go the other way.

The fault was not Dr Worrall's. In public relations terms, he is the best Ambassador the South African Government has had here for as long as anyone can remember.

With his academic background he has the reasoned, give-and-take approach which goes down well with the British.

But he was playing a losing hand from the start. The fact is that over the past few months the tide of public opinion has been turning against President Botha's Government.

President Botha may feel bitter and twisted that this should be so just when (in his opinion) he is doing more to reform apartheid than anyone else has done in the past 36 years of his party's rule, but there it is.

Several factors are responsible for this, perhaps the most important one being the new Constitution.

However valid President Botha's claim may be that his party would allow him to go no further than he did in parliamentary reform, the fact is that in the most dramatic way possible he excluded 22 million blacks from the country's constitutional life.

There is simply no way in which this exclusion can be explained to most people abroad, and, of course, the outcome has been the same both in South Africa and here in Britain: by trying to shut blacks out of the debate President Botha has ensured that people are talking about nothing else.

Hard on the heels of this debate has come the unrest in the black townships ... and the harsh methods the Government has used to quell the unrest.

In the circumstances it is not surprising that Dr Worrall did not stand a chance when he went to Cambridge this week: his case was lost before he got there.

President Botha's Government will have to accept that whatever the merits of a particular argument might be — to disinvest or not to disinvest, to ostracise or not to ostracise — the real debate about apartheid is a moral one, and until Pretoria can demonstrate a minimum morality in its approach it is going to continue to lose the debate.

And the only way in which this minimum morality can be demonstrated is by ensuring not only that the pace and nature of

apartheid reform are adequate, but also that any accompanying enforcement of law and order is not excessive.

President Botha has a real problem here.

At certain levels of Western society — government, business, Press and so forth — there is acceptance that his intentions genuinely are to reform. That much at least he has achieved.

But, particularly since Sharpeville 1984, there is a growing suspicion here that he may not be capable of carrying out sufficient reform.

To take just one example: if black councillors and other "collaborators" with apartheid are to bite the dust every time unrest flares up in a township, how can President Botha even begin to slot blacks into even the lowest level of constitutional integration?

What is left but old-style apartheid direct rule?

Even more worrying has been the despatch of troops and police en masse into the townships to suppress the unrest.

Among people here who accept that President Botha is pursuing reform, there is, of course, also reluctant acceptance that he will use force if necessary to prevent acceleration of reform beyond the official pace. But not in the crude way in which it is being done.

Reform has its own ethos: you cannot have new-style reform and old-style

enforcement. The latter will cancel out the former.

There have been the familiar raids and detentions without trial, followed by harassment of the Press ... following the time-honoured practice that, if the messenger brings you bad news, you cut out his tongue.

For an objective — even mildly sympathetic — foreign audience this is just not good enough. It smacks too much of the strong-arm stuff of the past three decades. The style belongs to pre-reform apartheid.

President Botha's problem, as many people here sympathetic to his reform programme see it, is that he is allowing himself to be squeezed too tightly between black pressure for reform on one side and Afrikaner resistance to reform on the other, that he is beginning to panic, that South Africa and the rest of the world are witnessing an act of apartheid recidivism.

Every time President Botha lashes out he will add to this impression and he will find himself in much deeper trouble than he has ever been internationally if friends, sympathisers and objective apartheid-watchers begin to suspect that he cannot handle reform.

As a reformer President Botha was seen by many as a winner. The more he shows signs of panic, the more he will be seen as a loser. And losers have no friends.

ZWELITSHA-BISHO ROAD OPENED

East London DAILY DISPATCH in English 27 Nov 74 p. 1

[Text] Zwelitsha--The construction of the Zwelitsha to Bisho link road was one of the Ciskei Government's foremost priorities in the list of independence projects to be financed and executed by the South African Government.

This was said by President Lennox Sebe when he officially opened the road yesterday.

The occasion was attended by Members of Parliament, chiefs, mayors and senior government officials.

The 7.5 km road cost R6.5 million to construct.

Pres Sebe said construction of the road had been urgent because the seat of government had moved from Zwelitsha to Bisho last year.

When the seat of government was moved to Bisho, it was anticipated that only limited housing for civil servants would be available there and most would be living at Zwelitsha.

"Thus it was necessary for hundreds of Ciskeian civil servants to pass daily to and fro through the tortuous and hazardous route to Bisho via King William's Town, and thereby continuously be exposed to the ever-vigilant and aggressive attention of the King William's Town traffic department," he said.

The commercial development of Bisho had presented a great challenge to the Ciskei Government and the Ciskeian people and it was necessary to link the people of Zwelitsha and its adjacent residential areas to Bisho by means of a short, direct and fast route which would bypass King William's Town.

The existing King William's Town to Komga road had never been constructed to carry the vastly increased traffic loads to which it had been subjected, and because of the narrow carriage way and steep gradients, the road effectively became a bottleneck for traffic trying to reach Bisho.

Pres Sebe urged Ciskeians not to underestimate the importance of the new road.

"As time and money permit, other trunk roads will be developed to by-pass King William's Town."

In this respect, it was envisaged that a new trunk road would intersect the Grahamstown to Alice and Stutterheim roads and link these routes directly to Bisho.

The linkage of the roads would help to build a strong internal economy.--Mk.

CSO: 3400/318

THREATS TO RUBBER INDUSTRY REPORTED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Don Robertson]

[Text]

THE R300-million a year industrial rubber industry is being undermined by huge increases in the price of raw materials and by imported rubber products.

Many South African producers have slashed production in a market which has shrunk by a quarter since the beginning of the year.

In October 1983 the world and SA prices of natural rubber were almost equal, but the weakening of the rand and the 25% tariff imposed on imported natural rubber in February this year has widened the gap between the two prices by 141% to the disadvantage of the SA consumer.


Sentrachem

The tariff was introduced to protect Sentrachem's polyisoprene plant in Newcastle.

The world price at the end of October was 78 US cents a kilogram, its lowest for two years, and the price of rubber landed in South Africa, including the 25% tariff, was R1,83 a kg.

This, says Alan Roberts, director of industrial products at General Tire, has allowed imports of finished products which use the cheap world price, to capture a growing share of the SA market.

Natural rubber prices in US cents and SA cents



Protection

Mr Roberts said yesterday: "Imports have more than doubled since February 1983, and now total almost R10 million a month compared with R3.5-million at the beginning of 1983."

Mr Roberts is a prominent member of the Industrial

Rubber Manufacturers Association, which says that the association will ask Government for greater tariff protection for SA-made rubber products, saying even so that import controls will be reinforced.

General Tire, which has continued six to ten years of rubber companies in the

roof — Mining & Industrial Rubber Company (MIR) — uses substantial quantities of natural rubber in its product mix. About 40% of all polymer used is imported natural rubber.

The affects of a 25% drop in the SA market and the larger share captured by imports have caused production to be cut by about 20% at its three manufacturing plants.

Mr Roberts is fairly optimistic, however. He says that because of high interest rates which increase the cost of keeping large inventories and the decline in the rand, imported rubber products are no longer much cheaper than the SA-made goods.

Sharp rise

The company's rationalisation has reduced fixed costs by about R2-million a year and resulted in a trebling of profits based on comparable sales last year.

The benefits of the grouping of the six producers in MIR and the cost savings were evident in General Tire's interim statement in August which showed a sharp rise in earnings to 220c a share in the six months to June from 127c previously.

CSO: 3400/318

KIMBERLEY LEAST EXPENSIVE PLACE TO LIVE

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 6 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Paul Bell]

[Text]

THE Vaal Triangle is the most expensive place to live in and Kimberley is the cheapest.

That's the finding of the Stellenbosch Bureau for Economic Research (BER), which publishes the September consumer prices indices for 12 metropolitan areas in its latest survey. The indices use 100 as a base, starting in 1975.

A little cheaper than the Vaal Triangle (314,3) are the Free State Goldfields (311,9), followed by Durban (303,9), Pretoria (303,4), the Witwatersrand — including Johannesburg (302,7), Pietermaritzburg (300,5), Cape Town (292,6), Bloemfontein (292,1), Klerksdorp (288,6), East London (287,1), and Port Elizabeth (286,8). Kimberley is at the bottom — or the top, from a consumer point of view — with 284,6.

That means that the Vaal Triangle is 10,4% more expensive than Kimberley. And there is naught for the Triangle's comfort — it also shows the highest increase in the rate of inflation (16,4%).

Unfortunately for Kimberley, while it may have the cheapest cost of living, it ranks only third from the bottom in terms of the rate of increase of inflation (11,3%). Port Elizabeth does best in this category — 9,8%.

While PE may eventually pull ahead of Kimberley and be the cheapest place to live in, it's also the heart of the motor industry

where the recession is in full swing. Slower inflation there probably means lower demand because people have less to spend.

The consumer price index (CPI) for food gives somewhat different results. It costs more to eat in Pietermaritzburg (326,2) than anywhere else. Close behind is Cape Town (323,2), Durban (320,5), Goldfields (315,9), East London (311,9), PE (310,5), the Vaal Triangle (309,6), Pretoria (309,4), the Witwatersrand (307,9), Bloemfontein (301,2), Klerksdorp (300,2) and Kimberley (295,9).

Durban shows the heftiest increase in the rate of food inflation — 14,1%, followed by Pretoria (12,8) and Cape Town (10,3).

Looking at Cape Town, not only are its food prices the second-highest, but the increase in inflation is third-highest. Still, there's hope for the Mother City; its rate of increase has slowed from 16,6% in June.

GST was removed from unprocessed foods when the hike to 10% was introduced in July and most metropolitan areas — notably Pretoria — have obviously registered the benefits of this in terms of significant declines in their rates of food inflation.

But there are exceptions. By September, Durban had almost completely lost the ground it gained in July. And the Vaal Triangle moved ever upwards; the GST food dispensation made not a jot of difference. Kimberley too, barely registered the change.

ASPECTS OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STUDIED

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 2 Dec 84 p 13

[Article by Ameen Akhalwaya: "Slotting People of Colour Into the SA Spectrum"]

[Text]

PEOPLE of colour. That's the term some newspapers are now using to describe people who are not white.

The term is intended to replace 'non-white', which is regarded as offensive by those to whom it is applied. Put 'people of colour' is no less offensive, judging by the derision and sarcasm with which it was received by politicians during the coloured and Indian election campaigns in August.

In racially sensitive and officially divided South Africa, epithets, no matter how well-meaning, are bound to cause problems.

So how did those newspapers arrive at 'people of colour'?

Well, once a large section of the population was called 'kaffir'. This was later changed officially to 'native'. (Today it is an offence to call anyone 'kaffir'.)

But 'native' became a politically charged term, not only because anybody born here is a native of South Africa, but the Nationalists, who claim white settlers moved into the interior from the Cape about the same time blacks were moving south from other parts of Africa, wouldn't agree that the 'natives' were really natives.

They replaced 'native' with 'bantú'. Bantu means people, but because the Nats used it, those so classified found it offensive.

Classified

They preferred 'African', especially since white people were then called 'Europeans'. In the late Fifties the Rand Daily Mail replaced 'native' with 'African'. Many of its white readers objected, and its circulation suffered a huge drop.

Meanwhile those classified bantú, coloured, Indian and Chinese were col-

lectively termed 'non-European', while the others remained 'European'.

Then 'European' was changed to 'white', and 'non-European' became 'non-white' in the Sixties.

Along came the Steve Biko-led black consciousness movement. It found 'non-white' offensive, saying the "negative" term recognised people not in their own right, but in comparison to whites.

Black consciousness insisted that 'black' be used to describe collectively its "sub-groups" — Africans, coloureds and Indians.

After initial hesitation, some white newspapers, finding that coloured and Indian politicians were happy to be called 'black', started endorsing the black consciousness usage in the mid-Seventies. It went off smoothly for four or five years.

Then the government found 'bantú' was indeed unacceptable, and replaced it officially with 'black'.

This threw newspaper usage of the term into confusion. If a newspaper said "blacks carry passes", it obviously did not refer to coloureds or Indians.

Instead, the Press started talking of 'blacks, coloureds and Indians', but it again ran into trouble, especially over headlines and the collective description. So it frequently talked of 'the black groups'.

Then, to complicate the issue, coloureds and Indians were admitted into Parliament this year. Some newspapers wrote about 'blacks in Parliament', but in terms of official usage, that was misleading, since people classified black are barred from Parliament.

So they talked of 'non-whites in Parliament'. This, too, was misleading, for only two sections of 'non-whites' were in Parliament. And, back to square one,

'non-white' had been accepted 10 years ago as being offensive.

Black consciousness supporters, who were angered by the earlier change to 'blacks, coloureds and Indians' from 'Africans, coloureds and Indians', were angered again. But, white journalists argue, whites born here are also Africans.

Meanwhile members of other local anti-apartheid groups who are classified coloured and Indian also say they prefer to be called black.

They want 'coloured' and 'Indian' to be dropped. Along come the resuscitated Transvaal Indian Congress and the Natal Indian Congress during the Indian elections. With 'Indian' being a political no-no, the congresses say they are really nonracial, but retain 'Indian' for historical reasons.

But, says Mr Saths Cooper deputy leader of the Azanian People's Organisation, "Indians belong in India". Just as 'African' and 'European' are no longer used, South African-born Indians are not Indians.

And people classified coloured are angry, too. As Labour Party spokesmen point out, there is no such ethnic group as 'coloured'. So they use 'so-called coloured', and some newspapers have endorsed that usage.

Politicians

Then again, white people who believe coloureds are really Afrikaners started using the term 'bruin (brown) Afrikaners' to describe them. Now Labour politicians, too, are heard talking about 'bruin mense' (brown people).

Afrikaans papers have for some years used 'gekleurdes' (people of colour) as the collective term. Now

some English newspapers are following suit.

And that is how we are now at 'people of colour'.

Of course everyone would prefer to be called plain South African — if only we had an open society.

When that happens, we're likely to run into another problem, for a short while at least. There will probably be a bitter debate over what to call our country — South Africa or Azania.

CSO: 3400/318

BUTI CALLS ON LEADERS TO SNUB CABINET COMMITTEE

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 25 Nov 84 p 2

[Article by Graham Watts]

[Text] THE Reverend Sam Buti, mayor of Alexandra, has delivered a blow to the government's plans for a constitutional formula for urban blacks.

He this week called on black leaders not to participate in talks with the Cabinet committee on the constitutional future of urban blacks chaired by Mr Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning.

Mr Buti said in a statement: "The participation by blacks in discussion concerning the constitutional plan for urban blacks will be a definite betrayal of established struggles by those men and women who have been banished, exiled or even imprisoned by the South African racist regime."

The government has made much of the Cabinet committee, frequently assuring its critics that a constitutional solution for blacks was in the pipeline. Talks have been held with the leaders of independent and self-governing homelands but these have been boycotted by Chief Buthelezi of Kwazulu.

Mr Buti has the rare status of a black community leader who has participated in the government-created black local authorities structure (upgraded community councils) and still has considerable legitimacy in his community--a sort of unofficial Chief Buthelezi.

During the height of unrest in Reef townships recently when black councillors died at the hands of residents, had their homes and businesses burnt down or went into hiding, Mr Buti's home stood unguarded.

He was just the sort of man Mr Heunis needed to lend credibility to his efforts for a constitutional formula for blacks.

Instead, Mr Buti has advised 'our black brothers and sisters--those so-called black community leaders--not to pose as if they have been mandated by the black South African people to discuss the future national constitutional matters' with the government.

'Experience has taught us that such committees and discussions bear fruitless results,' said Mr Buti.

'We wish to make an earnest plea to those so-called 'urban black' community leaders and 'homeland' leaders who have been invited to participate in the discussions not to fall into a trap of consciously or unconsciously propagating and promoting the policy of apartheid.

'We reiterate our plea for reconciliation and the unbanning of the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and black political movements,' he said.

CSO: 3400/296

DURBAN REJECTS DEMAND FOR MIXED BUSES

Johannesburg, SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 2

(article by Shaun Harris)

(Text) Durban remains the only major city in South Africa with segregated buses. After an application to partially desegregate the coastal city's over-crowded bus service was this week turned down for the fourth time.

The controversial decision by the transport authorities is certain to become a major issue between Opposition spokesmen and Transport Minister Hendrik Verwoerd when Parliament opens in two months--and the matter could even reach the Supreme Court.

Natal leader of the PFP Mr Ray Swart and MP Peter Gastrow vowed this week to take up the mixed buses issue with Mr Schoeman and demand that he put pressure on the transport authorities to allow Durban to integrate some of its bus routes, as has been done in some other major centres in South Africa.

THE DIVIDE

While white and black city workers stand together every day waiting for transport to take them to the same destination, they have to use different buses--blue buses for whites and green buses for blacks.

Many, weary of the ever-decreasing number of buses available on their routes, choose to break the law and use a bus designated for a different race group.

Even though this practice has become increasingly common, the Durban Transport Management Board (DTMB) has been unable to get the Local Road Transport Board (LRTB) to sanction mixed buses.

(Text)

H Pieter de Seer, chairman of the LRTB, said that, while he was not permitted from revealing the board's reasons for turning down the application, he was "not obliged to give any reasons."

General manager of the DTMB, Mr Marshall Cuthbert, said he had appealed to the National Transport Commission and was considering the option of going to the Supreme Court if the appeal was unsuccessful.

(Text) 0400716

VITALITY OF VERLIGTHEID MOVEMENT NOTED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 27

[Article by Prof Willie Esterhuyse: "Verligtheid: The Road Ahead"]

[Text] In this "credo of a verligte", Professor Esterhuyse of the Philosophy Department at Stellenbosch University, author of "Apartheid Must Die" and one of Afrikanerdom's most influential thinkers, takes issue with those who believe that verligtheid is a spent force.

Once again the so-called verligtes are under fire, and at a recent congress they were even asked to take their leave of verligtheid.

The shots are coming from three directions.

Rightwingers regard them as integrationists who have led the National Party down a lost path. They believe the verligtes have sold out the Afrikaner people.

Those left of the NP regard them as obstacles on the path of reform and masters of the art of avoiding or muddling the real issues; they accuse verligtes of standing for a form of non-apartheid and wanting to give the NP a credibility it does not deserve.

With both these groups of critics the issue is more an aversion to the NP than to verligte views. The argument of those to the left of the NP is especially striking.

It goes: "Despite their little aversion, the verligtes remain supporters of the NP. The party is caught up in the miasma of group nationalism and apartheid ideology.

"Therefore, verligtes remain in their hearts group nationalists and followers of apartheid."

There are also people within NP ranks who don't exactly appreciate the verligtes. They are suspected of disloyalty towards the party, are regarded as an embarrassment and are sometimes even accused of socialistic tendencies.

The diversity of the criticism gives rise to the question: If there is something like verligtheid, what does it actually mean?

For me it means:

--Verligtes are in favour of an orderly process of reform within which certain goals are striven for, but not according to final blueprints. They want to stimulate a process of renewal but without the sacrifice of stability.

--The goals for which they are striving are: the dismantling of all forms of apartheid and discrimination; continued democratisation of South African society and the extension of political participation to all South Africa's population groups.

Also a more just division of the economic and social advantages and the creation of legitimate negotiating bodies in which legally elected leaders will sit.

--Verligtes regard the NP as the only party political instrument of reform the whites possess.

They believe that reform without the cooperation of the greatest number of Afrikaners has no chance of success. Therefore they want to change the NP into an effective instrument for reform.

They also do not believe that the mainstream of our politics can exclude the NP and the Afrikaner.

--Verligtes concentrate on the question: how can one move in practice from point A (apartheid) to point B (a more just dispensation)?

Therefore they concentrate less on dramatic moral declarations about what South Africa should be like and more on tactical shifts to bring the process of renewal into gear.

For this reason they were, for example, in favour of the implementation of the new constitutional dispensation despite the fact that they did not regard it as the last word in constitutional development.

--In this process they also look at the existing reality and go to work on a step by step basis.

They choose their focus selectively and ask: within given circumstances, in which areas and in which issues is there a greater practical possibility to achieve reform than in others?

That was why for a long time sport was a focus. Thus Article 16 of the Immorality Act became a focus. Verligtes do not exclude other focus points, but argue that everything cannot be achieved simultaneously in a single dramatic act of creation.

Breakthroughs in one area are seen as precondition for breakthroughs in others.

--Verligtes believe that emotional criticism of apartheid and the damning of the Afrikaner and the NP for everything that has gone wrong in South Africa encourages polarisation and is an obstacle on the path of reform.

A moral attack on the NP and the Afrikaner with extravagantly emotional language is, according to verligtes, counter productive.

That is why they prefer to criticise from within, and they are also prepared to see the good in the NP and the Afrikaner. Briefly, they don't try to seek credibility by turning their backs on either the party or the Afrikaner.

--Verligtes are not concerned only about whites, neither do they see only blacks--they see both white and black people.

They are not in favour of a black majority government, but they also have no objection to sharing political power with blacks. For them, what is important is the form it will take.

In this they also accept that South Africa consists not only of individuals with individual rights, but also of groups with group demands.

--Verligtes have no objection to negotiation with the ANC.

--Verligtes think that the detention of people and the banning of organisations do not offer a solution to South Africa's problems.

Although they are firmly opposed to violent resistance, they believe that detention without trial and bannings contribute towards polarisation rather than reconciliation.

--Verligtes are against the forced removal of people and the heavy-handed clearing of squatter camps.

They are also in favour of property rights for black people in the metropolitan and other areas in South Africa.

--What verligtes try to do is to keep hope for the future alive and not to promote a spirit of despair and fatalism. This is why they have an aversion both to defeatist talk and the perception that whites simply want to promote their own interests and in the process oppress the blacks.

There can be no doubt that verligte strategy has contributed greatly to the fact that South Africa today is experiencing a dynamic process of renewal.

It was the verligtes, from newspapers to individuals, who softened the hard ideological certainties of the past and who stimulated new thought and ideas.

Indeed, I am arrogant enough to suggest that the verligtes' contribution in this connection has been greater than that of opposition parties and critics to the left of the NP.

And they could do it because they didn't fire moral broadsides from ivory towers against the Afrikaner and the National Party, but said their say within existing institutions.

Much of the criticism of verligtes is born out of frustration with the fact that they achieved more in practice with their strategy than those who left their Afrikanerskap behind.

It is true that verligtes have had to make compromises. But who doesn't make compromises within South African society?

Even the most stringent critics of apartheid within white ranks make extensive use of the privileges with which apartheid has endowed them--from housing to well-remunerated employment opportunities.

It is also true that verligtes have had to endure a great deal of harsh criticism of their views from within Afrikaner ranks. It is an indication of their commitment that they did not allow themselves to be silenced.

What is the future of verligte strategy?

I want to agree here with the critics that a point has been reached where a clearer articulation of long-term goals and more daring thought about possible political models have become essential.

It must be said very clearly in which direction the rights of black people can go.

While verligtes have articulated the idea of a declaration of intent, the time has also arrived when one must say what such a declaration will contain--including that black people are entitled to South African citizenship and what must be done to realise it, that joint political decision-making for black people is an intention, that all forms of discrimination must be dismantled and how this must be done, and where.

Such a list of intentions must also be linked to a timetable.

A stage has also been reached when verligtes must seek consensus outside the party link with other reform-minded people on specific issues. The question of a declaration of human rights is one such issue.

The time, in my opinion, is past when those in favour of non-violent change should discredit or sow suspicion about each other.

Today, more than ever, South Africa needs reform alliances--especially outside the party connection.

The seriousness with which we regard reform will be evidenced by our willingness to lay down mutual personal differences and to work for goals which are more important than our particular aspirations and prejudices.

South Africa's future has been sabotaged long enough by personal prejudice.

CSO: 3400/318

FORMER JUSTICE STEYN PROFILED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 1 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Hellouise Truswell]

[Text]

"THERE IS no more significant single pillar of a stable society than residential development based on the right principles. These principles include dynamism, affordability, involvement, home-ownership and privatisation of the financing process.

"We in South Africa believe in a free enterprise economic system. Blacks currently perceive capitalism to be the other side of racism. A dynamic housing process based on ownership is the most appropriate way of destroying the myth that salvation lies on the road of naive socialism."

The words are spoken by the Hon Jan Hendrik Steyn, former Justice of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Cape Provincial Division, currently Chief Executive Officer of the Urban Foundation. Yesterday he was the man nominated by the National Institute of Housing to receive its prestigious award: Housing Man of the Year.

Jan Steyn is a worthy choice for this honour. A protean man who pours his heart, enthusiasm and caring commitment into a daunting task ... the creation of a more just society in South Africa. The capacity to see a great objective and go after it is one of his strengths. Not hobbled by difficulties that tend to submerge lesser mortals, he takes the macroview. Black urbanisation will be the key issue to deal with in the year ahead, he reveals.

And, "in common with leaders in commerce and industries, I would like a colordinated private sector

thrust comprehending a multiplicity of agencies working towards defined reform goals in South Africa. I hope 1985 will give greater content to that ambition."

He adds: "We can start building bridges of confidence across the gulf of distrust which exists at present. I think we can create a climate where it is possible for us to look at the fundamental constitutional structures which have to be designed in order to accommodate legitimate aspirations for participation in decision-making at national level."

In a country where reciprocal mistrust between black and white is a way of life, Jan Steyn as chief negotiator of the Urban Foundation combined his particular personal skills with the authority of this organisation in obtaining security of tenure for urban blacks.

When he launched the Foundation in March 1977, housing almost immediately became one of the key operating areas. Securing the 99-year leasehold to urban blacks in 1978 was an exercise which required hard horse-trading. How hard it was at times only Jan Steyn and the small, tightly-knit group with whom he shares his faith at the Foundation, will ever know.

Unquestionably Jan Steyn's perseverance and leadership played a major role, not only in obtaining the 99-year leasehold, but in the extension of this leasehold to the Western Cape.

He has also been involved in negotiations and representations which led to the extension of these rights to non-independent homelands in June last year, as well as the recent an-

nouncements of State guarantees to building societies in respect of granting bonds in these areas.

The principle of freehold rather than the 99-year leasehold is what he wants to see now. "I would be bullish for this in the short term. I think Government understands that even the 99-year leasehold has a measure of impermanence about it. Freehold has great symbolic significance ... the sense of permanence and the elimination of a discriminatory component in the housing structure. There are many symbolic issues which Government could address by joint action with black leadership negotiated hard across a table."

On Tuesday I talk to Jan Steyn before he dashes off to the airport to take a flight back to Cape Town. Life for him is a frenzied round of travelling, negotiations with the private sector, Government, black leaders.

The challenge which fires him is, simply stated, "being part of what is going on". Hence the switch from the Bench to the Urban Foundation.

As he explains: "I'm not a lawyer's lawyer. Being in the law for the sake of the law can be frightfully dull. I think many of my colleagues enjoy the kind of judicial crossword puzzle exercise. I like the practise of law and decision making in the legal context. But law for the law's sake is not something that has ever really appealed to me."

What appeals is the desire to be involved. Coupled with this is a rare quality of compassion encoded in his genes. Concern for the hardship of others is more than acquired. It is inborn.

Both his parents — his father was a DRC minister — dedicated their lives to community service. His mother, Zerilda Steyn, was one of the founder members of the Citizen's Housing league in Cape Town, serving as a member of the National Housing Commission until her death in 1963.

"My mother taught us in Afrikaans that 'besorgdheid (concern) is die mooiste woord in die Afrikaanse taal'. I have very many memories of my mother, but that message was the one that really stuck."

In 1976 "I was really concerned for South Africa, very worried that we were facing a revolutionary situation. Making some small contribution towards trying to stem that sort of tide and to bring South Africa back from what I thought was the brink of a revolutionary abyss was the motivating force in moving from the Bench to the Urban Foundation."

"Today one is aware of the tensions that are about at the moment, the sense of insecurity and the disaffection. The highly critical attitude of people. The almost all-pervasive sense of instability. But 1976 I think was a lot worse."

He leans forward across his desk, squares his shoulders, rapidly fires off information with unflagging enthusiasm. A conversation with Jan Steyn turns into a balled fist-thumping-the-air conference. One is swept along by the lucidity of his arguments. His passion for justice.

Even after eight arduous years as CEO of the Foundation, his messianic zeal for his task is undiminished. Plenty of steam left in his boiling, although he admits: "There are times when one has gone through considerable soul-searching, asking yourself if what you're doing is really worthwhile. Sometimes you feel like walking away from it all."

"But today and over the last 18 months I have come to peace with myself in that respect. There's an understanding that each one of us can do what he can do. You've got to identify for yourself what you can do and do it well."

Prior to that, he says: "I was a bit inclined to run like the little Dutch boy trying to stick his finger in every hole in the dyke. I think the change is because of Robin Lee's help, which is of inestimable value to me."

"We have been partners in this operation right from the beginning. With his help we have defined for the Foundation a legitimate and effective

role concentrating on five main goals ... residential development, educational change, access to work opportunities, urbanisation and local government. In the beginning we tended to have a kind of shotgun approach with a very broad spectrum of concerns. Everything from a creche to an old age home ..."

His proudest achievement? "To have brought together an effective organisation that really works together as a team. A harmonious organisation that has been able to survive the buffeting of the South African political storm climate while retaining its cohesion."

Troubleshooter is how he defines his own role. "I'm a negotiator. After we've identified the issues, we work out the strategies as to how we think they can be redressed. I'm the guy up front who goes in there and tries to bring it about."

His ambition for the future? No hesitation before he replies: "Influx control."

He is a truly remarkable man. One senses the sincerity, the selfless commitment which communicates itself to the members of the Foundation

team. "The exciting thing about the Foundation is that people are prepared to work 24 hours a day if necessary. I think it is because the Foundation offers them an opportunity of something more than mere bottom line gratification."

Consensus is that his inspired leadership is central to the success of the organisation.

His golf handicap has plummeted from nine to 16 since he joined the Urban Foundation, as he manages to play only three games a month. But he remains, he says "a fanatic golfer". He's president of the Rondebosch Golf Club.

One thing that he does make time for is reading. He's a voracious reader. A keen student of the writings of the French Nobel Prize winner Camus.

Walking to the lift on his way to the airport, he quotes from Camus: "... is it possible to survive as a people without doing reasonable justice to other people?"

One is left with the overriding conviction that doing justice to others is the moral imperative that governs Jan Steyn.

POLICE SUBPOENAS ON JOURNALISTS CREATE 'MORAL DILEMMAS'

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 2 Dec 84 p 13

[Article by Ken Owen: "The State vs the Press"]

[Text]

THE moral dilemmas of journalism in South Africa — journalism in an unjust state, if you like — have been brought into sharp focus in the past week by the spate of subpoenas served on journalists by the security police.

Unders'andable confusion surrounds the legal, ethical and moral questions that are raised when the police, in effect, make journalists their fact-gatherers.

When, as in the case of the Sunday Express, they demand from a journalist verification of information which they have in their possession, and which they already know to be true, the journalists can hardly be blamed for suspecting the object is to intimidate or humiliate; strong emotional responses then cloud the issue even further.

The Sunday Express case — call it the State vs Graham Watts — is worth reviewing in some detail because it demonstrates with rare clarity how a path may, and indeed should, be threaded through a complex situation.

Graham Watts is the Sunday Express political reporter. His job, unlike that of the political correspondent, deals less with parliamentary and Cabinet politics than with the entire range of political activity from by-elections to riots. It is a minefield.

To this job Mr Watts brings more than journalistic skill. He is a singularly careful reporter who does his work with such unblinking honesty that he tends to open stunning new insights for his readers. Among his colleagues he is regarded as setting something of a standard of integrity so that when the police intervened it was immediately seen by many as a case of honesty clashing with a body of unjust law — a test of ethical and moral values.

This particular test began when Mr Watts interviewed a former Robben Island prisoner, Mr Thami Mali, who called himself a revolutionary and claimed a share of the responsibility for organising the two-day stayaway on November 5 and 6.

The substance of what Mr Mali was saying differed very little from the more generalised accusations so frequently made by the Minister of Law and Order or the Minister of Justice — that industrial action such as last month's stayaway was a political act, designed to make the country ungovernable and so to force change. It was what everybody already knew.

Mr Watts conducted the interview with characteristic care and decency. He used a tape recorder to ensure accuracy. He offered to switch it off if, at any point, Mr Mali wanted to go "off the record". He even offered to go back and erase anything about which Mr Mali might have second thoughts.

Mr Mali did not take up these offers (which, incidentally, Mr Watts makes fairly routinely out of a passion for fairness). Subsequently Mr Mali expressed a hope that the interview would be published. Mr Mali not only knew he was speaking for publication, he insisted on it.

The report which emerged was an astonishing piece of journalism, not because it conveyed anything new, but because it portrayed so vividly the

angry mind of a young black man in Soweto. It was to have enormous impact, not only on the government (which cited it as an 'orrible example of negativism') but also on business leaders and the white community at large.

The report was checked for legality and published on the normal grounds used by the Sunday Express that what the law does not forbid is permissible. Inasmuch as Mr Mali was a public figure, readers had a right to know who he was, and he had a right to a public platform. But before the report could appear in print, Mr Mali was himself detained by the security police. This made it instantly illegal to publish his picture but not illegal to publish the interview.

The picture was excised from the page, leaving a blank silhouette to denote the censoring effect of the law, and the interview was published.

Whether the report precipitated the action that followed is impossible to say. The government is known to be edgy about what it calls "negative" reporting (which the Press in general regards as simply reflecting the current state of the nation), and it can hardly be coincidence that the rarely used Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act was called into play no fewer than nine times in the following days.

In any event, a Captain van Wyk of the security police and a Warrant Officer Grundlingh appeared in the office of the Editor of the Sunday Express with a search warrant entitling them to seize the tape-recording which was mentioned in Mr Watts's interview.

Fortunately, Mr Watts had by then been sent to Jamba in Angola where he used the same tape to record the words of Unita's leader Jonas Savimbi. Captain van Wyk nevertheless

demanding the tape so that it could be subjected to forensic tests, since there was no quarrelling with the search warrant, the tape was handed over. The law has the power to compel.

However, when it transpired that the tape was now useless for the purposes of the police, Captain van Wyk demanded from Mr Watts an affidavit affirming the accuracy of his report of the Mali interview.

The policeman did not doubt the accuracy of the report. On the contrary, he said he knew it to be accurate because Mr Mali, who was then in detention, had told him the same things as he told Mr Watts. However, he required an affidavit affirming the accuracy of the report in order to put evidence before the court.

At this Mr Watts balked. He had interviewed Mr Mali as a reporter, not as an agent of the police. His purpose had been to gather information for the use of the society at large, not to save the police the time and trouble of gathering evidence for themselves. Mr Watts feared that the whole process of newsgathering would be inhibited if informants — or reporters — thought that the results would be used by the police.

The distastefulness of becoming, through journalistic work, a kind of unofficial police investigator was heightened in this case by the nature of the law which Mr Mali was accused of violating. The Internal Security Act is an appalling piece of legislation which can be interpreted as making an offence of innocent conduct (such as agitating for change in the character of the state) which should be regarded as normal political behaviour.

Neither Mr Watts nor the newspaper was anxious to become part of the machinery of enforcing laws which were so patently unjust and so clearly intended to frustrate the pursuit of normal rights by people deprived of them for the colour of their skin. The answer was to say to the state, in effect, "We don't like this role, we don't want to do it — if you insist on it, you must force us."

The police were prepared. They produced a subpoena which required Mr Watts to appear before a magistrate and, under oath, affirm the truthfulness of his report. Refusal would entail a heavy jail sentence.

The legal position, at least, was plain. South Africa is not unique in compelling journalists to disclose information bearing upon the commission or suspected commission of a crime. Indeed, any citizen can be compelled to tell a court the truth as he knows it.

But there were curious features to this case — the number of Section 205 subpoenas, the fact that the police

could read the information in the newspaper, the fact that they knew it to be true. All this suggested to the newspaper that the motive might be more political and intimidatory than legal.

Under the circumstances it seemed all the more important to make it clear that the newspaper was not co-operating voluntarily; it was decided to comply with the subpoena under protest, and make this protest plain by as much legal footdragging as could be achieved. In the end, the law would compel Mr Watts to comply, but at least it would be clear that it was rape, not seduction.

In theory, Mr Watts had the option to refuse to answer the questions put to him and go to jail, just as, say, Mrs Winnie Mandela has the option to ignore her banishment order and leave Brandfort, and then to go to jail as soon as she is caught. The argument was raised by some journalists who, not themselves faced with imprisonment, nevertheless felt enthusiastic about martyrdom.

But why should he do so? Every citizen is required to obey the law; neither newspapermen nor newspapers are exempt. Journalism knows only one exception — the classical refusal of a journalist to disclose the identity of informants to whom he has promised anonymity.

Even then, journalists do not dispute the law. They simply disobey, and accept their punishment.

Democratic states recognise that here lies a real dilemma. The law cannot yield but neither can the journalist who could not otherwise fulfil his function; and since that function is generally accepted by democratic societies to be benign and useful, the state is as lenient as it can possibly be. Laws like Section 205 are invoked with great care, sentences are usually lenient, the journalist is normally given opportunities to reconsider, and the police resolve the problem as quickly as they can by finding elsewhere the information they need so that the journalist can be released.

This understanding attitude makes it vital that the ethical exception should not be adulterated by the creation of additional "ethical exceptions" — for example, refusal to obey a law which an individual (whether he be a journalist or not) deems to be unjust. Rotten as the Internal Security Act may be, it cannot serve as a justification for a journalist to disobey the law. Neither can the fact that in South Africa the laws are passed by an unrepresentative minority.

To try to widen the ethical exception is to weaken its validity; the chances are that the state will react with impatience and such severity as to persuade journalists — as in the case of the Prisons Act — that it is

better not to report anything at all than to risk such punishment.

Only one other reason could be discovered for refusing to answer the questions and going to jail: personal conscience.

To refuse to answer questions in court is an act of conscientious objection that is comparable to the refusal of a religious objector to wear a military uniform. It is a decision of such gravity, a life-altering decision, that expert advice was sought on the point, both from a teacher of ethics and from an outstanding barrister, as well as from editors and lawyers.

The unanimous view was that Mr Mali's case did not raise any issue that required such a stand. Mr Mali is an adult, an intelligent adult, and he knew what he wanted to say. Indeed, he said it to several newspapers and to the police. He left no doubt in anybody's mind that he wanted his views published and publication of those views, though they might have a bearing on other matters, did not in itself violate the law.

When Mr Watts answered the questions put to him in court — noting that he did so under protest — he achieved a number of objectives.

He complied with the law; he made plain the reluctance of journalists to be cast as investigators for the police; he preserved, intact and unadulterated, the ethical exception that requires journalists to keep promises of confidentiality; he used the episode to warn that if journalists are put too often in such a position they will simply stop reporting matters which put them at such risk; and he emphasised to the world at large that informants who want protection must demand confidentiality in advance.

So the case of the State vs Watts was turned into a reaffirmation of the principles that guide the profession through the moral minefield that is modern South Africa.

GRAHAMSTOWN TREASON TRIAL DENOUNCED

London SECHABA in English Nov 84 pp 10-11

[Article by Justitia]

[Text]

In a trial that has already lasted more than a year, and which has been surrounded by a high degree of secrecy, eleven men are facing charges that could mean the death sentence. The eleven men are:

Rufus Nzo, aged 24
Douglas TyuTyu, 48
Sipho Hina, 44
James Ngqondela, 54
Mzayifani Khame, 57
Mzimkhulu Khame, 22
Sipho Nodlawu, 35
Vukile Tshiwula, 43
Lindile Mbekelana, 27
Wellington Gumenge, 29
Nceba Faku, 27

They are now in the Grahamstown Supreme Court because they are alleged to have acted together to overthrow the state, through the propagation of ANC literature and ideas, and through participation in the armed struggle. They are alleged to have established caches of weapons, to have harboured guerrillas and to be responsible for armed action against symbols of apartheid and economic targets in and around Port Elizabeth between 1981 and 1983.

In order to get what the courts of apartheid accept as 'evidence' the security police systematically tortured the accused after detaining them in May 1983. A succession of state witnesses have been used, including a juvenile, many of them appearing *in camera*, their names unknown to those outside the court-

room. As in so many political trials, this one has an unknown hero, a man who refused to testify against the eleven and who, without even being labelled Mr X or Mr Y, was sentenced, and disappeared into the prisons of apartheid for two and a half years.

Maseru Raid

Also before the court were 160 items, consisting of documents, literature and some weapons, which the South African Defence Force claimed to have seized in the infamous attack on Maseru in December 1982, when they killed 42 people, ANC refugees and Basotho nationals. The defendants are alleged to have had contact with one of those killed in the raid.

So secretive was the court about this dimension of the case that even the press was ordered out while an unnamed senior officer told the judge, for reasons that have not been disclosed, why the public should be excluded when evidence was given by two members of the SADF who took part in the raid. When the two did appear, what they said and what the defence could ask them in cross-examination was limited by an embargo which General Malan had placed on certain aspects of the raid.

Armed Struggle

The eleven facing trial range in age from 24 years to 57 years. They include three former Robben Island prisoners. Some had been detained several times previously.

The list of what they are supposed to have done is a long one, filling 25 pages of an indictment covering a period in which the Port Elizabeth region was in a state of heightened militancy and political activity. Apart from charges relating to the possession of banned literature, to military training, liaising with ANC people in Lesotho and elsewhere, establishing caches of arms, explosives and ammunition and seeking to bring about change in South Africa by 'unlawful' means, they are said to be responsible for a number of bomb attacks, or attempted attacks. There is also a charge of murder relating to the shooting, in circumstances that are still unclear, of the estranged wife of one of the accused.

The bomb attacks listed in the charges include ones at the Constantia Centre in Port Elizabeth in 1981 and 1982, at the new law courts in the city in 1982, at the offices of the community council in New Brighton in 1983 and on a railway line between Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage in 1983.

Police Violence and Torture

The detentions and investigations which followed were violent. The first arrests were carried out in a military-style operation by the South African Police reaction unit in Port Elizabeth. ('Reaction unit' is the name now given to what were once known as riot squads.) The head of the unit said in the court that force was used during arrests; he said that his

members had 'become excited,' that 'a tense atmosphere had prevailed' and that 'niceties were left behind.

The way that the defendants were treated by the police during their detention came out when the defence challenged the admissibility in court of statements they had made while in detention and were subject to coercion by torture and threats. Defendant after defendant spoke of being punched, of being slapped in the face, of being struck on the head with the flat side of a spade. One came to consciousness lying on the ground under a tap and soaked with water. Threats were made to harm them or their families. One was interrogated lying on the floor manacled to a bed. A number were hooded or partially suffocated in other ways, and one was driven in the boot of a car.

During the trial the court heard from the district surgeon for Port Elizabeth, Dr Tucker, notorious for his role in the events surrounding the killing of Steve Biko. He admitted that he had failed to take the action he should have taken in response to complaints and statements by some of the defendants when he visited them during their detention.

One thing is clear, and that is that the regime has stacked the cards against the eleven as they go through the protracted and violent process by which the apartheid regime seeks to brand as criminal their participation in the struggle for the liberation of South Africa.

SUBSTANTIAL BRITISH INVESTMENT CONTINUES

Pretoria SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST in English 23 Nov 84 p 15

[Text]

Despite the campaign for foreign disinvestment in South Africa, substantial investment continues to be made by British firms in this country, says Mr Kent Durr, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry.

Mr Durr was speaking at a lunch following the annual general meeting of the South Africa British Trade Association.

Since the inception of the decentralisation scheme in April 1982, up to the end of June 1984 as many as 135 applications from foreign industrialists have been approved by the Decentralisation Board, involving a capital investment of R264 million and providing 30 000 new jobs.

This is apart from the R3 710 million to be invested by South African companies which will bring the creation of new jobs to a level of 126 000.

"There are clear signs that a new sense of realism is growing in all of subcontinental Africa," said Mr Durr.

"Africa is coming to terms with itself and in doing so, the realisation has also dawned that it has to come to terms with the core power in the region — South Africa."

Pointing out that the value of two-way trade between South Africa and Britain was more than R3 800 million annually, Mr Durr said that about 40 per cent of total foreign investment in South Africa was British, with the rate of inflow said to be among the highest in the world.

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, TRANSFERS GAZETTED

Pretoria GOVERNMENT GAZETTE in English 16 Nov 84 pp 8-10

[Text]

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

No. 7491

16 November 1984

Statement of Receipts into and Transfers from the Exchequer Account for the period 1 April 1984 to 31 October 1984.

Treasury, Pretoria.

RECEIPTS—ONTVANGSTE

Head of Revenue	Month of October Maand Oktober		Total 1 April to 31 October Totaal 1 April tot 31 Oktober	
	1984	1983	1984	1983
Exchequer Balance, 31 March 1984	R	R	R	R
Exchequer Balance, 30 September 1984	167 636 402	—	19 302	—
State Revenue Account				
Customs and Excise	Dr 6 366 845	29 523 065	932 456 094	908 697 486
Inland Revenue	1 715 518 351	1 187 129 967	11 668 328 386	10 387 925 537
	1 709 151 506	1 216 653 032	12 600 784 480	11 296 623 023
State Oil Fund	24 057 686	25 670 061	175 339 439	170 771 482
National Road Fund	13 864 630	14 036 231	100 432 795	93 735 331
South African Development Trust Fund	6 323 000	1 069 000	16 020 005	12 163 258
Sorghum Beer Research Fund	—	1 534 021	—	1 701 022
S.W.A. Territorial Revenue Fund—Sales Duty	—	—	2 040	3
	1 753 396 822	1 258 962 345	12 892 578 759	11 574 994 119

Head of Revenue	Month of October Maand Oktober		Total 1 April to 31 October Totaal 1 April tot 31 Oktober	
	1984	1983	1984	1983
Other Receipts				
Treasury Bills—Internal	1 343 734 000	—	8 158 726 000	—
Internal Stock, Bonds and Loans Raised—				
Indefinite Period Treasury Bonds	5 877 200	—	47 184 700	—
Indefinite Period National Defence Bonds	1 247 250	—	12 226 450	—
Defence Bonus Bonds	8 352 325	—	67 299 545	—
Internal Registered Stock—				
13%, 2005	30 000 000	—	1 900 000 000	—
11.5%, 1990	—	—	226 850 000	—
14.5%, 1987	—	—	200 000 000	—
9%, 1988	—	—	30 000 000	—
15%, 1988	145 082 390	—	345 082 390	—
14.5%, 2006	290 347 834	—	421 347 834	—

[Table continued on following page]

[Table continued from preceding page]

Foreign Loans and Credits Raised --				
1984	16 204 995	---	142 654 252	---
1982	918 175	---	---	---
1979/84	---	---	20 287	---
1981/86	---	---	263 191	---
1984/90	---	---	50 805 400	---
1984/89	---	---	75 871 000	---
1978	66 555 740	---	66 555 740	---
Surrenders, State Revenue Account 1983/84	27 458 630	---	61 103 880	---
Surrenders, State Revenue Account 1982/83	---	---	11 000	---
	3 689 175 561	---	24 700 135 810	---
Total (including Opening Balance)	3 856 811 963	---	24 700 135 810	---

ISSUES—UITBETALINGS

Service	Estimates Begroting 1984/85	Month of October Maand Oktober		Total 1 April to 31 October Totaal 1 April tot 31 Oktober	
		1984	1983	1984	1983
	R	R	R	R	R
State Revenue Account					
1 State President	1 385 000	89 000	106 500	755 000	748 000
Statutory Amount	84 000	7 000	6 250	49 000	40 000
2 Parliament	9 173 000	1 790 000	700 000	7 827 000	5 032 000
Statutory Amount	6 566 000	1 043 000	490 000	4 793 000	3 096 000
3 State President	10 240 000	827 000	587 000	1 482 000	1 400 000
Statutory Amount	73 000	4 880	8 817	40 581	35 000
4 Co-operation and Development	1 702 558 000	160 000 000	145 000 000	791 000 000	670 000 000
Statutory Amount	226 985 000	18 000 000	---	187 000 000	206 978 000
5 Transport	243 893 000	35 000 000	32 400 000	206 866 000	302 000 000
6 Finance	842 554 000	65 000 000	68 000 000	492 120 000	480 400 000
Statutory Amount	3 490 121 000	491 647 000	341 535 000	2 607 252 000	2 084 800 000
7 Audit	10 883 000	907 000	750 000	6 343 000	5 980 000
8 Constitutional Development and Planning	4 559 413 000	380 837 000	333 500 000	2 706 872 000	2 346 297 750
9 Foreign Affairs	651 632 000	63 000 000	65 000 000	312 250 000	315 000 000
Statutory Amount	120 512 000	10 040 000	9 050 000	70 280 000	77 350 000
10 Home Affairs	1 293 242 000	105 911 768	107 000 000	748 683 155	643 985 000
11 Commission for Administration	46 329 000	950 000	1 300 000	41 261 000	26 112 000
12 Improvement of Conditions of Service	267 000 000	---	---	---	4 730 000
13 Police	795 640 000	81 500 000	56 000 000	511 800 000	346 000 000
14 Health and Welfare	1 722 468 000	145 000 000	123 000 000	1 022 000 000	809 000 000
Statutory Amount	200 000	20 000	15 000	121 400	111 000
15 National Education	866 675 000	65 000 000	53 000 000	617 100 000	513 500 000
16 Defence	3 754 667 000	314 690 000	276 000 000	2 300 700 000	1 836 400 000
17 Manpower	92 285 000	7 200 000	6 341 000	49 307 000	40 705 000
18 Industries and Commerce	575 757 000	87 000 000	68 500 000	424 760 000	329 000 000
19 Justice	134 782 000	8 500 000	8 000 000	73 000 000	54 750 000
Statutory Amount	6 123 000	500 000	470 000	5 673 000	3 380 000
20 Prisons	311 592 000	27 366 000	17 000 000	213 973 000	140 506 000
21 Public Works and Land Affairs	1 269 904 000	105 000 000	56 000 000	695 000 000	572 500 000
22 Environment Affairs	392 404 000	31 271 700	27 800 000	227 771 700	200 000 000
23 Agricultural Economics and Marketing	684 778 000	69 000 000	76 000 000	514 700 000	411 000 000
24 Mineral and Energy Affairs	557 637 000	75 200 000	62 000 000	347 074 000	347 550 000
25 Education and Training	709 257 000	58 000 000	46 000 000	401 000 000	289 000 000
	25 356 812 000	2 416 216 000	1 980 456 800	15 592 864 000	12 695 402 000
State Oil Fund (a)	300 000 000	24 057 686	25 670 000	108 800 000	108 800 000
National Road Fund (b)	172 000 000	13 864 630	14 000 000	66 433 000	66 433 000
South African Development Trust Fund (c)	20 000 000	6 323 000	1 069 000	10 000 000	10 000 000
Sorghum Beer Research Fund (d)	1 800 000	---	1 534 000	---	---
S.W.A. Territorial Revenue Fund—Sales Duty (e)	1 000	---	---	---	---
	493 801 000	44 245 316	42 309 313	291 794 000	291 794 000
	25 850 613 000	2 460 461 367	2 022 766 113	15 884 658 000	13 266 773 400

Service	Estimates Beginning 1984/85	Month of October Maand Oktober		Total 1 April to 31 October Totaal 1 April tot 31 Oktober	
		1984	1983	1984	1983
<i>Other Issues</i>	R	R	R	R	R
Treasury Bills repaid Internal.....	—	936 268 000	—	7 185 411 000	—
Tax Redemption Certificates repaid.....	—	—	—	49	—
Loan Levy repaid.....	—	1 018 498	—	10 088 189	—
Sinking Fund Advances.....	—	354 932	—	4 385 358	—
Payment in terms of section 2 of Act 96 of 1982.....	—	—	—	32 770 306	—
Transfer in terms of section 3 (2) of Act 113 of 1984.....	—	75 000 000	—	75 000 000	—
Internal Stock, Bonds and Loans Redeemed					
Five Year Non Resident Bonds.....	—	—	—	3 427 000	—
Second Series National Defence Bonds.....	—	—	—	4 942 700	—
8½ National Defence Bonds.....	—	439 600	—	5 472 200	—
9½ National Defence Bonds.....	—	110 000	—	1 212 200	—
7½ Treasury Bonds.....	—	1 470 300	—	21 896 000	—
Second Series 8½ Treasury Bonds.....	—	837 400	—	3 699 800	—
Indefinite Period Treasury Bonds.....	—	6 851 800	—	34 604 000	—
Indefinite Period National Defence Bonds.....	—	944 550	—	6 353 700	—
Defence Bonus Bonds.....	—	26 995 881	—	93 057 086	—
Third Series National Defence Bonds.....	—	—	—	2 271 000	—
Internal Registered Stock:					
7.5%, 1984.....	—	—	—	50 000 000	—
9.5%, 1984.....	—	—	—	335 277 700	—
12.75%, 1984.....	—	—	—	417 273 200	—
Foreign Loans and Credits Redeemed—					
1983/84.....	—	49 736 397	—	84 545 643	—
1981/86.....	—	—	—	9 621 559	—
1979/84.....	—	—	—	50 885 406	—
1984.....	—	—	—	20 667 989	—
1978/82.....	—	—	—	57 626 923	—
1977/84.....	—	15 624 967	—	15 624 967	—
1978/87.....	—	1 121 794	—	1 121 794	—
Issues, State Revenue Votes, 1983/84.....	—	3 057 000	—	3 060 831	—
Issues, State Revenue Votes, 1982/83.....	—	—	—	2 679 900	—
	—	1 119 831 119	—	8 532 976 500	—
	—	3 574 292 486	—	24 417 635 695	—
Exchequer Balance, 31 October 1984.....	—	282 519 477	—	282 519 477	—
Totals.....	—	3 856 811 963	—	24 700 155 172	—

(a) Section 1 of Act 38 of 1977
(b) Section 2 (1) (a) of Act 54 of 1971
(c) Section 8 of Act 18 of 1936
(d) Section 196 (i) of Act 63 of 1962
(e) Section 22 (4A) of Act 25 of 1969

CSO: 3400/333

OFFICIAL TABLE OF PRECEDENCE GAZETTED

Pretoria GOVERNMENT GAZETTE in English 23 Nov 84 pp 16-18

[Text]

STATE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

No. 2590

23 November 1984

**REVISED OFFICIAL TABLE OF PRECEDENCE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

The Official Table of Precedence, as approved by the State President, is hereby notified for general information.

OFFICIAL TABLE OF PRECEDENCE

(As from 1 November 1984)

1. The State President or the Acting State President.
2. The Chief Justice or the Acting Chief Justice.
3. Former State Presidents, in order of seniority, and the State President Elect (for the period between his election and assumption of office).
4. (a) Cabinet Ministers and Ministers of the Ministers Council, in order of seniority. (When foreign representatives are present the Minister of Foreign Affairs enjoys precedence over the office bearers in this Rubric.)
(b) The Speaker of Parliament and the Chairman of the President's Council, in order of seniority.
5. (a) Ambassadors, in order of seniority.
(b) Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary, in order of seniority.
(c) Chargés d'Affaires en titre, in order of seniority.
6. (a) Chief Whip of Parliament.
(b) Chairmen of the houses of Parliament, Deputy Chairman of the President's Council and Deputy Ministers in order of seniority.
7. The Chief of the South African Defence Force; the Director-General: Foreign Affairs (when foreign representatives are present).
8. (a) Chargés d'Affaires *ad interim* of Embassies, in order of seniority.
(b) Chargés d'Affaires *ad interim* of Legations, in order of seniority.
9. Leaders of the Official Oppositions in the Houses of Parliament.

10. (a) Administrators in their own provinces.
(b) Administrators outside their own provinces, with seniority according to the number of the population of their provinces.
11. (a) Judges of Appeal, in order of seniority.
(b) Judges President, in order of seniority.
(c) Deputy Judges President, in order of seniority.
(d) Judges of the Supreme Court in order of seniority.
12. Former Chief Justices, in order of seniority and former Vice State President.
13. Commissioners-General.
14. Members of Parliament and members of the President's Council in order of seniority.
15. Members of Provincial Executive Committees in their own provinces.
16. (a) The Auditor-General and Governor of the SA Reserve Bank.
(b) The Chairman: Commission for Administration.
(c) Members of the Commission for Administration in order of seniority according to date of appointment.
(d) Permanent Heads of Departments (including the General Manager: South African Transport Services, the Postmaster-General and the Secretary to Parliament), in order of seniority according to date of appointment as Head of Department.
(e) Chairman of the Armaments Corporation of South Africa Ltd.
(f) Members of the South African Transport Services Board in order of seniority according to date of appointment.
17. (a) Former Cabinet Ministers and Ministers of the Ministers Council, in order of seniority.
(b) Former Speakers of the House of Assembly and Parliament, Chairmen of the President's Council, Presidents of the Senate and Chairmen of the standing committees of the President's Council, in order of seniority.
(c) South African citizens entitled to the title "Honourable" with seniority according to the precedence they enjoyed at the time of their retirement or resignation from the post which entitled them to use the title.
18. Chairmen of Provincial Councils in their own provinces.
19. Provincial Secretaries in their own provinces.
20. Members of Provincial Executive Committees outside their own provinces, with seniority according to the number of the population of their provinces.
21. Chairmen of Provincial Councils outside their own provinces, within seniority according to the number of the population of their provinces.
22. Members of Provincial Councils in their own provinces.
23. The Mayor of the Capital of the province in which the function is held.
24. Provincial Secretaries outside their own provinces with seniority according to the date of appointment.

25. Members of Provincial Councils outside their own provinces, with seniority according to the number of the population of their provinces.

26. Mayors of Provincial Capitals, with seniority according to the number of the population of their respective cities.

27. The wives of the foregoing persons (or in the case of single or divorced persons or widowers, the ladies officially recognised by the Government as their hostesses) enjoy the precedence of their husbands (or the persons for whom they act as hostesses) and *vice versa*.

28. Persons who do not appear on this Table may, on special occasions, be accorded courtesy precedence (as defined in rule 3) by the State President in consultation with the Office of the State President.

RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN CONNECTION WITH THE OFFICIAL TABLE OF PRECEDENCE

1. The order of precedence laid down in the Table of Precedence shall be strictly observed on all official occasions except that it shall be permissible for the host, at his discretion, to intersperse persons appearing in Rubrics 4 (a) and (b) and 5 (a) and (b) and further, on occasions on which the position of Parliament particularly comes into prominence, such as the annual State Banquet at the opening of Parliament, at his discretion to intersperse persons appearing in Rubrics 4 (a) and (b), 5 (a) and (b) and 6 (a) and (b).

2. Persons not appearing on the Table shall take the precedence assigned to them by their host at any particular official function, but unless they have either been accorded ad hoc precedence in terms of Rubric 28 of the Table or are invited as guests of honour, they shall not be placed above persons appearing on the Table.

3. Courtesy precedence is restricted to persons who are not normally resident in the Republic of South Africa but includes church dignitaries, within the Republic, as well as other dignitaries, office bearers and functionaries for whom separate provision has not been made in the Table.

4. Amendments to the Table shall be effected only by the State President and shall be notified in the *Government Gazette*.

SAP OPPOSES FORMATION OF 'PRIVATE ARMIES'

Kimberley DIAMOND FIELDS ADVERTISER in English 29 Nov 84 p 4

[Text]

JOHANNESBURG — The SA Police will not tolerate the formation of 'private armies,' no matter what guise they appear in or what noble purpose they serve, the senior Deputy Commissioner of Police warned yesterday.

An address by Major-General H J P van Zyl was given by Brigadier H C Muller, Divisional Inspector, Witwatersrand, at a conference on security in industry held at the Chamdor Training Centre, Krugersdorp yesterday. The general was called to duty in the 'rumour war,' the organisers said.

Brigadier Muller said some security firms, in efforts to attract better quality staff, promised careers full of action and excitement. 'Pictures of tough guys armed to the

teeth in the likes of the notorious 'A-Team' are projected. They even see themselves as assault groups who will not only ward off attacks by terrorists, but who will hunt terrorists and in turn attack them.

'This I want to warn against very seriously.'

'People who trained personnel to such heights that they regarded themselves as an attack force should know that such a force could only be used at the order of the police, in which case they would be under direct police control.'

Groups which became frustrated due to lack of action, and which exceeded the limits of protection services, were just as dangerous as poor security services.

CSO: 3400/336

DRIVE FOR DIRECT CONTROLS OF ECONOMY SCORED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 6 Dec 84 p 2

[Article by Howard Preece]

[Text] **SOUTH AFRICA's drive towards a more market-oriented economy is coming under pressure.**

Demands for some reversal of policy — for greater use of direct controls — have already been made from influential quarters.

The most notable has been Dr Fred du Plessis, the chairman of Sanlam.

He claims that the country would have been much better served over the two years by the imposition of import controls and by not relaxing exchange controls.

There are many other individuals and interest groups who at least partially endorse his views.

This lobby is likely to grow next year.

South Africa will see little real economic growth in 1985 (1% or so), further rises in unemployment, painfully high, though falling, real interest rates and continuing double-digit inflation.

In that gloomy situation there is bound to be some surge in support of those calling for alternative economic strategies.

It may be that these will find a receptive audience with powerful figures in the Cabinet, some of whom have never been believers in the market mechanism, anyway.

Those whose natural instinct is to ban anything they do not like are not over-impressed by economic liberalism.

In the boom times of 1979/81, there was, of course, no problem.

When gold went racing up (and the rain came steadily down) it was easy to be a free marketeer.

When taxes were falling and living standards were rising, there was little to quarrel about from the viewpoint of white business.

Even those industries which have always campaigned for more protection from imports were comparatively muted.

Now things are very different.

All this puts Dr Gerhard de Kock, the Governor of the Reserve Bank, in a particularly difficult position.

He has been the prime mover since 1979 of the free market drive, although it was Mr Owen Horwood who was the main official standard bearer while he was Minister of Finance.

With Mr Horwood out of it, and the standpoint of Mr Barend du Plessis, the new Minister of Finance, not properly evident yet, it is Dr De Kock who must take the strain.

It is worth, therefore, looking at what has happened to the economy over the past three years to see to what extent free-market policies have been applied and whether they have helped or harmed developments.

There is no doubt that economic policy has gone badly astray.

There have certainly been adverse developments recently with the drought and the severe fall in the dollar price of gold.

By the same token, however, South Africa had colossal windfall gains from gold in 1979/81.

The fact is that much of our present difficulty is self-inflicted.

South Africa has failed to make any sustained impression on the rate of inflation for a decade now, it has failed to get Government spending under proper control, it has failed to give priority to economic needs over political ideology and it has failed to develop labour skills anywhere near their potential.

But the blame for this hardly lies with the modest move towards free-market economics.

Our net gold and foreign exchange reserves have not been reduced to precariously low levels by the relaxation of exchange controls.

They have been denuded by an import boom prompted by massive State expenditure and a long-drawn-out unwillingness to clamp down

sufficiently on consumer spending.

Indeed, had those exchange controls been eased much earlier — in 1979, for instance — we could have reduced inflationary pressures then and at the same time encouraged foreign investments, which would almost invariably be showing huge rewards now.

It may well be that the advantages of relaxing the controls have been oversold.

Some supporters have perhaps claimed too much for them.

Again, however, what is the real problem?

It is surely this:

So long as South Africa has a political situation which frightens away most overseas investors, we shall not attract much foreign capital.

The answer to that, though, lies in changing the politics, not in imposing a siege economy which might possibly have some short-term benefits but which, in the long term, will entrench inefficiency.

This does not mean, though, that South Africa must keep an open house while nearly all the rest of the world pursues protectionist measures of some sort.

Imports controls do not have to be scrapped entirely.

Far from it.

There are special situations in this country where they can be justified.

But the justification needs to be on well-documented grounds of eventual economic advantage, not for the expedient accommodation of powerful interest groups.

It is also claimed in many quarters that interest rates have been allowed to rise excessively and that they are counter-productive at present levels.

In itself that is simply a matter of dispute.

The issue runs wider, however, because the implication in some cases is that the authorities should have intervened to keep interest rates down.

But why have they gone up so much?

It is in large measure because they were not kept high enough in 1983.

If Mr Horwood, Dr De Kock and their team are to be charged with policy errors, their fault (as Dr De Kock admits) is that they allowed and even encouraged rates to fall prematurely.

The price of that mistake is that rates have in the end had to be put up to even more onerous levels than before.

It is not that market policies for interest rates (as against the old regime of controls) have proved wrong, it is that the market policies were not allowed originally to work through.

What about the ultimate issue, curbing inflation?

There is a view that severe monetary policies are not enough.

This is the argument of, for example, Mr Chris Ball, the managing director of Barclays National Bank.

He wants some kind of price restraint imposed on the public sector.

In so far as that is really a demand for making sure that the public sector is compelled to look for greater efficiencies of operation and not just permitted to pass on all cost increases in higher prices without any questions asked, it is certainly a legitimate demand.

Sound monetary policies are a necessary condition for reducing inflation in South Africa, but they are not a sufficient basis for a total economic strategy.

There is no way now, however, of avoiding a grim period of recession if inflation is at last to be tackled seriously.

Any hope that this unpleasant prospect can be avoided by some ragbag of controls is a dangerous delusion.

SASOL ATTITUDE TO UNIONS TO BE RETESTED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 5 Dec 84 p 8

[Article by Steven Friedman]

[Text]

THE attitude of Sasol to dealing with emerging unions is to be tested again — only weeks after it fired about 6 000 workers who took part in the recent Transvaal work stayaway.

In a surprise development yesterday, the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU), which represented most workers fired during the stayaway, said it had recruited most of the 9 000-plus workers at four coal mine shafts owned by Sasol at Secunda.

It said it had asked Sasol for stop order facilities — automatic deduction of union dues by management — at the four mines and it is believed that this may lead to a demand for full recognition at the mines.

This means the CWIU is likely to retain a strong presence in Secunda despite the sackings and could help it re-establish a foothold in the Sasol II and Sasol III plants.

The two plants rely on the mines for the coal used in Sasol's oil-from-coal process.

Before the mass sackings, the CWIU had stop or-

ders at Sasol II and III and was about to be granted full negotiating rights.

It claimed the sackings were designed to keep it out of the plants. Sasol has denied this.

The CWIU suggested in a statement yesterday its request for stop orders would again test Sasol's stance on dealing with it.

"It will be interesting to see whether or not Sasol management is sincere in its statements that the dismissal of workers was not aimed at ridding itself of the CWIU," the union said.

A union representative said a letter had been sent to Sasol last week asking for stop orders at the mines. No reply had been received yet, she added.

A Sasol spokesman, Mr Robin Hugo, said yesterday the company had no means of verifying what the CWIU membership at the Secunda mines was and implied that the company had not yet received the stop order request.

"If an application for stop order facilities is received from the CWIU, it will be considered on its merits," he added.

CSO: 3400/336

RADIO COMMENTS ON DETAINEES, U.S. ROLE

MB111538 Johannesburg International Service in English 1500 GMT 11 Dec 84

[Station commentary: "The Release of Detainees"]

[Text] The release from prison of a number of trade unionists and other people held in preventive detention in South Africa, and the immediate arrest of six of them yesterday on charges of treason, should be seen in its proper perspective.

The detentions came at a time when the internal security situation in South Africa was threatened by a number of radical groups opposed to the implementation of the country's new constitution. Political activists and a number of trade unionists were identified as being responsible for intimidating voters during the recent colored and Indian elections. They were also seen to be responsible for orchestrating the subsequent campaign of violence in black towns resulting in the deaths of dozens of law-abiding citizens, arson, looting, and threats against children going to school and adults to work.

In an attempt to defuse the situation, the agitators and intimidators were detained in terms of the country's security legislation. Since then, conditions in the black towns have returned to normal, and in the interim police have been able to conduct their investigations into the unrest. The result is that six of the detainees who were released were immediately arrested, and have appeared in court on charges of treason. They have been remanded in custody pending a bail hearing later this month.

President Reagan of the United States has taken credit for the release of the trade union leaders, saying this proves the value of his administration's policy of constructive engagement in Southern Africa. It is no coincidence that the unrest situation in South Africa ran concurrently with the campaign in the United States protesting against the policy of constructive engagement. It is held in some circles that, in releasing the detainees, South Africa has bowed under pressure from the United States, but in fact it is perfectly in keeping with the whole concept of constructive engagement.

While the efforts of pressure groups and lobbyists, internally or externally, will not sway the South African Government one way or the other, South Africa is more than willing to listen to constructive criticism and consider the advice of concerned and well-informed friends. This is what constructive engagement is all about. More is achieved through dialogue, consultation, and understanding, than through destructive rhetoric and unhelpful action.

ANC RADIO COMMENTS ON REAGAN'S POLICY TOWARD RSA

MB120532 Lusaka Radio Freedom in English 1700 GMT 11 Dec 84

[Station Commentary]

[Text] Ronald Reagan's reelection as president of the United States of America was greeted with hilarity by the apartheid regime. The administration's record over the 4 years of his first term brought nothing but happiness to the Pretoria regime. Constructive engagement came after the Carter administration's policy, which was unambiguously anti-apartheid. It was that policy which contributed to the success of the UN arms embargo in 1977.

(?The Reagan policy) [words indistinct]. (?It) unashamedly encouraged [words indistinct] apartheid regime. (?Every) crime of this regime [words indistinct]. It was a crime of an anticommunist regime that has fought on the side of the United States in (?two world wars) [words indistinct] claims that it was engaged in quiet diplomacy to get the criminal regime to mend its ways. The Reagan administration simply welcomed and encouraged all crimes committed against our people and the people of southern Africa by the apartheid regime.

In his term the regime was terrorizing southern Africa, violating borders with the aim of killing, committing [words indistinct]. Only applause came from Washington. When Reagan got the mandate to go ahead as president for another 4 years, it was a moment of jubilation in Pretoria. That jubilation was based on the ignorance of the force that American people [words indistinct] the apartheid regime can be.

The situation in the United States today gives every sign that, though the Reagan administration has reiterated that constructive engagement will remain the (?flag) of its policy towards South Africa, [words indistinct] of this is likely to be different from the constructive engagement of the past. This [words indistinct] the American people who are on the side of justice are appalled by the policies of their government towards the out-and-out criminal and illegal regime, which the apartheid regime is.

For the past 3 weeks a very big campaign against apartheid has taken place in the United States. The Washington embassy of the regime and its consulates around the United States have been scenes of these demonstrations. The demonstrations have included sit-ins. All signs now point to the intensification

of anti-apartheid (?action) in the United States. The activists involved are now reported to be planning to make more effective their campaign. They intend to target the more than 300 American corporations doing business (?in) South Africa. Their products will be boycotted as a means of bringing pressure on them to take concrete action against the Pretoria regime.

The wave of protest against the regime that has been sweeping through the United States is, of course, not unconnected with the (?rejection) of Reagan, with his further commitment to constructive engagement. The democratic movement in the United States, by these actions, are challenging the administration's policy of constructive engagement. The massive demonstrations they have undertaken are an eloquent expression of their outrage, not only of the collaboration of the Reagan administration, but also with the very system of apartheid with which Reagan collaborates.

There is also no doubt that the actions of the democratic forces in the United States have had effect. It was a result of these campaigns that Reagan agreed to an audience with Bishop Desmond Tutu. Reagan was told by somebody who represents those who are on the receiving end of constructive engagement as to what is their attitude towards it. And what Reagan was told was that since constructive engagement our situation [words indistinct] has worsened. That clearly is a shock to Reagan, who was too ashamed to agree (?in the forthright way) of the bishop. But the audience was not [word indistinct]. That is why, when he addressed the human rights day message to Americans, among the nine countries that President Reagan singled out (?to mention) violators of human rights, South Africa was right on top. (?This is) something new about the Reagan administrations and campaigns by American democratic forces.

Now that these forces have taken the decision to scale up and make even stronger their campaign, there can be no doubt that a new content can be given to constructive engagement. Given sustained pressure, American progressives are in a position to force their government to change its policy towards this fascist regime.

Their pressure, however, can only be successful if it is a complement of our own resistance in our country. So the duty to intensify is also ours. By so doing, we shall be sending unambiguous signs to both the Reagan administration and our allies among the American progressive forces. [Word indistinct] coordinated assault by us on the apartheid regime, [word indistinct] by progressives in all these countries that (?battle) the apartheid system [words indistinct]. It is with such coordination of our efforts that we shall paralyze the forces of imperialism in the Western countries that are natural [word indistinct] of the apartheid regime. [Words indistinct] isolated [words indistinct] and finally strike the finishing blows against [words indistinct].

With or without Reagan in power, the [word indistinct] movement of opposition to apartheid in the United States will have the result of staying the powerful hand of America from aiding and abetting a criminal and immoral regime.

RSA'S SHIPPING LINKS WITH EUROPE IN DANGER

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 5 Dec 84 p 18

[Text]

CAPE TOWN — South Africa could find itself without a regular shipping service to Europe in a few years if the Conference shipping lines did not get more support from SA importers and exporters and help from the authorities.

This warning was issued by Mr NM Forster, chairman of the Europe South and South-East Conference Lines.

He told a group of clients and officials that the Conference lines were getting a return of between one and percent on the \$1,5-billion they had invested in providing Southern Africa with "one of the finest services in the world.

"It has to be asked, therefore, who would be prepared to make this sort of re-investment when the time comes, in the not-too-distant future, to replace the fleet?"

Mr Forster said rate erosion, escalating land-side costs and insufficient support were among the major problems facing the Conference lines.

The oversupply of shipping had led to near-suicidal rate-cutting by non-Conference lines. The average conference rate in 1983 for north-bound cargo was only 1,64 percent higher than in 1979, while the south-bound rate was only 13,3 percent higher.

Uncontrolled increases in costs had also reduced profitability.

Road and rail transport in the export of canned fruit from Paarl to London accounted for only six percent of the journey covered but accounted for 50 percent of the total transport cost.

Mr Forster called for tariffs for harbour and depot services to be revised to relate to volume and to reward the competitive benefits of containers versus conventional cargo.

The Conference lines sought no subsidy, formal protection or the banning of non-Conference ships but wanted help from the SA Government, on a purely commercial basis, to get a better deal for ship and cargo owners.

CSO: 3400/336

SECURITY INVOLVES WEIGHING CONFLICTING PRIORITIES

MB120937 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 12 Dec 84

[Station commentary]

[Text] If politics is the art of the merely possible, it is precisely because it reflects the complexity of the human condition. It is necessarily a continuing process of accommodating and arranging priorities among conflicting demands; a process directed in accordance with generally held fundamental values and the overriding imperative of national security.

Indeed, in safeguarding national security itself, its primary obligation, the state is required continually to be weighing priorities and making accommodations. Only occasionally are the results of that process brought dramatically into public focus as the events of the past few days have been. Those events provide a striking illustration of the multi-dimensionality of national security. They are also a timely reminder that properly discharging the security obligations can never be a matter of implementing simplistic slogans.

The security of a nation is a function both of internal circumstances and of international attitudes, either of which may be translated into actions inimicable to the interests of the state. Clearly therefore, it is as much in a country's interests to strengthen its position in the world by building friendships and alliances as it is to build on a stable and harmonious dispensation internally. If there is a clash on those two levels--if action taken to promote internal order provokes intense hostility from an important ally--priorities have to be weighed. In the particular circumstances, to what extent is national security affected at each level?

That is a general perspective on the release of the detainees who had been held under Section 28 of the Internal Security Act. Detentions were recently ordered during a time of violent upheaval in certain black urban areas. Calls to make the townships ungovernable pointed to the organized nature and goals of the unrest. Since then order has been restored, and already inquiries and discussions are in progress to sort out legitimate grievances from revolutionary pretexts and to act accordingly. The next step, where appropriate, is criminal prosecution.

Six people have so far appeared in court on charges including high treason. However, while order has been restored internally, the goodwill of the world's most powerful state, and South Africa's best potential ally, has been eroding rapidly. This country has made major gains through President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement. It has greatly strengthened its security position in Southern Africa, has benefited from American vetoes of punitive measures sponsored in the United Nations, and has been able to concentrate more fruitfully on resolving political problems without undue interference from outside.

In recent weeks however, constructive engagement as a positive force in national security has been under growing pressure. Whatever the rationale behind the recent detentions, they have been represented as a resort to repressive measures to stifle the free expression of grievances. As a result, the appropriateness of the constructive engagement policy suddenly became a high profile political issue in the United States. Both internally and externally, therefore, the situation has changed. The relationship between the different facets of national security has shifted.

CSO: 3400/332

SWAPO CRITICIZES REAGAN'S LINKAGE STAND

MB070957 Lusaka Voice of Namibia in English 1830 GMT 6 Dec 84

[Stationary Commentary: "The Reagan-Botha Attempt to Kill Two Birds With One Stone"]

[Text] After his reelection, President Ronald Reagan of the United States has come out strongly in favor of what he termed a negotiated settlement in Angola between the MPLA and the UNITA movement of Jonas Savimbi. In an interview with the WASHINGTON POST newspaper, Reagan said that the United States would certainly not turn against Savimbi and added that there has to be a negotiation which involves the situation domestically in Angola.

This is the point of view which South Africa is also sharing with the Americans, by trying to tie it with a settlement in Namibia leading to the territory's independence. South Africa claims that all obstructions to a settlement in Namibia have been removed except for one, and that is the presence of Cuban troops in the People's Republic of Angola. South Africa is insisting on this because, and we quote; the presence of Cuban forces in neighboring Angola jeopardizes a free and fair election in Namibia. The United States, on its part, wants the Cubans out of Angola because of; and we quote again; the threat they pose to regional stability in the southern African subcontinent.

Reagan himself has declared that the Cuban withdrawal is essential in achieving Namibia's independence, as well as creating what he called long-range prospects in that region. American so-called chief negotiator on African affairs, Chester Crocker, went on to elaborate on this by posing questions as to how a young state of Namibia can survive while there is endless civil war on its northern border.

The Americans, together with their client South Africa, want to kill two birds with one stone. They want, as they claim, to solve the independence of Namibia on the one hand and to destabilize the MPLA government on the other. Their arguments and complaints are baseless, for Namibia's right to self-determination cannot be coupled with Angola's internal affairs. The Cuban presence in the People's Republic of Angola poses no threat to anybody or any country in the region.

South Africa has never allowed a free and fair election in Namibia. How can the presence of the Cubans in Angola jeopardize elections which have never been

allowed in Namibia? Where in the world has Cuba been a threat to democratic elections being supervised and controlled by the United Nations [words indistinct]. The Reagan administration has to go back in history and recall that it was South Africa who posed a threat in this region, notably by invading Angola in 1975. It is South Africa who is the aggressor in this region. Had it not been for her aggression against the People's Republic of Angola all these years, the Cuban presence in Angola would not be necessary.

Finally, it is imperative to note here that after the General Assembly decision of the United Nations in 1966, and the ruling of the International Court of Justice in 1971, South Africa's presence in Namibia was regarded as illegal. Thus, today South Africa is occupying both Namibia and southern Angola illegally. It is against this background that we feel dismayed at the irrelevant demand of the Americans to tie our independence to Angola's internal affairs.

It is also against this background that we see no reason why the Americans do not want to realize the fact that the issue of the Cubans cannot be related to Namibia's independence. It is an issue which can be separately negotiated between Angola, Cuba, and perhaps the United States.

As to the claim by the Boers that all obstacles have been removed, except the Cuban presence in Angola, this is not true. It appears nowadays that the South Africans are insisting on another thing again. This time [word indistinct] reactionary front [words indistinct] to the MPLA-Labor government. This view has the full blessing of the Reagan administration. South Africa also wants the world to believe that it is the Americans who initiated the linkage issue. However, the world is not blind to realize that during the invasion of Angola in 1975 by South Africa, the Americans promised to intervene militarily in that civil war, apart from giving military assistance to the pro-Western groups in Angola. This was disclosed by the South Africans themselves after their shameful defeat in Angola, that they were left in the lurch by Washington.

Ever since that time, the South African Government was not happy with the American Government until in January 1981, when warmonger Reagan took office in the White House. Reagan came up with what is commonly known as the so-called policy of constructive engagement with southern Africa. This is a wide-ranging policy that includes the so-called linkage issue on Namibia's independence. The policy is aimed at reviving the counterrevolutionary groups in Angola and above all appease South Africa after she was defeated by the MPLA-FAPLA forces with the assistance from Cuba.

These facts demonstrate clearly why Washington insists on [as heard] the Cuban presence in Angola and why she wants them to leave before Namibia's independence. The Cuban troops have served as a deterrent force in Angola, for South Africa could have invaded the young republic by now and installed Savimbi in power.

This week again Chester Crocker conferred with Reagan in Washington on developments in southern Africa. Reports from Washington indicate that the United States will continue with its dangerous policy of constructive engagement. Thus independence for Namibia will once again be held hostage for another 4 years while conservative Reagan and company are in power.

We know that this is America's global imperialistic design and South Africa's dreams of so-called regional power. It is unfortunate that our country's independence is being used as a trump card by the United States and her watchdog of imperialism in southern Africa. South Africa has to evacuate Namibia, or else Reagan's and Botha's wishful thinking of killing two birds with one stone will be a disastrous doom.

CSO: 3400/332

PFP DILEMMA SEEN AFFECTING ALL PARTIES

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 25 Nov 84 p 30

[Article by Brian Pottinger: "One Into 3 Doesn't Go"]

[Text]

THE FUNCTION of opposition parties in a parliamentary democracy — we are told — is to oppose.

That description served politicians handily for years — arid years during which implacable party political ideologies clashed ponderously, and not particularly productively.

The definition needs re-examination.

The turmoil in the Progressive Federal Party last week simply highlights a more general reality since the new constitution was introduced — polarisation has many houses, our untested "consensus-style politics" but few.

And in the morass of the new conditions, Opposition — no less than Government — is battling to find its way.

The old divides are crumbling, and amid an exponential increase in polarisation between communities and within communities the options become starker.

Some argue it is a choice between moderation and extremism.

Tagging

In fact it is broader than that — it is, to give it a name and to refer specifically to constitution, be-

tween constitutionalism, para-constitutionalism and extra-constitutionalism.

Between these three descriptions the political forces of the country divide.

That it should be so is not surprising.

The constitution, which should be the ring within which the political wrestling takes place, has itself become embroiled in the scrap.

Mr P W Botha and his new coloured and Indian allies hold the floor, the PFP and CP are tagging backwards and forwards through the ropes, while a vast surrounding crowd is intent only on wrecking the ring.

Whether this "reform by polarisation" can eventually develop an over-riding momentum that forges a centrist consensus, and leads to genuine political reform, remains to be seen.

But in the interim, parliamentary opposition politics have entered a remarkable phase.

Take the PFP, for example.

The sharp divisions within the party over the Political Interference Act and conscription point to a much more profound row about what and how the party should be doing in the new tricameral Parliament.

One group — looking to its white constituents — argues for the wrestling match to be kept within the ropes. These are the constitutionalists.

The other element — looking to the seething black discontent — wants the fight waged both inside and outside the ring. These are the para-constitutionalists.

Invidious

And the other element is no longer in the PFP at all. These were the ones — predominantly young — who are now in the United Democratic Front. They are the anti-constitutionalists.

For the PFP it is an invidious position.

Defiance of the law and support for the anti-draft groups invite comparison with an earlier and more radical era of white opposition politics.

In a period of the "consensus-politicking" assiduously packaged and sold by the Government, even the hint of radicalism is anathema to most reform-orientated white voters.

The Harry Schwarz and Philip Myburghs know this, and their response last week was directed at "Mr Average Opposition Voter". Votes — white votes naturally — and party growth are the name of the game.

Torn

But, at the same time, the burning black townships and low August election polls create a parallel reality.

Polarisation between white and black, within white and black, is growing, and if any white political party hopes for a future role as mediator between implacable white and black nationalisms it has to build up its credibility stakes — now.

The Boraines and Suzmans know this.

Their response is directed at holding doors open, and their strategies are themselves open-ended.

Constitutionalism, for whatever gains the party can make within the structures of the new constitution, and para-constitutionalism, where all else fails or exigency demands — like in the middle of the worst urban unrest since 1976.

And so, on the left flank of the party, a cautious liaison with the United Democratic Front continues, and will no doubt grow if the unrest escalates and polarisation becomes more acute.

It is this association, ultimately, which could split the PFP.

The Conservative Party is, in a way, torn by the same problem, but on the other flank. They are para-constitutionalists; the green benches to be used to the maximum to ridicule and white-ant the constitution.

The Volkswag, the AWB, the far-right cultural organisations, are the ringers to be brought in to wrestle with the Government.

Dilemma

But the dilemma of the white liberal and far-right opposition is no more acute than the problem confronting some other constitutionalists — the Labour and National People's parties.

The Reverend Allan Hendrickse and Mr Amichand Rajbansi claim they are Opposition figures sitting in the Cabinet.

The contradiction does not allow of resolution and this, probably more than anything else, accounts for the aching silence of the two leaders in the present political crisis.

It is not as if they are really members of a coalition Government — those sort of governments require at least some foundation of binding policy.

But Hendrickse and Rajbansi are there, ostensibly, not only to fight Government policies but to destroy this constitution.

As members of the Cabinet, they are increasingly bound by the actions of Government — and that ranges from detentions to squatter evictions and Rattels in the townships.

Their options have narrowed dramatically — more so than the PFP.

The participating "establishment" coloured and Indian parties have to rely entirely on their fledgling,

and often fractious, party support base in the communities they represent.

The unions, the sports organisations, the churches, the community organisations, the students and the poets are all implacably opposed to them.

Agonise

This is not another example of nation-building National Party-style — it is an isolated political elite battling to keep its head aloft in a sea of indifference or antagonism.

They do not even have the option of para-constitutionalism, of liaison with extra-parliamentary groups such as the United Democratic Front.

Ironically, the men who defined themselves as the prototype anti-constitutionalists are now the arch-constitutionalists.

The Government and establishment parties will watch the alternative opposition — the anti-constitutionalists — deploying on an ever-widening terrain; the schools, the universities, the factories, the theatre, the rent associations and the pulpit.

And, like the liberal white opposition, they will have to agonise how best to address this vociferous and powerful alternative opposition, and from which side of the ropes.

(Report by B C Pottinger, 171 Main Street, Johannesburg).

LIVINGS STANDARDS OF WHITES, BLACKS ERODED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 6 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Mike Jensen]

[Text]

WHITE and black living standards have been badly eroded this year with elderly blacks particularly hard-hit, according to the latest Omnichek Poll conducted by Cape-based Research Surveys.

The poll found that 39% of whites believe their living standards have decreased since the beginning of the year while 59% of blacks say there has been a drop in standards.

About 70% of the blacks in the 50 years and over category report diminished standards.

More than 1 300 South African housewives were interviewed in the poll — 500 whites and 816 blacks. The respondents were asked a broad range of questions about the economy, GST and their confidence in Government's ability to improve economic standards.

The most problematic areas for blacks are the PWV region and Port Elizabeth, where retrenchments have been particularly extensive.

In these areas 64% of blacks say their living standards have

dropped.

The majority of whites feel the Government can solve the problems but nearly 30% of blacks polled feel it cannot.

When white respondents are broken down into language groups, 35% of English speakers are not confident in the Government compared with 25% among Afrikaans speakers.

Split by region, 38% of whites in the PWV lack confidence in the Government while in the other regions the percentage is about 25%.

The lifting of GST on basic food items elicited a positive response from 50% of the whites.

Both whites and blacks envisage a recession lasting several years.

Only 6% of blacks feel the economy will improve within two years, but 15% of whites believe there will be an improvement within 6 months to a year. A further 33% of whites feel the recovery will take between one and two years.

CSO: 3400/336

NEW NRP LEADER BACKS FEDERAL SENATE

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 25 Nov 84 p 30

[Article by Bill Sutton]

[Text]

IF ONE has a wagon with three wheels, one can prop up one side with a pole and then load it with goods. One can put a tent on it and sleep on it.

There are many things one can do with it, but one thing you cannot do with it is to go anywhere with the load to deliver it to its proper destination.

The new constitution is a smart piece of political engineering. It can and will work to provide the three groups represented with a political vehicle that will allow a better sharing of what South Africa has to offer.

It may do many things, but there is one thing it cannot do and that is to take South Africa over the next hump, which is the inclusion of blacks in the central decision-taking processes which determine priorities for public spending.

A grand gesture, except for blacks

The new constitution was a grand gesture on the part of the Government to include other groups but it yet lacks the grand gesture of confidence in blacks, more specifically urban blacks, that will make it address the real problem of today.

It is a pretty wagon but it will not go anywhere without the fourth wheel, the Fourth Chamber that will allow it to go out to

meet the advancing tide of black aspirations that must be met and must be channelled into useful and constructive purposes.

All politics is, in the end, about money. Taxation is the base of political power and the right to distribute taxation is the fruit of political office.

The greatest test of a civilised people is the way in which they handle the public funds.

In a country like South Africa where such great differences exist in the relative living standards of the groups, politics will be for a long time about the distribution of the proceeds of taxation.

Government has created a mess

The rising tide of black aspirations represents a charge on the public purse which can only be met in Parliament.

The dilemma of the Government is obvious and of its own making.

The one thing that must be avoided at all costs in our country is the tyranny of the majority.

We must avoid that mindless urge to take everything and supply nothing to the public weal.

The problem of the Government is that the formula for the three chamber Parliament is an instant recipe for majority rule the very moment the black man steps onto the political stage.

A ratio that just won't work

If followed to its logical conclusion the formula 4:2:1 applied to blacks as well must result in 6:4:2:1, at the very least.

It is this fact that is inhibiting the Government in its search for a method of including urban blacks in the new dispensation.

This formula would result not only in a majority for blacks in Parliament but also in the Electoral College, which is the real vehicle for political power in that it chooses the President.

It is this dilemma that is giving the Government nightmares.

The NRP does not believe that it is at this stage necessary that a fourth chamber should be based on any numerical ratio.

The mere gesture, the offer of a real share in decision-taking at Parliamentary level, would do a great deal to settle the current unrest in the townships.

What is more, such an offer would force a definition of attitudes among Blacks that would soon expose the weakness of the radical elements in the urban black population by forcing them to choose between co-operation and another meaningless boycott of democratic procedures.

Participation — not take-over

No responsible person here or overseas would advocate an immediate black take-over. What is required is black participation, not black take-over.

The dilemma of the Government is very real. The moment it is admitted that non-homeland blacks have a right to participate in the political life of South Africa the question of the majority has to be faced and overcome.

The Government has in fact admitted the necessity of allowing non-homeland blacks to participate in the new dispensation and is now wrestling with the problem of its own creating.

NRP wants the federal Senate

It is all very well to put on the fourth wheel but what is then indispensable is the locking-pin that will ensure that the wheel does not fly off at the first corner.

The NRP proposals go hand in hand with a proposal for a federal Senate that is the guarantor of group rights by means of a veto for each group in dealing with its own affairs.

This mechanism is familiar in South Africa from its use in the former Senate as the guarantor of provincial rights.

The formula is used with great success in the Bundesrat in the West German Federation.

It is for this reason that the New Republic Party has advocated a federal-confederal relationship between non-homeland South Africa and the homelands.

With unrest in the urban areas at an all-time peak, and violence in danger of becoming endemic, it is imperative to support moderate black leadership with the gesture of acceptance that a fourth chamber would represent.

The greatest failure of democracy in the 1930s was the failure of the moderate parties in Germany to hold together, thus leaving the country no choice but a dictatorship of the right or the left.

Black aspirations would be satisfied

A coalition of moderate leaders in a four-chamber Parliament with a federal Senate that would be the guarantor of group rights would, for the first time, indicate to blacks that the other groups had at last accepted them as South Africans.

With the fourth wheel in place and firmly locked in, our political wagon could at long last go in the right direction, which is SAAMHEID, the NRP direction.

LOANS, LAWS RESTRICT BLACK TRADERS

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 25 Nov 84 p 10

[Article by Themba Khumalo]

[Text]

BACKYARD traders in Soweto are prevented from developing their informal businesses into big concerns by laws such as influx control regulations and the difficulty of getting loans.

These traders vary from registered to unregistered merchants: motor mechanics, brickmakers, dressmakers and coal merchants. Most unregistered traders are denied the chances of becoming prospering businessmen by the influx control regulations, which prevent them starting their businesses in Johannesburg.

A random survey in townships revealed there were more businesses operating from pri-

vate houses than officially registered concerns.

One businessman is Mr Daniel Mokoto, a 45-year-old motor mechanic and coal merchant who started his "illegal" business 14 years ago.

"I've lost close to R10 000 cash by hiring other people's permits, which often allowed me to operate a registered coalyard in Soweto. When I realised I was working at a loss I resorted to the backyard business," said Mr Mokoto.

Mr Mokoto said he erected a shack on a small farm just opposite Soweto, where he settled with his wife and two children.

"I decided to continue my business in a backyard and believe you me, it's flourishing

and I'm popular with most local motorists."

Mr Solomon Zulu, who was supplying building contractors working on new houses in the elite Diepkloof Extension, would be a "filthy rich" brickmaker were it not for the authorities refusing him a bigger site for his business.

"I've applied without success for a better site where I can transform my business into a big outlet. I think I have enough money to enable me to run a bigger concern," he said.

A man who did not wish to be identified said he wanted to start a photographic studio in a Soweto shopping centre.

"I teamed up with several businessmen but they all disappointed me at the last minute. Banks and building societies are offering too little money for my planned business," he said.

The authorities seem to be ignoring "illegal" businesses at present, but there were times when unregistered traders were so harassed by police that it became risky for an ordinary resident to carry around a bag of oranges.

The National Federated Chamber of Commerce is encouraging the State President to concretise his hints that the government would strive to uplift the standard of black businesses. Perhaps he was implying that even unregistered traders would be considered.

EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE SMALL BLACK ENTERPRISE BACKED

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 25 Nov 84 p 10

[Article by Michael Chester]

[Text]

THE personal intervention of the State President has been urged by the Free Market Foundation to bulldoze a barrier of red tape hindering the launch of small black business ventures.

The call on Mr P W Botha to order faster action in the removal of obstacles has also been backed by the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce.

Mr Leon Louw, executive director of the Free Market Foundation, said he had uncovered at least 500 statutes that shackled the development of the informal sector of the economy — backyard business ventures that operate with no official records.

"But development of the informal sector is bogged down in a morass of legislation laying down totally unreasonable standards — from factory buildings to complex accountancy practices.

"Progress may also be hampered by the vested interests of larger firms, which want no competition, and by an army of bureaucrats who enjoy flaunting their power with harassment and prosecutions.

"We can also expect critics making the argument that to introduce lower standards will be rowing back into the 19th century. They should take note that even the United States, Canada, Britain, Japan, Holland and Italy have taken action to remove or relax legal impediments faced by their own informal sectors."

Mr Louw suggested three alternatives should be considered:

- The total removal of regulations and a new start from scratch to work out new minimum standards by experience.

- A system of geographic zoning to create sites for informal sector operators and set various tiers of regulations to be applied to specific zones, as now in use in the United States and Canada.

- Regulations set out in tiers with layers fixed by the size of the business venture as measured by the number of employees or the level of turnover.

Mr Salthiel Mphaka, head of the special small business advisory unit at Nafcoc, said he agreed the State President should intervene.

"Black business initiative will stay stifled until the whole of the informal sector is deregulated", he warned.

"For the moment, there is total frustration because of all the obstacles.

"How can a budding entrepreneur in Soweto launch a backyard motor repair workshop when the law demands he meets all the standards set by the Ford Motor Corporation? It's nonsense.

"It is all a terrible waste at a moment when we should all be encouraging black business initiative and the creation of new jobs".

CSO: 3400/296

ENGINEERS USE 'WAXY OIL 20' TO CUT IMPORTS

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 4 Dec 84 p 9

[Article by Jasper Mortimer]

[Text]

Two Durban engineers have successfully converted the dregs of Sasol into a fuel for ships, saving South Africa an estimated R9 million in oil imports.

Two-thirds of the Unicorn fleet will be running on the substitute, Waxy Oil 20, by early 1985.

The advantages of WO20 over the usual bunker fuel are several. It has an eight percent higher calorific value, meaning it will take a ship eight percent further. It is cleaner burning, which reduces the costs of maintenance and the contamination of lubricating oils.

It performs well at the low manoeuvring speeds when ships normally have to switch from bunker to more expensive fuels. It costs about the same as the cheapest bunker and saves foreign exchange.

Disadvantages are that it cannot be used by high-speed diesel engines without major modifications, and its high wax content means it needs to be heated where it flows through thin pipes.

EX-SASOL ENGINEER

The man chiefly responsible for WO20 is mechanical engineer Mr Tony Hurter.

Trained by Sasol, he now runs a firm specialising in exploiting waste fuels. He found a way of extracting the impurities from the Sasol residue to produce a fuel that would burn. (Sasol used

to dump the residue in dams at Secunda and Sasolburg. Today Mr Hurter buys it all.)

Unicorn had become increasingly unhappy with the deteriorating quality of bunker.

Refineries were improving their extraction methods so that the residue bunker had little energy.

Knowing this, Mr Hurter took a sample of WO20 to Mr Robert Young, Unicorn's technical manager. Mr Hurter had seen that WO20's chemistry was suited to internal combustion engines.

Mr Young agreed and sent 10 tons of the tar-like fuel to his engine manufacturers in Kiel, Germany. When the Germans ran their test engine on WO20, the results were so positive that Unicorn decided to try it at sea.

In March 1983 the 8 900-ton Berg sailed from Durban to Walvis Bay on WO20. At the end of the voyage, the chief engineer asked for more.

By February 1984 Unicorn had six ships running on WO20. But then problems struck. The fuel injection pumps were corroding rapidly.

Mr Young called in the advice of Natal University, Shell Oil, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and a Norwegian institute.

He also ran WO20 through a simulator in his workshop.

The fault lay with moisture in the fuel. Whereas bunker emulsifies the moisture somewhat,

WO20 did not.

Unicorn solved the problem by adding a chemical emulsifier and by chrome-plating the plungers of the fuel pumps.

Today eight ships are running on WO20, sailing as far as Israel and Sri Lanka. Unicorn will be introducing it in three more ships in coming months.

Depending on the type of engines, Mr Young predicts fuel-cost savings of 10 to 20 percent.

However, he is conservative about the implications of the discovery. Sasol is not producing sufficient WO20 for export, he says. "It will only be for the South African fleet and, at the moment, it is only available in Durban."

Mr Hurter is now looking at the processing at bunker to see if he can improve that.

CSO: 3400/336

MOZAMBIQUE TREATY FAILS TO EXCITE FISHERMEN

Kimberley DIAMOND FIELDS ADVERTISER in English 28 Nov 84 p 12

[Text]

DURBAN — Durban's trawler fishermen yesterday expressed doubt that the agreement giving them access to Mozambique waters would boost the local fishing industry, and said it might in fact lead to a rise in the price of seafood.

In terms of the new agreement announced by the Minister of Environment and Tourism, Mr John Wiley, South African trawlers will be able to catch a limited amount of langoustine, crab and pink prawn in Mozambique's waters.

The seafood is expected to be on the shelves in South Africa before Christmas.

EXCITED

'It is no El Dorado' said Mr Des Nel, chairman of the Natal Trawlers Association. 'We are not particularly excited about it as the prices per ton levied by the Mozambican Government on fish caught, are very high indeed.'

'In fact this agreement might eventually have to be renegotiated.'

'Seafood certainly won't be any cheaper than it is at present, and there is a chance that prices will rise to cover the costs involved.'

He said South Africans would also have to pay in dollars or the rand equivalent in advance, and would have to set up facilities in Maputo from which to operate — and both factors would drive up the cost of seafood.

'The seafood will be weighed and inspected there before being shipped to South Africa,' he said.

'However, two companies — Stirling Fisheries and Quintas — are giving it a try, and will send a limited number of boats up there.'

A spokesman for Quintas declined to comment, as he said his company had as yet signed no agreement with Mozambique, and the spokesman for Stirling Fisheries was unavailable for comment at the time of going to press.

Mr Audrey Shooter, whose trawler Morning Star was confiscated for allegedly fishing in Mozambique's territorial waters last year, said there was no chance of getting the boat back now as it had already been sold to a Spanish concern.

INSURANCE

He is currently involved in a Supreme Court action to get the insurance of R300 000.

Mr Shooter won't be sending any trawlers to Mozambique because of the extremely high cost of the seafood.

He said, contrary to figures previously released, the prawns and langoustine would cost a levy of about R3 000 a ton, and crab in the region of R800.

'However, you have to pay for the crab's shell and the prawns heads — which almost doubles the actual price in both cases.'

The banning of Natal trawlers from Mozambique waters in March last year led to severe problems for the industry locally.

CSO: 3400/336

PLANS TO DEVELOP OFFSHORE GAS DISCUSSED

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 25 Nov 84 p 10

[Exclusive article by Dr Franz Quass: "Beat the Boycotts with Oil-from-Gas"]

[Text]

DR FRANZ QUASS (left), an internationally-recognised energy expert and the first managing director of Soekor — the State-run oil exploration organisation — writes exclusively for The Sunday Star on plans to develop an offshore gas industry in South Africa.

OIL is the soft under-belly of South Africa's economy and defence — and will remain so for many decades.

The country will be vulnerable until oil — or its petroleum stablemates — is manufactured from indigenous sources.

The Sunday Star reported two weeks ago that Sasol's oil-from-coal production was estimated to be meeting about half the country's oil needs.

The mention of the production figure was in conflict with restrictions laid down by the Petroleum Products Act of 1977.

But The Sunday Star was in this respect in the company of Ministers of State, senior government officials and representatives of the oil industry who have often published data contrary to this Act. In any case, I do not agree with the figure.

In September 1981 the Director-General of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, Mr Darel du Plessis, referred to the building of "another eight giant Sasol-type plants.

during the next few decades".

Assuming these eight plants would be more efficient than the present three Sasols, we may deduce that at their completion South Africa would be producing about four times today's production of liquid fuels from coal — twice the nation's present requirement.

Thus, with eight more Sasols in the "next few" decades, South Africa will have some measure of comfort in that further oil-from-coal production could meet future liquid fuel demands. But the investment required would be astronomical.

Of the estimated 59 billion tons of mineable coal in South Africa, 51 billion tons are located in the coalfields of the Transvaal. No giant Sasol-type of oil-from-coal plant can be built anywhere other than the Transvaal.

Hence the fuelless coastal areas will be more and more dependent on imported crude oil or oil-from-coal from the Transvaal in the next few decades. This is logistically and strategically a very undesirable situation.

The development of available offshore gas sources (and their conversion to liquid fuels) is imperative before another wave of oil embargoes.

The present-day phrase that "the markets are awash with oil" aggravates me intensely. It probably comes from the same local "experts" who as late as 1978 were predicting a world-wide oil famine by 1985.

During the first years of the oil boycott — 1973 and 1974 — the world produced 56 million barrels of oil a day. The figure increased to 63 in 1979, but gradually dropped to 53 by 1983.

But oil was two dollars a barrel in 1973, compared to 30 dollars (nearly R60) a barrel last year.

It can be agreed that coal replaced oil in some respects, but there are limits to those replacements.

When the medium-term future of the availability of crude oil imports to South Africa is considered, there are two deciding factors:

- How long will the present worldwide recession last?
- How long will the unceasing unrest in the country continue?

My answer to the first question is: another two years at

the most. Then the oil consumption of the world will again increase, causing oil to be in short supply and more expensive.

If the answer to the second question is "a very long time", then oil boycotts against South Africa will be renewed and strengthened.

One paragraph in a letter from a good friend and competent oil man in Los Angeles illustrates the problem:

"The possibility of participation in... oil exploration in South Africa... seems unlikely now because... of the especially bad publicity South Africa now receives in our Press. The more progress you make toward social reform, the more outraged our liberals get."

If the offshore gas production and conversion project of Soekor were to be initiated in the near future, it would encourage overseas and local institutions to become involved with further offshore exploration.

The authorities should start developing the offshore gas production project — and the next few Sasol plants — speedily.

Let us not wait for another international oil crisis.

LABOR 'STAY-AWAY' DRIVE LABELLED 'FUTILE'

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 25 Nov 84 p 15

[Article by Brian Pottinger]

[Text]

AMID the turmoil of union organisation and disorganisation precipitated by the events of recent months there remains at least one person whose optimism is undiminished.

Professor Nic Wiehahn, father of the country's new labour dispensation, believes the country has endured worse before and has survived.

Now head of Unisa's Business Leadership School, the man whose name is synonymous with the dramatic changes in industrial relations since 1979, took time out to share some views on the state of the country's industrial relations.

For one thing he is optimistic about the future. And secondly, he does not regret the pioneering moves he initiated in 1979 which led to the recognition of black trade unions.

Move to moderation

His response to the significant decision of the Federation of South African Trade Unions to take part in this month's two-day stay-away:

"My sense is that this should not be seen as a growing trend towards politicisation of the unions.

"One must accept development in the unions and the fact that some will become

more radical.

"It is known all over the world that trade unions are used for many purposes and that one can expect them to be used for political motives and movements."

But, Professor Wiehahn claims, there is a discernible movement towards moderation among most of the unions and a generally better situation between employers and employees.

The political stay-away — he argues — is a futile war.

"To aim at the employers is to hit at the wrong target. If the stay-away is political there is very little the employers can do.

"It is fighting a war in an arena where the other party can do nothing. In the end, employers can be expected to respond."

Unlike a number of others, Professor Wiehahn does not believe the new constitution itself has forced a deterioration in industrial relations in the country. The labour dispensation had developed its own momentum.

Choice of dangers

Has he created a monster which is now difficult to control?

"Had we not taken the steps we did we would most certainly have created a monster," he says.

The position at which the country had arrived in 1979 was no longer a simple

choice between what was safe and what was dangerous.

"It had become a choice between what was more dangerous and what was less dangerous."

At least six major factors underly the need to change the laws; the lack of immigrants, decline in white birth-rate, the multinationals' pressure for change, the slow internationalisation of the trade union movement, the dangers of exploitation of the situation by radicals and, lastly, the political developments around South Africa.

"We are no longer Robinson Crusoe living on an island. We are part of a world which is getting smaller and smaller. Had we not changed the laws, we would have had a monster even more vicious."

Professor Wiehahn sketched a situation in which the entire black work force would have turned against the country.

"We would not have had a single, intelligent, thinking black person with the desire to preserve the system — not one."

But he admits there are certain areas of concern.

In the first instance there appears to be a growing internationalisation of the black trade union movement rather than the development of an indigenous South African character which the commission advocated.

Unfortunate amendments

The second was the indications of Government re-entry in the industrial relations set-up. The legislative amendments to the scope of the Industrial Court recently were "unfortunate".

Government attempts to define an "unfair labour practice" — the subject of an ongoing debate inside the Industrial Court — were also unfortunate.

"The court should be allowed on the basis of equity to develop its concept and in that way stimulate the development of the labour law system."

Professor Wiehahn was cautious about commenting on detentions of trade union members.

"The bottom of the balance sheet must show one is either in the red or in the black. Again it is very much a question of not what is safe and what is dangerous, but what is more dangerous and what is less dangerous."

THE black political tumult following the introduction of the new constitution has led to a radical shake-up in traditional strategies within the trade union movement.

Caught most firmly in the vice of the new pressures — black frustration on the one side and white intransigence on the other — is the powerful Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu).

Earlier this month, the Federation took the unusual step of supporting a political work stay-away called by a number of community and other organisations under the umbrella of the Transvaal Regional Stay-Away Committee.

The police raid on Sebokeng, supported by the SADF, has been offered as the ostensible reason for the Federation's decision to ally itself with community organisations in this highly-political action.

But fierce pressure from the seething black membership was the main factor.

In the wake of the polarisation created by the constitu-

tion, the union has come under intense pressure to abandon its traditional policy of concentrating on shop-floor issues.

Now it has finally made the change and the crucial question being asked is whether this implies a growing Fosatu role in overt political resistance to the status quo — an ominous development for the state and employers.

Fosatu's basic philosophy was spelt out by the Federation's president, Mr Joe Foster, in 1982.

He argued against the affiliation of unions to community-based political organisations, as was practised by the black consciousness-aligned unions.

Instead, he argued for concentration on shop-floor issues so as to build a durable base while at the same time developing "working class politics".

Increasing pressure

Since then, however, there has been an explosion of community-based political organisations — enhanced by successes achieved by the Anti-Republic Day Committee of 1981, the Anti-Sak Committee and others.

Rents, services, squatter removals, bus tariff hikes and numerous other issues have served as sore points around which the community-based political organisations have been able to build their strengths.

Fosatu's attempts to remain sympathetic to these struggles, but not directly involved, came under increasing pressure from the rank-and-file membership who could not see how shop-floor issues could be separated from the political situation in which they were forced to live.

The formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 exacerbated the problem.

While some of the general unions joined UDF or its black-consciousness equivalent, the National Forum, Fosatu, held rigidly to the view that organisational and other problems made it difficult to affiliate, although they were sympathetic to the

aims of the organisations.

At root was concern that the trade unions — vanguard of the workers' struggle — would be submerged in a loosely-defined organisation which included middle-class and merchant elements.

Fosatu's refusal to affiliate led to increasing tensions within the organisation.

In July this year, one of the most prominent of the Fosatu unions, the Metal and Allied Workers Union, split over this issue.

A breakaway section established its own union and attempted to hijack last Rand factories.

One of the reasons offered for the breakaway was that the Fosatu leadership was "not political enough".

But the events since the implementation of the constitution have resulted in a speeding up of the political dynamics within which the unions work.

Although Fosatu condemned the new constitution and the August tricameral elections, it did not embark on any overt political action.

But the black unrest in the townships, and in particular the deployment of the army in Sebokeng, appears to have been the final straw precipitating the union into support of a political action.

But whether it will continue taking part in such political demonstrations is not certain.

The union itself maintains that its basic strategies have not changed and that it re-

Strategies unchanged

mains sympathetic to the broader-than-workplace issues.

But the recent detentions of its leaders and the internationalising of the dispute could push it into an even tougher stance.

Professor Roux van der Merwe, head of the Volkswagen Chair of Industrial Relations at the University of Port Elizabeth, does not detect a dramatic radicalisation or politicisation of the Federation.

"It is reacting to the very unusual circumstances created by the constitutional reform process," he said.

RIFT BETWEEN BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT WIDENS

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 25 Nov 84 p 31

[Article by Darryl Phillips: "Why the Men Who Make SA Tick Are Losing Faith in Those Who Rule It...."]

[Text]

THE private sector in South Africa has become increasingly sceptical about the professed determination of government that our society should be a shining example of free enterprise.

I believe that in the past few months this scepticism has turned into outright resentment and disillusionment, which may very well prove difficult to counter.

Sad as this may be, just as unfortunate, and perhaps lying at the very crux of the matter, Pretoria does not understand why the mood should be changing so drastically.

In this very fact lies one of the current tragedies of this country — the widening gap in thinking between the public and the private sectors.

Few of us in business have not heard, in the course of board meetings, casual contacts or in general business discussions, evidence that people engaged in commerce and industry are more worried about the state of affairs in this country at the moment than for many years.

This concern embraces the handling of the country's economy and the Government's handling of the socio-political situation.

In the past, we have experienced bouts of misgivings about both these important subjects, but not at the same time.

The fact that the two should now coincide accentuates immeasurably the unease among my fellow-businessmen.

Rightly or wrongly, we now increasingly hear the argument that the Government's accord with business, believed at the time to be sincere, was never more than a sham.

We hear it said that that accord was the Government's way of persuading the business sector to do what it had traditionally done, which is to keep its head down, get on with its own affairs

and not meddle in the process of governing the country.

No government likes being criticised. To remove a potential source of embarrassing criticism would, therefore, be important.

While I sympathise with people who are trying to encourage businessmen to use their own international contacts as a means to offset the increasing strength of the anti-South African lobby, I share the fears of many of my colleagues that the task may be beyond us.

We have plenty of evidence of efforts being made in this direction. Within the past six months, several prominent South African businessmen have delivered important addresses to American audiences on the question of disinvestment.

Without having canvassed opinions, it is easy to imagine their embarrassment at having their well-intentioned and intelligently-based arguments almost immediately negated by widespread television coverage of police action in African townships.

The potential effectiveness of

ambassadorial businessmen is further weakened by the reactions of government to the three major private sector organisations when they jointly called on government to rethink its policy of arresting black labour leaders.

We understand that the Government's theory is that evolutionary change can only take place within a situation of social stability, and that stability must be achieved, even by using force.

What concerns many of us is that this attitude of the end justifying means may be a little simplistic.

What is more, the fact that it is being challenged by business on practical, and not political, grounds must surely suggest to the authorities that they should at least listen before reacting so violently.

It seems that the Government is trying to achieve two aims within this context.

One is to attempt to perpetuate what is, after all, the established, if unfortunate, behaviour pattern of business's role within the country.

The other is to prevent something of an evolutionary change in which not only does business come out of its shell on socio-political matters that affect the entire society of which it is part, but that process is actually led by Afrikaner business.

In historic terms, business in this country has, as we all know, been dominated by the English-language group.

The emergence of Afrikaners in the roles of entrepreneurs and managers has been both dramatic and successful.

Thus a new dimension has been added to the private sector.

This process of change could produce one of the most potent sources of objective criticism of government policy.

It could also lead to a much healthier relationship between the public and private sectors.

I use the word "objective" advisedly. In the past, English-language business has produced people unafraid to take a firm line on subjects which the politicians have felt is their preserve.

The problem has been that of language. Such criticism has been perceived in Pretoria to be less than objective because business has been perceived to be controlled by a language group basically opposed to the Government.

This argument must now fall away. Business is beginning to speak with one voice.

The language used has become of secondary importance. For this reason, if for no other, the message deserves to be heeded, or at least listened to without attracting the instant critical reaction from Pretoria which we have read about in recent weeks.

If the intention is to scare businessmen from both language groups from forging what could be a powerful alliance, the move would be short-sighted.

Most developed nations acknowledge the need for all available talent to be used in the effective governing of the country.

We are, if anything, more in need than most of this pooling of our available resources.

Assuming that all three employer bodies which have approached the Government remain in concert, we could see the first signs of a degree of co-operation between the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the Federated Chambers of Industries and Assocom, that has never before been achieved.

If this were to happen, it could become an important product of an otherwise deeply-damaging recession.

It is worth pausing a moment to consider why what happened in the past couple of weeks took place at all.

For a number of years, the Government has made various attempts to convince business that it is genuinely keen to work for the common good.

First came the Carlton Conference, proclaimed a resounding success by both sides.

The most prominent and powerful men of commerce and industry responded positively to what they believed to be an important gesture by the Government.

This success was followed by the Good Hope Conference, where again the results were positive.

Perhaps because the Government failed to realise that the conferences were no more than the preliminaries, and that actual implementation of strategy was the next essential step, something then went awry.

The failure on the part of the Government to follow up its advantage led to doubts about its motives in the first place.

Since the two conferences, we have seen a steady return to the status quo — a return to the situation of "Them and Us", "Pretoria vs capitalism".

It is perfectly clear that the Government did not, and possibly even now does not, realise why its attempts to close the gap between itself and private enterprise failed.

One of the reasons for this failure is the lack of understanding of each other's needs and problems which such a gap induces.

The new Minister of Finance has made efforts to start rebuilding bridges. In his case, the need was greater than ever because businessmen are naturally uneasy about entrusting authority to inexperienced hands, particularly at a time when we are experiencing the worst recession in years.

Whether or not these two factors lay behind the decision to try again to move closer to the private sector is not central to my theme.

What is important is the fact that the gesture once again worked. It was appreciated and it must have assisted the new Minister to ease his way into a difficult portfolio.

It is a great pity that the Government now shows signs of repeating its previous mistakes.

It is again failing to follow up an advantage by building on the goodwill. What compounds the error is that this has happened at a time when the private sector is being called upon to carry an absurdly onerous burden, made all the more burdensome by a failure on the part of the Government to accept the need for making an equitable contribution towards economic recovery.

It is these considerations which have finally caused business to reconsider its role within our system.

Having done so, the importance of its response is made all the greater because it is obviously not politically-inspired.

In fact, it is true to say that even before so many Afrikaans voices from business were raised in protest, the bulk of

criticism from business was non-political in its origins.

By and large, the businessmen of this country tend to consider themselves removed from politics.

This is partly inspired by a desire to get on with what they need to do in order to make a living, and partly by fear of embarrassing the Government and thereby bringing down the wrath of Pretoria upon themselves. Far safer, therefore, to keep one's profile as low as possible.

What the private sector is saying is sufficiently important to warrant the Government according it due recognition.

Expressed simply, it is a natural desire, as a significant force within any capitalistic system, to be consulted on matters concerning the economy and its management.

If the Government believes it

has made a serious attempt to move closer to business, and if this belief is not shared by business, which is undoubtedly the case, something is obviously very wrong.

The answer would seem to lie in one word — "communication".

Capitalism actually represents a partnership between State and the private sector even if, in the interests of good government, the former is acknowledged as the senior partner.

The success of any partnership rests in good communications. In the current situation there is no real proof of true partnership — and it is this fact that is deeply resented by the people who actually make the wheels of enterprise turn in South Africa.

Private enterprise appears to be losing confidence in the Government's ability to manage the

economy and in its ability to bring about evolutionary change within our society.

It is easy enough to dismiss this sort of reaction as being a manifestation of the greedy capitalist's inherent selfishness. To do so would be folly, and would achieve nothing more than a further weakening of an already troubled economy.

Not since the days of Sharpeville has there been greater gloom within the private sector. It is deep-seated and will not simply go away.

Unless the Government takes immediate steps to counter this mood with positive proof that it is prepared to adopt a more responsive attitude to its partners, unless much more sensitivity is shown in the handling of social progress, the very people who are capable of making a major contribution to evolutionary change will have been stripped of the two essentials equipping them for such a role: business viability and a sense of involvement.

CONSERVATIVES TAKE CREDIT FOR REMOVAL OF 'ILLEGAL' FAMILIES

Kimberley DIAMOND FIELDS ADVERTISER in English 22 Nov 84 p 13

[Text]

JOHANNESBURG -- The Conservative Party has taken full credit for the pending removal to their own areas of hundreds of coloureds and Indians living illegally in the white Johannesburg suburbs of Hillbrow and Mayfair.

Mr Clive Derby-Lewis, CP Johannesburg regional chairman, who has been personally involved in a campaign to kick coloureds and Indians out of the white areas, yesterday hailed the government's announcement that the 'illegals' would be provided with housing in their own group areas as 'a signal victory scored by the CP for the people of Hillbrow and Mayfair.'

ELECTIONS

His party has made what it calls 'a Govern-

ment laxity with regard to the implementation of the Group Areas Act in Hillbrow and Mayfair' an issue in next week's parliamentary and provincial by-elections.

Members of the House of Delegates and the House of Representatives were called on to resign yesterday following their involvement in a Government decision to house in their own areas, hundreds of coloureds and Indians living illegally in Mayfair and Hillbrow.

Mr Cassim Saloojee, chairman of Actstop, an organisation which actively opposes the Group Areas Act, said it was now clear that 'the Rajbansis and the Hendrikse's were actively participating in the

implementation of the Act and were 'wishing people into separate racial ghettos.'

The chairman of the Ministers' Council of the House of Representatives, the Rev Allan Hendrikse, and his corresponding Cabinet colleague of the House of Delegates, Amichand Rajbansi, as well as the own affairs Minister of local government and housing in each chamber, Mr David Curry and Mr Baldeo Dookie joined four white Ministers in the release of a statement on the matter on Tuesday night.

They announced that 1 100 flats for Indians were to be built in Burghersdorp in Central Johannesburg and 500 units were to be erected for coloureds in Newclare.

BOESAK KEEPS ELECTRONIC RECORDS OF SPEECHES

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 25 Nov 84 p 4

[Article by Arlene Getz]

[Text]

A TINY tape-recorder has become the new travelling companion of United Democratic Front patron Dr Allan Boesak.

Dr Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, now keeps electronic records of his speeches while waiting to hear the result of a police probe into a newspaper interview he gave in Australia.

When he chaired a Detainees' Parents Support Committee (DPSC) Press conference in Johannesburg this week, the recorder lay beside a battery of microphones used by the media to record his statements.

Dr Boesak has been the focus of police attention since the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, advised them to charge him for remarks allegedly made during the newspaper interview.

Dr Boesak was reported as saying the South African Police were committing "the most unbelievable atrocities" and the South African Defence Force was "one of the most sophisticated murder machines in history".

Mr Le Grange called him a "liar and a slanderer".

Speaking at this week's Press conference, Dr Boesak said he had not yet been approached by the police about the matter.

"I only know what I've seen in the Press," he said.

Top legal academic John Dugard was doubtful about whether Dr Boesak could be prosecuted successfully under the Police Act for an interview given outside the country.

In terms of Section 27 of the Police Act anyone who publishes untrue matter about the police without having reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, could be liable for a fine of R10 000 or five years' imprisonment.

Professor Dugard said that in his opinion the Police Act was not extra-territorial and did not extend to acts committed overseas.

CSO: 3400/296

UNIVERSITY SURVEY REVEALS INDIAN PUPILS OUT-PERFORM WHITES

Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 25 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by Kitt Katzin]

[Text]

INDIAN pupils who wrote their matric at government schools are out-performing their white counterparts — mostly former Transvaal Education Department pupils — in at least one faculty at the University of the Witwatersrand.

A confidential report by the university shows that from 1980 to 1983, Indian students who wrote the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) matric, achieved better results in the Faculty of Science than those who passed the Transvaal Education Department (TED) matric exams.

And the Indian students, whose standard of schooling is generally regarded to be inferior to that of whites, have also performed better than students who wrote the Joint Matriculation Board (JMB) exam.

The JMB curriculum is said to be the country's toughest school-leaving test, and is adopted by most private schools.

The Wits finding, based on an intensive study by an ad hoc committee of four of the university's academics, comes in the wake of disclosures by the Sunday Express that the TED, which controls almost all white schools in the Transvaal, fiddled last year's matric results.

The result was that hundreds of additional distinctions were awarded to pupils who did not earn them.

The disclosures set off a storm in education circles and led to a top-level inquiry by the TED, which admitted that discrepancies had taken place.

Stringent

As a result, the JMB, which oversees all matric examining bodies in South Africa, introduced more stringent controls to its marking procedures to prevent TED examiners from awarding inflated marks again.

The Wits survey shows that in spite of TED schools scoring a record num-

ber of distinctions — most of their English students opt to study at Wits — Indians swept the boards in the university's three-year BSc course, and again almost topped results in the four year course.

For the three-year course (1980-1983) the report shows that of 65 Indian students who registered over the four years, 35 (54%) passed their final year, compared with a 51% pass rate for JMB students (50 out of 99), 50% for Natal students (15 out of 30), 45% for TED students (390 out of 877), 36% for Cape students (eight out of 22) and 5% for coloured students (one out of 22).

It also shows that of 28 students from the Free State and other areas, seven (25%) passed. Thirteen Indian students (20%) failed, as against 26% (225) of TED students, 27% (six) of Cape students, 16% (16) of JMB students and 10% (three) of Natal students.

"These results," said the report, "show that the Indian (DIA) students had the best pass rate."

In addition, fewer Indians (four), cancelled their course, compared to 88 (TED) and six (JMB).

In the four-year course, Indian students again fared better than most other groups, with the exception of Natal students, although more Indian students actually passed.

Out of 14 students from Natal, two (14%) passed, whereas 15 Indian students out of 113 (13%) got through their final year, and although JMB students scored the same percentage pass (13%), only five out of 40 actually passed.

The TED students again shaped badly — out of 350, only 26 (7%) passed. Of the 35 National Senior Certificate students, four (11%) passed, and of the 20 Cape (white) and 18 coloured matriculants, only one in each category passed.

Of 42 black students who wrote the Department of Education and Training (DET) matric, two out of 42 obtained their degrees.

Of those who cancelled their course, TED students (57) again topped the list, followed by Indian students (eight), Cape students (six) and NSC students (five).

A total of 190 TED students (53%) failed, compared to seven Natal students (50%), nine Cape students (45%) and 39 Indian students (35%).

Said the report: "It is worth noting that the JMB, Indian and NSC students performed better than the rest."

Academics concerned with the report's findings declined to comment.

But education experts said the results reflected poorly on the credibility of the results and overall achievements of TED matriculants.

Distinctions

They point out that the Transvaal has for years posted the best matric results in the country.

Last year, 123 matric pupils got six distinctions each, 140 got five apiece, and of the 26 000 candidates who wrote the examination, 50% obtained university entrances (a 45% pass mark).

"But when matric marks are inflated," said one academic, "university results will be even more disastrous."

● The interim report on the performance of Wits' science faculty was compiled by an ad hoc committee consisting of Professor A S Howard of the department of chemistry, Professor G A Tyson of the department of psychology, Mr R D Layton of the department of computer science, and Mr Peter Fridj-hon of the department of statistics.

The report was submitted to the undergraduate committee of the faculty of science, which studied its findings, and later commissioned further investigations.

THE CLASS OF 1980: ONLY 25% WILL MAKE IT

IN A separate survey, the report revealed the extent of the dropout rate at the University of the Witwatersrand.

It focused on students who registered in a particular year — 1980 — and charted their progress.

Of 262 three-year students, 119 (45%) cancelled their registration by the end of 1983 without completing a BSc, while less than half — 114 (44%) graduated with at least a BSc.

Twenty-five students were "limping" but still active, which meant that

a maximum of only 54% could eventually graduate.

In the case of four-year students who enrolled in 1980, 118 out of 163 — 73% — had cancelled their registration by the end of last year.

Only 20 (13%) had graduated, and 19 (12%) were within reach of obtaining a degree.

Thus, said the report, only 25% of students who started in the faculty of science in 1980 would eventually graduate.

MORE ACCURATE FORECASTING OF ENERGY NEEDS URGED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 25 Nov 84 p 1,2

[Article by Fleur De Villiers: "Secrets of Escom's Big Power Failure"]

[Text] SOUTH AFRICA could save R105 000-million over the next 20 years through more accurate forecasts of its electricity needs.

These forecasts, based on a lower expected growth rate and energy saving, are a key suggestion of the De Billiers Commission of Inquiry into Escom.

The report, which has been accepted "in toto" by the Government, could also shape the future of the other state monopolies, such as Iscor, South Africa Transport Services and the SABC.

The R105 000-million saving represents the difference in capital expenditure between Escom's projected growth rate of seven percent a year in electricity consumption between 1983 and 2003 and the commission's insistence that, through savings and more accurate forecasting, it can be reduced to to a more realistic level of five percent.

As Escom is now a virtual monopoly, providing South Africa with 93 percent of its power needs, and as its capital needs are financed either through tariff increases or hugely expensive loans, this well represent a direct saving to the South African consumer.

Hurriedly

The report, hurriedly released this week--two months ahead of time--in response to public fury over the latest Escom tariff increase, is more than a damning indictment of Escom's long-term planning, its growing share of the dwindling South African economic cake, its huge inroads into the capital market, and its contribution to this country's soaring inflation rate.

It also, by implication, condemns the non-accountability of all South African public corporations and parastatals. Observers believe that the Government may be persuaded by the report to reexamine the structure of the other bureaucratic monsters which dominate South Africa's corporate landscape and -- like nationalised British industries, with which they have much in common -- can do exactly as they please.

The report points out that the "arms-length" principle which gives the parastatals their independence from government, and which requires that they operate according to free market principles, also make them accountable only to the statute which created them, and which requires that they make neither a loss nor a profit.

The responsible cabinet minister has virtually no control over their tariff structures, and can only "ask" them to postpone or lower tariff hikes.

But, the report points out, while they are free of parliamentary or government control, neither are they subject to the final sanction of the private sector: going bankrupt.

The result has been to create enormous, structured bureaucracies with their own peculiar management systems.

Cash Flow

Because cash flow comes either from tariffs or depreciation, return on capital is not used as a means of measuring efficiency or the creation of funds. These bureaucracies, therefore, enjoy untrammelled power -- even while they are accountable to no one.

When Escom, SATS, Iscor or the SABC want to embark on huge capital projects they simply add the costs to their tariffs.

And they go on borrowing expeditions abroad.

From 1946 to 1960, the private sector attracted 87,7 percent of the foreign capital which flowed into South Africa, but the pendulum swung dramatically in the other direction in 1973 to 1976.

In this period, 87,7 percent of the total foreign capital inflow went to the public sector in the form of loans, and only 3,3 percent to the private sector.

As a result, foreign capital has not flowed into productive investments, but into public sector spending.

And it was Escom's greed could squeeze out other demands for capital.

From 1971 to 1980, public sector spending accounted for 67,2 percent of total investment in South Africa.

And an even more shocking figure revealed by the report is that Escom's capital investment, as a percentage of gross national saving, less depreciation, was 41,8 percent in 1982, and diminished only slightly to 34,4 percent in 1983.

Millions Added

--From its inception in the 1920's to 1982, Escom's fixed capital assets were R7 500-million. But work in progress on December 1 of that year added another R5 000 million. Escom's capital expenditure from 1983 to 1987 was an estimated R27 000 million -- and all this at a time when South Africa's current and expected growth rate was the lowest in decades.

--Escom's annual capital expenditure grew from R642-million in 1976 to R2 732 million in 1983, and will increase even further over the next few years.

--Electricity prices in South Africa, which grew at 3,21 percent a year from 1967 to 1974, soared at annual rate of 19,32 percent from 1974 to 1982, when they exceeded the inflation rate by five percent a year.

--Despite the increased capital spending, availability in Escom's coalfired power stations diminished, from 82,3 percent in 1973 to 7 percent in 1982.

And this at a time when, in response to the shake-up which the oil crisis induced in world economy, other Western countries had abandoned Escom's favoured "econometric" method of forecasting growth, had slashed their energy projects and introduced massive and long-lasting savings in their energy consumption.

In South Africa, forecasts were based on energy needs in the late 60's and early 70's when consumption grew by 10 percent a year. Because of the long lead times in power station construction, Escom was trapped into a major expansion programme.

Thus, while the rest of the western world was engaged in tailoring its energy needs to lower growth rates and energy saving, Escom went on a massive building spree.

In America, 1981 electricity consumption was 32 percent lower than had been estimated in 1974 -- the equivalent of 200 1 000-megawatt plants, each costing three billion dollars.

The result of Escom's forecasts -- and the fact that it serves no master but itself -- have been enormous capital expansion, an over-supply of power, escalating tariffs and high inflation.

South Africa's high energy and transport costs since the mid-70's have, in turn, under-cut the international competitiveness of key South African exports such as high-energy-using ferrochrome and ferromanganese.

It was these exports which, benefiting from low energy and transport costs in the early 70s, protected South Africa from the full effects of the oil crisis.

Now that advantage has disappeared -- partly because of Escom's ambitious expansion programme based on inaccurate forecasts of South Africa's power needs

at a time of diminishing growth, and the fact that South Africa did not join the rest of the world in reducing its energy needs.

With the publication and the acceptance of the De Billiers Commission's recommendations, that has come to an end, and observers believe that the writing is also on the wall for other big-spending state corporations who have added so substantially to South Africa's inflation rate.

Recommended

The major recommendations accepted by the Government are:

--The replacement of Escom's board with a two-tier structure embracing an electricity council and a management board.

--The electricity council, which will be a policy-formulating body, will include the Directors General of Finance and Mineral and Energy Affairs, five independent experts, and five representatives from major private sector organisations such as the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, FCI, Assocom, the Chamber of Mines and organised agriculture.

CSO: 3400/296

TRIBAL ROW CENTERS ON ZULU PRINCESS

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 25 Nov 84 p 1

[Article by Peter Sullivan]

[Text] A ROYAL row over a princess is threatening to turn a squabble between Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and a son-in-law he refuses to acknowledge into a war between the Zulu and Swazi nations.

The bizarre tale of Princess Phumzile, Chief Buthelezi's daughter, whom Swazis believe to be married to their Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimpi, was tossed into the public arena at the funeral of Chief Buthelezi's mother this week.

It has such serious repercussions that a Swazi delegation discussed the matter with South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, in Pretoria yesterday.

There are allegations by the Swazis that the princess was thrashed with a sjambok "to within an inch of her life."

The allegation is that this occurred after she had been returned to kwaZulu from Swaziland for the first time.

Since then the tug-of-war princess has been back and forth three times.

The last time was while Chief Buthelezi was overseas. She crossed the border either with false documents or without any at all.

Prince Bhekimpi and the princess are married in terms of Swazi custom, but Chief Buthelezi refused the "lobola" that was offered and has not recognised the marriage even though there is a son aged 10, presently being educated in Swaziland.

Chief Buthelezi is demanding the return of the child (which Zulu custom says is his child because the Princess is not married according to Zulu law), and he is demanding the return of the Princess (because return law says he is still her custodian if she is unmarried even though she is 30 years old).

Prince Bhekimpi, on the other hand, is loath to let his wife return to kwaZulu because he fears she would be beaten. She has been back three times and "escaped" three times back to Swaziland.

Chief Buthelezi also refused to acknowledge Prince Bhekimpi as the father of the little boy.

At Chief Buthelezi's mother's funeral on Friday, the master of ceremonies, Prince Cideon Zulu, told the guests the Zulu nation was angry with the Swazi Government for not allowing Princess Phumzile to return to kwaZulu for her grandmother's funeral.

When King Sobhuza II was alive he warned that whoever returned the Princess to kwaZulu would be responsible for her death.

After the death of Chief Buthelezi's mother this week, the Zulu Chief Minister arranged for a car to be sent to Swaziland to pick up Princess Phumzile. She refused to go, saying she was scared and threatening to commit suicide.

Chief Buthelezi has warned that he will take the matter into his own hands if a satisfactory solution is not found, and there are fears this could lead to a border clash or even a war between the two nations.

A spokesman for Chief Buthelezi described the assault allegation as "the biggest lot of nonsense" and said there was "not a word of truth in it".

"If it had happened it would not have taken two years to be published. It would have been all over every newspaper in the country within hours.

"There has been trouble between the families but the chief has always tried to settle it peacefully," the spokesman said.

"The Chief is a Christian and could never agree to a polygamous marriage for his daughter."

The spokesman said Chief Buthelezi might ultimately take the matter to court.

CSO: 3400/296

SOUTH AFRICA

RACIAL DEMOGRAPHY IN URBAN, RURAL AREAS

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 14 Nov 84 p 10

[Text] The number of whites in the rural areas is unfavorable in relation to the number of blacks. A large part of the growth taking place in our small towns is the result of this white depopulation in the rural areas. One of the results is that it leaves the country's borders all the more open for foreign occupation and infiltration. The accompanying article was drafted by the research committee of the Afrikaner National Guard and has just been distributed to its membership.

Two kinds of appeals are being made to whites in the rural areas: on the one hand, they are being asked to remain there and thus stem the tide of depopulation; on the other hand, they are being asked not to struggle and to give up their land which is needed for the consolidation of black states. Both those who must stay and those who must give up their land are making sacrifices that are being asked of them for the sake of white survival.

Today more and more people are wondering whether the sacrifices they are making are helping at all to realize the goal of white survival. Their doubts are not wholly without reason; willingness to sacrifice is definitely tapering off and real action is needed to exorcise this loss of confidence.

Whites are being asked to remain in the rural areas so that our borders can be occupied by our own people at all times. The inviolability of our sovereignty is our own responsibility and cannot be entrusted to foreigners.

It is therefore necessary that our people's presence in their country must be visible up to the border every day. It is precisely at the border that every inch of ground must be utilized; an energetic religious, cultural, and social life must be led; defense must be effective; and the feeling of solidarity with the people in the interior must be demonstrated strongly.

Whites are also being asked to give land up for consolidation. This is necessary so that our borders can effectively separate us from other peoples: borders must be short, they must hinder entrance, be able to be defended easily, and, most important, they must contribute to the establishment of

viable black states, so that their ever-increasing populations can be housed and the white state's population can become whiter and whiter.

Reclaim

Consolidation is thus a necessary means for us to use in reclaiming and holding on to our land for ourselves. This must be supplemented by other methods, such as small town development and decentralization of work opportunities in the black areas.

We have been occupied with consolidation since 1936 and with conscious industrial decentralization and small town improvement since 1960. To what degree have we succeeded in manning our borders with our own people in place of foreigners and in making our population more white?

The testimony given to consolidation committees points to the fact that whites on the borders are in unevniable circumstances. They are being stared in the face by capital losses as a result of consolidation. They can really only remedy these losses after a fasion, by offering their land up for consolidation. The feeling of solidarity among border residents is being adversely affected as a result.

Widows and other heirs are apt to give way in the border areas and to relocate to the nearest small town or elsewhere. Our own people are thus decreasing in number and the number of foreigners on the borders is probably increasing. The security of life and property is a source of concern, although no one likes to admit it openly. Many people are oppressed by the thought of what will happen when the approaching border of the black state "is right here next to us...."

The compensation to farmers for land that they have to give up has already been the cause of discord in the past. The market value falls at the slightest mention of the inclusion of an area in a black state; questions are raised about the length of time it will take and the method of valuation; and the question about how one can guarantee that a property owner will not be impoverished as a result of consolidation has not yet been effectively answered. Everything points to the fact that the replacement value of a piece of property is going to have to be seriously considered as the most equitable form of compensation.

Farmers who object to giving their land up for consolidation sometimes point to the fact that the land in question has been in the family's possession for a hundred years or more; they talk about the success that has been achieved by succeeding generations; and they charge, sometimes from previous experience, that what they have accomplished will come to nothing once the sacrifice has been made, without any great ideal being served.

The elderly, and even less elderly people, with their experience of consolidation behind them, are not always inclined to begin somewhere else again and move...back to the south from where their forefathers who settled the land had come. Thus is the Great Trek undone, as it were.

An analysis of census and other data shows that the realization of our ideals of making our country's population whiter and keeping whites safe on our borders is not progressing smoothly, as desired, but that greater success is being achieved in the interior.

Table 1. White and non-white population growth in large urban, other urban, and rural areas in the Transvaal, 1970-80.

<u>Area</u>	<u>White growth</u>	<u>Non-white growth</u>
Metropolitan areas	23.7%	39.9%
Small towns	31.5%	-10.9%
Rural areas	17.8%	30.5%

It is clear that whites in the metropolitan and rural areas have declined significantly during the last ten years, while there has been progress in the small towns in certain key portions of the country.

In the largest metropolitan area, the Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Verenniging industrial area, the influx of blacks and the growth in the black population was markedly greater than the corresponding white influx and population growth. The white portion of the population in this area thus decreased from 37.3 percent in 1970 to 34.5 percent in 1980. This same pattern applies in broad outline to the other large urban areas except for those in Natal.

In places where whites already make up a small minority of the population, they are also considerably weaker in 1980 than in 1970. These are precisely those areas we would like to populate with our own people and where much of the land being given up for consolidation is being sacrificed.

In the Transvaal the number of non-whites has increased in the white rural areas by more than 30 percent during the ten-year period, while the number of whites has increased by only 18 percent. The white increase was strong in much of the High Veld and other districts where the mining, electrical, and other industries grew in volume during the ten-year period. The more rapid increase in the white as opposed to the non-white population is not, however, characteristic of districts in which agriculture is the prevailing activity.

In the West and North Transvaal the white portion of the local population decreased from 12.5 percent to 10 percent, and in the South and East Transvaal districts the percentage was actually lower, as little as 2 percent in some East Transvaal border districts.

Table 2. White and non-white population growth in the urban and rural areas of the Orange Free State (OFS), 1970 to 1980.

<u>Area</u>	<u>White growth</u>	<u>Non-white growth</u>
Metropolitan area	20.7%	21.6%
Mining area	18.6%	-19.9%

Other small towns	1.3%	8.7%
Rural areas	- 6.0%	27.4%
OFS total	12.6%	- 0.3%

In the Orange Free State, circumstances took an even less favorable turn in some places than in the Transvaal. There were 6 percent less whites here and 27.4 percent more non-whites. In places the ratio thus changed from 77 whites for every 100 non-whites in 1970 to 47 for every 100 in 1980.

Change

Although the number of whites increased in some places in Natal by 14 percent, the number of non-whites grew by 52 percent; so that the ratio also changed there from 57 whites per 1000 non-whites in 1970 to 43 per 1000 in 1980.

Table 3. White and non-white population growth in the urban and rural areas of Natal, 1970 to 1980.

<u>Area</u>	<u>White growth</u>	<u>Non-white growth</u>
Metropolitan area	21.6%	1.8%
Small towns	57.9%	- 2.5%
Rural areas	14.0%	52.0%
Natal total	27.6%	22.6%

In the Cape Province the ratio of whites to non-whites appears more favorable than in the Transvaal and considerably more favorable than in Natal and the Orange Free State. Whites are the strongest in Boland and in the coastal area of False Bay to Port Elizabeth and the interior on which it borders. The ratio is the weakest in the Eastern Cape where virtually all districts lost rural whites.

Table 4. White and non-white population growth in the urban and rural areas of the Cape Province, 1970 to 1980.

<u>Area</u>	<u>White growth</u>	<u>Non-white growth</u>
Metropolitan area	23.7%	50.2%
Small towns	6.2%	4.7%
Rural areas	- 8.9%	4.6%
Cape Province total	15.0%	22.3%

As far as small towns are concerned, all the provinces (the Cape Province to a lesser degree) show a more favorable course of population change for whites than has been the case in the rural and metropolitan area. The white population of small towns in Natal, the Transvaal, and certain Free State regions increased sharply, while non-white populations decreased.

Gain

By means of settlement and annexation in black states, large populations have been removed from the political and social dispensation of the white state and political allegiance has been established in their own nations. This represents a significant gain, but it will come to nothing again if they are not able to get loose of white economic life and find a livelihood within their own states. And we cannot ignore this warning much longer.

The sacrifices that whites have had to make thus far have not, therefore, been totally in vain. Success has been achieved, and it is now necessary to follow this up with greater efforts rather than toss in the towel.

The future does not ask that we gradually abandon control over the incoming tide but that we use it effectively; black property ownership must not be promoted in the white area but rather in the black states. This will come about in good time as a result of small town development and the establishment of industries in black states, if we work at it even more energetically than in the past rather than devoting millions of rands to it in white territory.

However, this will still not solve the problem of our people on the border. A large part of the growth that has taken place in the small towns is the result of depopulation in the rural areas. This leaves our borders more and more open for foreign occupation and infiltration. The circumstances prevailing on the border sound awfully distant to the city-dweller; but, like a crippling disease, they could come creeping nearer to the white heartland.

The border problem requires fundamental research--research which does not, as in the past, accept the presence of the foreign masses as a matter of course but which is based on achieving effective borders so that our own people can guard them vigorously, both spiritually and physically.

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CSO: 34J1/47

BRIEFS

MOSSEL BAY GAS--GEORGE--The Mossel Bay area is the most likely location for the development of a multi-billion rand refinery to process offshore gas reserves. However, feasibility studies--which would take at least another six months--must first be completed, says the Director-General of Mineral and Energy Affairs, Dr. L. Alberts. Dr. Alberts says the project will be given the go-ahead only if every test result is positive. There will have to be absolute certainty of sufficient reserves to last about 30 years. The Government would make its final decision known as soon as possible so that planning could start, Dr. Alberts told the annual congress of the Southern Cape Tourism and Development Association at George yesterday. He warned that planning for the area, for example property speculation and the establishment of infrastructure, had to be approached with great caution. "Although the Government wants to exploit all possible fuel resources with the highest possible degree of private sector participation, such planning is subject to certain economic realities." [Text] [Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 5 Dec 84 p 6]

FOSKOR EXPORTS--The Phosphate Development Corporation Limited (Foskor) consolidated its breakthrough on the export market during the past year with a 73 per cent increase in the export of phosphate rock compared with the previous year. Foskor's consolidated income after tax for the year until July 1984 was R4,5-million compared with R4,3-million for the previous year. Foreign exchange rate losses reduced this figure to R2,2-million. [Text] [Pretoria SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST in English 16 Nov 84 p 4]

EXPORTS BOOST PLASTICS--The plastics industry is one of the few sectors of the economy which appears certain to improve in the next 12 months. This year will see exports of about 50 000 tons of PVC, bringing in foreign exchange earnings of R32-million, and exports of high density polyethylene (HDPE) are also on the cards next year. Locally, the whole R2,5-billion-a-year plastics market had risen 6 per cent in volume terms this year and was expected to rise another 3 per cent next year thanks to market growth and import substitution, said Mr Bill Naude, executive director of the Plastics Federation. [Text]

DROP IN COMPANY REGISTRATIONS--New company registrations in South Africa have dropped by a massive 30 per cent in recent months. An analysis of Credit Information Bureau Dun and Bradstreet of figures supplied by the Registrar of Companies, shows that the number of companies registered between July and October dropped by 1 555 (5 227 to 3 672) compared to the same period last

year. Since May this year the number of new companies registered has been consistently lower than in 1983, which would seem to indicate a lack of confidence in new business start-ups. This trend is likely to continue for the remainder of 1984, according to a Dun and Bradstreet forecast, with a total drop off for the year of 14 per cent, of 2 000 businesses, compared to last year. [Text] [Pretoria SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST in English 16 Nov 84 p 23]

MAURITIAN TRADE LINKS STRENGTHENED--The Mauritian business community has taken steps towards strengthening trade links with South Africa with the appointment of Mr Jean-Michel de Senneville as the Mauritian Trade Representative based in Johannesburg. The Mauritian Chamber of Commerce and Industries approved the appointment which took effect in July 1984, SAFTO (South African Foreign Trade Organisation) is providing back-up facilities and assistance. Mr De Senneville maintains that the potential for increasing two-way trade between Mauritius and South Africa is tremendous. He regards his appointment not only as an opportunity to develop Mauritian exports to South Africa and the rest of the world, but to encourage South African exporters to use Mauritius as an off-shore base for the development of international markets. [Text] [Pretoria SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST in English 23 Nov 84 p 15]

INVESTMENTS IN BISHO--More than R120 million is to be pumped into Ciskei's new capital city, Bisho, over the next three years in a series of private and public sector investments, the managing director of the Bisho City Corporation, Mr Gert Claassen, said yesterday. Bisho was expected to grow into a "sizeable city," with a large commercial potential, Mr Claassen said. Interest in investment in Bisho had been so dramatic since the announcement of new tax laws for the country that the initial plans for the size of Bisho had to be increased by at least 25 percent. A statement released by Ciskei's Directorate of Communications yesterday listed six major development projects scheduled for the "very near future". The were: --Three government complexes costing about R76 million, including a civic centre, to be built under the independence agreements between Ciskei and South Africa; --A light industries park; --A recreation park surrounding a lake; --At least five housing projects, some of which are already under way. The first of these, Bisho Gardens, will cost R3 million. --A post office, police station and various office and shopping facilities; A private school with an estimated value of R8-million, funded by the Anglo-American Chairman's fund, which will be started early next year. [Text] [Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 27 Nov 84 p 10]

LP 'PORTFOLIOS'--THE Labour Party yesterday announced that the Member of Parliament for Kimberley's Diamant constituency, Mr Leslie Abrahams, would be responsible for the foreign affairs and information 'portfolio.' The members responsible for the other portfolios are: Constitutional development and planning and constitutional affairs: Mr Jac Rabie (Ryger, Paarl); Transport affairs: Mr Anthony Reeves (Klipspruit West); Home affairs and national education: Mr George van der Heever (Grassy Park); Law and order: Mr Don Mateman (Eldorado Park); Communication and public works: Mr Llewelyn Landers (Mitchell's Plain); Health and welfare: Mr Willie Meyer (Robertson); Co-operation, development and education: Mr Tommy Abrahams (Wentworth); Defence: Mr Abe Williams (Mamre); Manpower: Mr Arthur Stanley (Liesbeeck); Industry and commerce: Mr Louis Dewrance (Eerste River); Justice: Mr Peter Mopp (Border); Agricultural economics and water affairs: Mr James Swiegelaar (Dysselsdorp); Minerals and energy affairs: Mr Ray Williams (Mid-Karoo); Finance: Mr Fred Peters (Silverton); Environmental affairs and tourism: Mrs Joy Pilcher (Kasselsvlei). [Text] [Kimberley DIAMOND FIELDS ADVERTISER in English 17 Nov 84 p 3]

MOZAMBICAN MANPOWER DELEGATION ARRIVES--Mozambican delegation led by that country's minister of manpower, Mr Mazula, has arrived in South Africa for a 2-day visit. The group visited the (Chamdor) Training Center near Krugersdorp today, accompanied by Mr Du Plessis, the South African minister of manpower, and Dr Van der Merwe, director general of the Department of Manpower. Our economic staff reports that during the visit attention will apparently be given to the rationalization of procedures for recruiting Mozambican workers who wish to find employment in South Africa. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in Afrikaans 1400 GMT 10 Dec 84 MB]

SADF PRESENCE BACKED--East London--The city council wants a strong military presence here. This was confirmed last night at its monthly meeting when the future of the South African Defence Force Klerck Rifle Range on the West Bank was discussed. Defence force authorities are known to be concerned about the future of the range and the city council is supporting its retention. It was agreed last night that the consultants doing the planning of the West Bank be made aware of the council's full support for a SADF presence and that the consultants assess the impact of retaining it allowing for full landscaping in the course of their existing assignment. It was also agreed that council give the SADF a firm commitment that land would always be available for a rifle range in East London. The chairman of the action committee, Mr Donald Card, said it had long been council policy to back a strong military presence in the area. "It is good for the confidence in the area, for security and for the vibrancy of our community. It brings young men to the city and this is good for sport in the area," Mr Card said.--DDR [Text] [East London DAILY DISPATCH in English 27 Nov 84 p 3]

CENSUS '85--Many of the 300,000 or so newcomers to the job market next year will have to make do with part-time work. There will not be enough jobs to go around as school-leavers, graduates and national servicemen arrive on the market. Thanks to the need to know how many South Africans there are, 40,000 enumerators will be employed at various centres from March 5 to 19 for Census '85. Central Statistical Service does not say how much it is paying, but if current pay scales in the public sector are anything to go by, the cash should not be bad. Enumerators will be appointed before the end of January, so apply now. There are 50 regional offices and applicants of all races should apply to a census office. [Text] [Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 13]

KHAYELITSHA HOUSES--One house will be completed every eight minutes when building reaches its peak at the Khayelitsha township near Cape Town. About 30,000 houses will be built, and 5,000 are expected to be finished by March. Site architect Peter Derby, of VZS design consortium, says this scale of operation is seldom undertaken at this speed when compared with projects elsewhere in the world. [Text] [Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 7]

LIVING STANDARDS--If you are what might be loosely called a Wasp--white Anglo-Saxon Protestant--you have probably been less affected by the ravages of the recession, the credit squeeze and retrenchments. An Omnichek poll conducted by Cape Town-based Research Surveys shows that white English-speaking people weathered 1984 better than most other groups. The poll shows that the living standards of 61 percent of English-speaking housewives have not fallen in the past year compared with 36 percent who believe they have. Of the Afrikaans-speaking respondents, 43 percent say they are worse off than last year and only 51 percent are not. Blacks are the worst affected--especially those aged over 50 years. A total of 59 percent say times are tougher and only 33 percent say they are not. As a group, 39 percent of whites are feeling the pinch and 56 percent remain unaffected. Surprisingly in a survey of this nature, there are many don't knows. In contrast, it appears that Afrikaans-speakers have more faith in the Government than the Wasps. A total of 53 percent of Afrikaners believe the authorities will be able to improve the economy, but only 40 percent of English-speakers share this faith. Not surprisingly, a mere 25 percent of blacks voted yes to this question. [By Don Robertson] [Text] [Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 3]

LUCKHOFF TOWNSHIP ABOLISHED--The black residential area in the south-western Free State town of Luckhoff has been "abolished." This is declared by notice in the Government Gazette in the name of Mr Sam de Beer, Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Education, in terms of the Black Community Development Act of 1984. In June this year the SUNDAY EXPRESS reported that more than half the 94 black families living in the village had been moved 240 km to the sprawling resettlement camp of Onverwacht, 64 km from Bloemfontein. Many said they had moved unwillingly and those who were still at Luckhoff said they did not want to leave what had been their home for generations but feared they would be forced to do so. This was denied by Mr Hennie Kriel, Chief Commissioner of Co-operation and Development for the Free State. Those who want to stay can do so, said Mr Kriel. And anyone who wanted to move back could do so. The effect of the gazette notice "abolishing" Luckhoff is to make it illegal for black people to live there without the permission of the local development board. If they don't move "voluntarily" they face forced removal by the police. [Text] [Johannesburg SUNDAY EXPRESS in English 2 Dec 84 p 5]

FINNISH GROUP--The R2-billion Valmet Corporation has opened in South Africa after commissioning of a multi-million rand automation system for Mondi's Richards Bay pulp plant. Valmet, a Finnish-based group, has interests in shipbuilding, paper machinery, defence equipment, transport and tractors. Its South African activities will be confined to the sale and installation of automation systems based on microprocessor technology. It will be called Valmet Automation. Valmet will take on groups like Honeywell and Siemens in the automation control industry, which is worth a conservative R300-million annually. The company's involvement in the South African market started two years ago with the Mondi contract in conjunction with its agent. [Text] [Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 9]

TRANSKEI TELECOMMUNICATIONS--Butterworth--The Transkeian government is negotiating loans with the Development Bank of Southern Africa to fund a new development phase in its telecommunications services. Speaking at the opening

of a new electro-mechanical telephone exchange in Butterworth at the weekend, the Prime Minister, Chief George Matanzima, said his government had identified the need for the first digital electronic exchange in Transkei, with an initial capacity of 1,500 subscribers, to be installed instead of shifting the existing containerised exchange. Chief Matanzima said that with the sophistication of modern technology and the fact that Transkei should also keep abreast of developments in the field of telecommunications, "our postal administration could not see its way clear to increasing the exchange capacity of Butterworth with a similar containerised pentex, which is not compatible with world-renowned digital electronic exchanges. It is common knowledge that our automatic exchanges in Umtata and Butterworth have been closed for new connections due to lack of indicators. This aspect has been taken into account in the government's first five-year plan, which proposes to add extensions to Umtata and Butterworth by installing the latest digital electronic exchanges and augmenting their capacities each year with an initial 1,000 subscribers," he said. A containerised digital electronic exchange was also planned for Lusikisiki, in eastern Pondoland.--Sapa. [Text] [Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 4 Dec 84 p 12]

CSO: 3400/318

BRIEFS

EPSILON TRAINERS--General Eyadema signed a contract with Aerospatiale (France) concerning the purchase of three armed versions of the Epsilon trainer aircraft for the Air Force of Togo. General Eyadema, President of the Republic and Chief of Staff of the armed forces, plans to have the air force employ these aircraft for basic training and for keeping pilots in form. This is the first export order for the Epsilon. The French Air Force has already ordered 150 of them as non-armed basic trainers. The Epsilon has been designed by the Aircraft Division of Aerospatiale and is manufactured by SOCATA, its subsidiary for light aircraft. The aircraft was demonstrated in the trainer and armed versions in eight African countries including Togo, during a tour which took place from March 12 to April 23, 1984. [Text] [Paris AFRICAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Nov 84 p 16]

AIRCRAFT SOLD--The Air Force has sold its five Fouga Magister trainer aircraft, powered by the Marbori VI engine. [Text] [Paris AFRICAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Nov 84 p 16]

CSO: 3400/335

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

NCNA OFFICIAL ENDS VISIT--Kinshasa, 7 Dec (AZAP)--Mu Qing, NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY [NCNA] managing director, left Kinshasa yesterday for Abidjan, Ivory Coast, at the end of a visit of a few days to the Zairian capital where he attended the ceremony marking Marshal Mobutu's inauguration. Expressing his impressions to the press, Mr Qing said he was particularly impressed by the great atmosphere which prevailed over Mobutu's swearing-in ceremony and stated that this showed to the whole world the indissoluble bond existing between Marshal Mobutu and his people, adding that he was honored by the audience which the leader Mobutu granted him. [Excerpt] [Kinshasa AZAP in French 0937 GMT 8 Dec 84 AB]

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